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Medical Anthropology in Tarragona
Medical anthropology at the Universitat Rovira i Virgili (until 1991, the University of Barcelona 
at Tarragona) has a history going back more than 30 years. 
In 1981, the first medical anthropology course in Spain was offered here as part of the under-
graduate degree program in anthropology; in 1984, a medical anthropology course was offe-
red here for the first time in a Spanish university as part of the degree program in nursing; and 
in 1986, medical anthropology became part of a Ph.D. program here for the first time in a 
Spanish university. A required course in medical anthropology has been part of the URV un-
dergraduate program in social anthropology since 1993, and will remain so until this program 
is phased out in 2016. 
In 1982, the first medical anthropology symposium in Spain (Primeres Jornades d’Antropolo-
gia de la Medicina) was held in Tarragona. It was an international event and marked the 
formal founding of the specialty in this country.
Between 1988 and 1994, medical anthropologists in Tarragona organized an interdepartmen-
tal Ph.D. program in social sciences and health (Ciències Socials i Salut) jointly with the Uni-
versity of Barcelona’s Department of Sociology.
A master’s degree program in medical anthropology was offered at URV between 1994 and 
2000, and a Ph.D. program in medical anthropology between 1998 and 2007.
In 2005, with the so-called Bologna reform of European universities and related changes in 
the Spanish legislation governing universities, the current two-year master’s degree program 
in medical anthropology and international health (Màster en Antropologia Mèdica i Salut Inter-
nacional) was initiated. A year later, this focus became a priority research line of the depart-
ment’s Ph.D. program in anthropology (2006-2013). In 2013, this Ph.D. was transformed into 
a new doctoral program in anthropology and communication with two priority research lines: 
medical anthropology and global health, and risk and communication.
The students enrolled in these programs come not only from Catalonia and elsewhere in 
Spain, but also from other European Union countries and Latin America.
Between 1996 and 2013, 74 doctoral dissertations in medical anthropology were defended 
at URV, 23 of them by foreign students.
The Department of Anthropology, Philosophy and Social Work, founded at the same time as 
the Universitat Rovira i Virgili in 1991, has medical anthropology as one of its hallmarks both 
in Spain and abroad. During the summer of 2013, URV will create an interdisciplinary Medical 
Anthropology Research Center (Centre de Recerca en Antropologia Mèdica) with the partici-
pation of medical anthropologists and researchers from other departments: Nursing, Commu-
nication Studies, Sociology, History, and Medical Sciences.
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The multiplication of diagnoses, the seepage of diagnostic language into 
popular culture and the media, the rise of self-diagnosis and the world wide 
web, all position diagnosis as an important social phenomenon to which 
anthropology, sociology, and their cognate disciplines must pay particular 
attention. In order to understand the health goals to which individuals 
and communities aspire, it is important to know the place that diagnosis 
plays in understanding health and illness. In order to determine what 
conditions are of particular public concern, it is also vital to know how 
those conditions are conceptualised, categorised, and indeed, diagnosed.
Whether it is fibromyalgia, gout, or obesity, each diagnosis is testimony 
to a particular way of seeing the world and understanding disease. 
Fibromyalgia, for example, is, as I write these words, a symptom-based 
diagnosis, established in the presence of a certain number of symptoms 
assembled in indicative ways. But, at the same time, it is a diagnosis 
which lacks legitimacy in the eyes of many, for the absence of biological 
markers providing so-called objective confirmation. This is why clinical 
researchers, and notably geneticists, are frenetically trying to discern a 
profile, be it genetic or biologic, which can explain this baffling condition.
Gout is also determinant, but in other ways. It has biological 
markers, so its existence is not in doubt, but its causes and location raise 
questions. Does the problem of uric acid build-up in the joints belong to 
rheumatology, endocrinology or nephrology? Is it a disease of decadence, 
or one of poverty? 
Obesity, on the other hand, says much about who we are, and what a 
society should look like. In the neo-liberal context of responsibilisation, 
obesity, like gout, makes social statements about the large body, 
stigmatising at the same time as it rings alarm bells about the society in 
which the large individual is situated. The health of a nation is measured 
in BMI, with rising obesity touted as an alarming trend. 
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All three of these examples occupy slightly different social and cultural 
spaces, but wrestle, as do the case studies provided in Diagnostic fluidity: 
working with uncertainty and mutability, with the themes captured in the 
up-coming chapters: tension, negotiation and power. These themes both 
influence, and are influenced by diagnosis, yet often remain unelucidated, 
invisible, in need of exposure. 
Diagnoses are not simply names. They shape the way we think of 
disease, and they determine our public actions. They are both categories 
and processes —a diagnosis is the classification tool, at the same time as it is 
the means by which the classification is conferred upon an individual. That 
diagnosis is both category and process means that the consideration I call 
for in the opening paragraph must think broadly about how a diagnosis is 
arrived upon, whose interests are served by particular configurations and 
symptom arrays, and whose are silenced. As Thomas Arnold, head master 
of Rugby School, in England, wrote in the great age of classification, “We 
are not to suppose that there are only a certain number of divisions in 
any subject, and that unless we follow these, we shall divide it wrongly 
and unsuccessfully: on the contrary every subject is as it were all joints, 
it will divide wherever we choose to strike it, and therefore according to 
our particular object at different times we shall see fit to divide it very 
differently” (Arnold, 1839).
Arnold spoke these words before the theory of social construction 
had been developed, yet they presage important precepts of contemporary 
social and cultural theory. These words should give pause to the medical 
anthropologist or sociologist whose research can be just as often critical 
of, as it is useful to, the contemporary practice of medicine. What Arnold 
highlights in the quaint language of yesteryear is not that things are simply 
imagined and have no substantive content. They are “real” in material 
and tangible ways. However, their labels, and how they are understood 
is determined by the institutions that negotiate them, by the place they 
assume in the cultural landscape. Institutions and culture then determine 
to a great degree how we approach the materiality of everyday life.
If we extend this to diagnosis, it highlights the fact that even while 
disease and dysfunction are real, material challenges, diagnosis is separate 
from —yet of course, related to— human suffering. Diagnosis is the social 
action related to disease. It is in its pursuit, often, that the lay person will 
enter the world of medicine. It is also the way in which medicine decides 
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what matters, both taxonomically and clinically. But finally, it is how 
symptoms are explained, resources are allocated, the future is predicted, 
behaviours are legitimised, and people make sense of their dysfunction. 
Diagnosis does more than just determine how diseases are organised, 
it organises medicine as well, determining what conditions are seen by 
which specialists, and which specialists have the most status and prestige. 
It serves a didactic purpose: students learn diagnosis and study diagnostic 
manuals. Despite these important social functions, diagnosis has only 
recently come to the attention of scholars as a social or cultural object. 
It has been consistently seen as a simple label of mainly uncontroversial 
disorders, rather than as a highly-complex process involving hierarchies, 
interests, paradigms and power.
And, even as diagnosis has started to surface as a topic of interest 
to social and cultural scholars, it has often done so in the context of 
particular diagnoses, or of particular disorders. Calls surface in academia 
for attention to be paid to a particular diagnosis, citing the specific and 
particular contexts in which this diagnosis is experienced, its unequal 
distribution, its consequences on its sufferers. Less frequent are those calls 
to consider diagnosis in a more general sense, of which this diagnosis, or 
that diagnosis, is simply a poignant example amongst many.
The Medical Anthropology at Home conference, held in Tromsø, 
Norway, in June 2016, which was the starting point for Diagnostic 
fluidity: working with uncertainty and mutability, moved forward towards 
considering the more general import of diagnosis. Nina Nissen and Mette 
Bech Risør have pulled together in this volume a collection which should 
take an important early step in considering the broader implications of 
diagnosis in culture and of culture in diagnosis. 
In its pages, one will find important concepts which capture the 
way diagnosis is either practiced or understood. There are the tensions 
in diagnostic work. These can be between patient and doctor, between 
specialists. They are related to the nature of the diagnosis, and the degree 
to which it legitimises or explains dysfunction; the resources to which it 
gives access; the stigma with which it might be associated. But these are 
also related to the patient group. To be positioned culturally in a different 
place than one’s doctor creates other kinds of tensions, not all of which 
result in optimal care, or optimal diagnosis.
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At the same time, these tensions give rise to different forms of 
negotiation, particularly in the presence of uncertainty, and power. The 
authority to name and label confers the labeller with extensive power: to 
decide who is normal and who is not, to determine what counts as sick and 
what counts as mad. When the label itself is linked variably to resources 
and legitimisation, or to stigma and rejection, the negotiation of power 
has more gravitas. How does diagnosis cement a particular organisation 
of power? Of care? What tensions are present in the diagnostic process, 
and what are the work-arounds implemented by lay person as well as 
by clinician? How do social class, gender, context, and culture shape, or 
indeed, diffuse, these tensions; change the configurations of power? 
In this context, the book Diagnostic fluidity: working with uncertainty 
and mutability does the important work of locating diagnosis in different 
cultures, in different settings, and in different conditions. In so doing, it 
provides a way of thinking more generally about diagnosis and its role in 
understanding health, illness and disease. 
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Diagnoses are inherently social realities, linking the individual and the 
social system, while also being actors that “configure and reconfigure the 
lives of real men and women” (Rosenberg, 2002: 250). Considering the 
abundance of stories, studies and projects on diagnosis from the social 
sciences to social media, one could argue that nowadays almost any 
person in a high income society seems to juggle, use, be concerned about 
and engaged in diagnostic processes, and in so doing draws on a diagnosis 
(or diagnoses) as a compass for how to organize and perceive his/her 
life, health and body. In a medical sense, diagnoses are overall confined 
to classificatory terms, but the ways that patients perceive diagnoses and 
make them meaningful transform them into individual illness explanations 
and socially adaptable frameworks. One may consider, for example, the 
patients (most often women) who receive a diagnosis of chronic fatigue 
syndrome and struggle to find social acceptance (Sachs, 2016); the 
gendered differences in the experiences of a diagnosis of Multiple Sclerosis 
and associated sense-making processes (Frost, Grose & Britten, 2017); 
patients’ experiences of receiving a cancer diagnosis (e.g. Tobin & Begley, 
2008; Johnsson, Aus & Berterö, 2009; Edmondson, Birtwistle, 
Catto et alii, 2017); and studies on risk assessment, such as coming to 
terms with screening results indicating prenatal diagnoses that are severe 
or fatal (Lou, Jensen, Petersen et alii, 2017). Diagnosis pervades and 
expands into numerous areas of life, and as Rosenberg (2002) argues, 
the tyranny and prominence of diagnosis has increased despite a strong 
distinction between disease entities and unique manifestations of illness 
in particular men and women. 
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This increase has prompted researchers to discuss whether the 
proliferation of diagnoses is real and how it may be judged as real. 
Suggesting the notion of “diagnostic culture”, Brinkmann (2010), for 
example, asks whether there is indeed a growth in ill health, or whether 
the proliferation of diagnoses, supported by new diagnostic practices 
and technologies, reflects a tendency to pathologize certain behaviors 
as disease. Irrespective of the explanatory framework, disease categories 
have always linked knowledge and practice, and have long been used to 
determine, modify and exert designation, prognosis and treatment through 
medical authority. But the separation of place and person from disease, 
that is, the idea that disease mechanisms exist somehow outside the body, 
is more recent (Rosenberg, 2002). This development is supported by the 
standardization of a nosology that aligns with innovations in technology 
and shifting bureaucratic structures and practices, making further in-
roads towards a supposedly value-free biomedicine that exerts increasing 
influence on perceptions of what a disease is and how diagnoses prosper. 
This anthology brings together a selection of papers that were 
presented at the IX biennial Medical Anthropology At Home (MAAH) 
conference, entitled Configurations of Diagnostic Processes, Practices and 
Evidence, held in Tromsø in Northern Norway from June 2nd-5th 2016 
under the auspices of UiT, The Arctic University of Norway. 
We, the conference organizers, saw a need to critically engage with 
and analyze the configurations of diagnostic processes, practices and 
evidence, given the ongoing medical developments and the concurrent 
changing social realities for patients, relatives, healthcare professionals 
and others. The aim of the conference was to critically explore the many 
dimensions of diagnosis, its functions and consequences, and to uncover 
the centrality of diagnosis for research in medical anthropology and diverse 
forms of medicine. The conference addressed four interrelated themes: a) 
Symptoms and diagnoses, b) Diagnoses and biopower, c) The enactment 
and becoming of a diagnosis within medicine, and d) Intersubjective 
experiences of diagnostic processes. We envisaged the conference to 
provide insights into existing and changing values, configurations, 
structures and contexts that surround and implicate diagnostic processes, 
practices and evidence, and in so doing to contribute towards rethinking 
empirical and conceptual phenomena on technology, regulations, power 
relations and the interactions of the many parties involved in defining and 
responding to diagnoses. 
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The papers presented at the conference covered a wide range of topics 
within these themes, and addressed both theoretical and methodological 
issues pertaining to studies of diagnostic work, categories, practices 
and processes. Salient in the many papers, and constituting the core of 
this collection, was the importance of spatial and temporal dimensions 
as well as a demonstration of the fluid and often unruly processes of 
diagnosis, both concerning classificatory work and the everyday practices 
when dealing with diagnoses. The emotional work and the performative 
and intersubjective practices especially were ongoing issues of the 
anthropological field studies presented, as will be shown in the chapters 
that follow. 
Several issues concerning diagnosis and diagnostic processes have 
been dealt with in anthropology and sociology. In this introduction, we 
do not mean to reiterate or synthesize these contributions; rather we 
wish to build on previous research to expand and complement ongoing 
developments. We thus see this introduction as a contemplation on 
diagnostic issues emerging from these contributions and our reading of 
them. What follows below are reflections on diagnosis as both category and 
process, on debates that concern the concept of risk and of medicalization, 
and on the pervasive impression from the papers of seeing diagnoses 
as fluid, being worked on and able to invoke emotional dimensions of 
intersubjective relations. 
Process within classification and framing
Notions of subjectivity, intersubjectivity and diagnostic process within and 
beyond clinical settings are key to this collection. In one way, diagnosis is 
both a category and a process (Blaxter 1978; Jutel & Nettleton 2011). 
This distinction provides a useful analytical perspective, bearing in mind 
that diagnosis in real life encompasses a combination of both category and 
process, and the separation of the two may obscure important aspects of 
diagnosis. 
Diagnosis as category often refers to classification structures and 
nosology, exemplified by international classification systems such as 
DSM V (Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders), ICD 
10 (International Classification of Diseases) and ICPC (International 
Classification of Primary Care). In principle, diagnostic categories 
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work as vehicles to capture a person’s distress and align this to existing 
nomenclatures of disease. Categories therefore are an attempt to arrange 
diseases in specific groups according to clear boundaries. The history of 
how classification systems have developed is long and shifting, pointing to 
changes in epistemology, causation and the sociopolitics of health.
Several researchers have scrutinized the aims and principles 
of classification. Jutel (2011a), for example, identified two major 
trajectories in medical classification, the statistical and the nosological, 
and links these to their social embeddedness. This highlights the way in 
which the establishment of a classification is modulated by social, political 
and technological factors, whereby “classifications give voice to certain 
perspectives and silence others” (Bowker & Star, 1999, paraphrased by 
Jutel 2011a: 198). 
Drawing on medical history, Armstrong has demonstrated how 
nosology in primary care has changed according to the problems presented 
by patients. The ICD system originally classified illness according to 
pathological types and causes of death. However when attributed to 
illness patterns and symptoms in general practice, health problems and 
symptom presentations did not seem to fit the pathological classifications 
and a new system was developed, the ICPC (Armstrong, 2011). 
Armstrong’s point of this observation is that: “Major changes in medical 
classification demonstrate that there are no diseases waiting in nature 
to be discovered; there are no diagnoses which capture an immutable 
illness state. Diseases and diagnoses only become apparent through the 
contemporary classifications systems” (ibid.: 806). Rosenberg (2006) 
points to another aspect of medical history and shows how the attempt to 
legitimate behavioral ills in psychiatry is dominated by a search for somatic 
mechanisms, a reductionism which defines specific disease entities and 
thus creates a specificity of diseases with consequences for psychiatry 
as discipline. Ultimately, disease categories are about classification, of 
suffering but also of ourselves. The examples illustrate that the medical 
reality created through classification has a history that follows the social 
and cultural developments of society as much as developments and 
processes in medicine (Armstrong, 2011). Josep Comelles & Susan 
DiGiacomo (Chapter 9) contribute to these debates. With an emphasis 
on the cultural context of classification history, they guide us through 
the development of historical concepts of diseases. The authors connect 
nosology and classification systems with the very practices of doctoring 
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across rural Europe and in overseas colonies, presenting early attempts 
to systematize what was observed and learnt from peoples’ local illness 
presentations. From an emic gaze, we gain a vivid and differently angled 
story of how doctors developed terminology ranging from “ethnic 
pathology”, “folk medicine”, and “culture-bound syndromes” to “medical 
concerns”. The authors argue that “medical diagnosis is no longer based 
exclusively on responding to illness but increasingly on responding 
to medical concerns,” and that this contemporary folk nosology has 
impacted already on both medical constructs and medical anthropology. 
Such historically detailed and empirical accounts of local disease nosology 
make an important addition to other, more classic presentations of disease 
categorization.
Inevitably, an emphasis on the historical development of a diagnosis 
and disease nosology leads to considerations of diagnosis as a process. 
Processes of diagnosis include any activity surrounding investigations, 
assessments and negotiations pertaining to clinical and non-clinical 
judgments of ill health. Different actors with their skills, experiences 
and sensing bodies are involved in these processes, in conjunction with 
technology and instruments of measurement. Studies of such processes 
have explored the enactment and the making of a diagnosis with particular 
focus on subtle intersubjective processes between health professionals 
and patients (Büscher, Goodwin & Mesman, 2010; Gardner, Dew, 
Stubbe et alii 2011; Mol, 2002). For instance, Allan Young, in his seminal 
study The Harmony of Illusions. Inventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(Young, 1995), critically scrutinizes how a specific disorder is made and 
has come to encompass certain disorders and symptoms. He describes the 
practices, technologies and narratives that support the proliferation of the 
diagnosis of PTSD (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder) and demonstrates 
how it acquires facticity. 
More recently, in an anthology entitled Ethnographies of Diagnostic 
Work. Dimensions of Transformative Practice (Büscher, Goodwin & 
Mesman, 2010), the editors and authors depart from an understanding 
of diagnosis as predominantly associated with health care situations, and 
extend diagnosis to a broad spectrum of spaces and practices of deciphering 
and enacting situations that call on both professional and mundane 
judgments, sense-making, assessment and action. To substantiate the 
argument, the contributions in this volume range from explorations of 
prison officers reading prisoners’ behavior, call centre workers trying 
16
Mette Bech Risør & Nina Nissen
to troubleshoot problems of technological devices, and the evaluation 
of videoelectroencephalography used for assessing epileptic seizures or 
pseudoseizures. In challenging the conventional boundaries and use of 
the term diagnosis, the authors move from a focus on diagnosis as such 
to diagnostic work as a collaborative social and technological process, 
to understand how this work is done and to present the transformative 
potential of such analyses. This offers an inspiring and transgressive input 
to the making of a diagnosis, which is deeply anchored in the subtle 
practices of assessment while moving beyond linear cognitive notions of 
rationality. In addition, these studies take into account space, setting and 
the transformative role of instruments and other non-human factors as 
pertaining to the process of diagnosis rather than existing outside it. 
Other studies point to the negotiation of what constitutes a diagnosis, 
how it is evidenced and how the evidence is interpreted. This is illustrated 
in a study of prenatal screening results (Lou, Nielsen, Hvidman et alii, 
2015), where diagnosis is not a fixed category, but involves multiple fluid 
processes of knowledge production and results in varied consequences for 
the diagnosed. The consequences of a diagnosis may also pertain to those 
who are not (yet) diagnosed or are “in the waiting”, including parents 
whose newborn babies are genetically screened or tested (Timmermans 
& Buchbinder, 2010). The processing of diagnoses, in other words, takes 
place and continues both within and beyond clinics, for example when 
screening may bring muddy results, placing a person between health and 
disease with a specific social significance in terms of, for example, illness 
trajectory. 
In this anthology, we are primarily concerned with the processes 
surrounding diagnoses, with diagnostic work and the making of a 
diagnosis. Thus, explorations of diagnostic processes predominate in the 
chapters that follow, both methodologically and theoretically. Although 
one can speak of classification systems as objective standards, void of 
temporality and space, it is only when enacting these standards that they 
become meaningful, disputed or ambiguous, and open to scrutiny. With 
Jutel & Nettleton we may say: “Diagnosis serves thus as an analytic 
device that can explore the way classifications and labels are constructed, 
framed and enacted” (2011: 798). Critical examinations of these processes 
are therefore central to this anthology, and we wish to emphasize how 
individuals, patients, relatives, and health professionals participate in 
the activity of processing diagnosis, with the diverse trajectories and 
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consequences such engagement may have for each actor. Diagnosis as an 
epitome or imaginary of illness and disease could be said to be the point 
of contact between medical anthropology and (bio)medicine – where 
both disciplines contribute to discussions of diagnosis and diagnostic 
processes, practices and work from different perspectives.
By adopting a process-oriented approach, we move beyond a strictly 
structural approach and the social constructionism found in several 
earlier studies (e.g. Aronowitz, 2001; Brown, 1995; Lock & kaufert, 
2001; Rapp, 1993; Young, 1980). We seek to highlight the processes of 
intersubjectivity surrounding diagnostic activities. We see a possibility 
for further theoretical development and a deeper understanding of re/
actions, emotions and roads taken by the actors involved in diagnostic 
processes. At the same time, we attend to the space and temporality of 
negotiations as influential dimensions, thus building on previously 
documented cultural, social and medical mechanisms of diagnostics. 
In this way, social framing remains a key concept underpinning this 
anthology. However, the contributions mainly present how people frame 
or enact their dealings with diagnosis, more than they show how people 
are passively framed. As Jutel says, “diagnoses are not prior, ontological 
entities but social categories that organize, direct, explain, and sometimes 
control our experience of health and illness” (2011b: 34). Our interest lies 
in what this “direction, control and explanation” consists of, and how such 
an interest may evoke the subtleties of immediacy and simultaneousness 
in a diagnostic process and look to the capacities of framing and directing 
hopes, wishes and intentions not only of professionals but also of those 
being diagnosed or affected by a diagnosis. 
Anthropological and ethnographic studies on health and illness 
certainly address diagnostic processes as a core issue, but this attention 
can circumscribe analyses of doctor-patient relationships, illness 
experiences and the production of medical knowledge. Diagnosis per se 
and its enactment at the level of scientific production of diagnosis and 
at the level of clinical interaction, professional performance or the self-
diagnosis in everyday life, are less often seen. Exceptions of course exist, 
such as early deconstructionist analyses of the procedures and styles of 
reasoning which underpin the establishment of the menopause as a 
medical diagnosis (Lock & kaufert, 2001), and the detailed ethnography 
of hospital clinical performance when “doing disease”, for example, in the 
case of atherosclerosis (Mol, 2002). 
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More recently, some medical anthropologists have explicitly taken 
up the critical examination of diagnosis, with the aim to “look beyond 
social issues and clinical challenges” (Smith-Morris, 2015). With a 
focus on diagnostic conflicts, Smith-Morris and colleagues present 
a meta-analysis of diagnosis in terms of patterns, designs, impacts and 
structures of authority, in an anthology entitled Diagnostic Controversy. 
Cultural Perspectives on Competing Knowledge in Healthcare (2016). This 
focus is substantiated by in-depth ethnographic explorations of the many 
ways in which social factors in diagnosis interact and produce broader 
issues, including processes of medicalization and resistance, and the 
transforming and transformative position of diagnosis for 21st century 
global health. The authors brought together in this anthology question 
specific diagnoses (such as Parkinson’s disease, andropause, psychosis), 
and scrutinize the structural and epistemological elements behind the 
naming and experience of a disease. Thus, the shared impact of a diagnostic 
event unifies the discussions in this volume, while also capturing some of 
its complexity and controversy in real-world settings. In this way, Smith-
Morris and colleagues allow the critical study of biomedical praxis to 
emerge, contributing a coherent and thought-provoking critique of the 
process and wider implications of diagnosis. 
In the specific field of medically unexplained symptoms, the lack of 
a diagnosis has prompted scholars from different academic backgrounds 
to examine diagnostic issues and their consequences (Dumit, 2006; 
Karterud, Risør & Haavet, 2015; Risør, 2009). This fundamental 
questioning and the workings of a diagnosis, whether named or not, are 
also explored in studies of chronic fatigue syndrome and Lyme’s disease in 
the above-mentioned anthology (Davis & Nichter, 2016; Sachs, 2016). 
These and several other studies produce new entrances to investigating 
diagnostic processes and stimulating theoretical reflections that may be 
applied to other fields of diagnostic work, not merely where diagnoses are 
absent or contested. 
We perceive the examination of diagnostic processes as a window to 
exploring, for example, the often medically defined boundaries of social 
life and health where several actors participate and disciplines intersect, 
thus showing the diverse ways in which subjectivity, intersubjectivity and 
diagnostic processes are mediated and configured. Here, the contestations, 
enactments, extensions and changes of diagnoses surrounding the multiple 
perspectives invested in these negotiations come to the fore.
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Diagnoses under the auspices of biopolitics and risk technology
A diagnostic development that seems to stem from the more frequent 
and increasing specificity of diagnosing via technological and scientific 
achievements (Rosenberg, 2006) is the focus on pre-illness states and the 
fine differentiation of particular diseases. Surveillance technology, testing 
and genetic and molecular profiling has directed attention to the huge 
numbers of at-risk factors for otherwise healthy people, shaping the lives 
of those affected as well as transforming what counts as disease (Jutel, 
2011b). Not only does the surveillance and detection of at-risk conditions 
configure the illness trajectories of people at risk for heart disease, diabetes 
or cancer, but new diagnoses enter the stage through complex blood tests, 
genetic testing, and biomarkers that establish novel disease scenarios, such 
as pre-diabetes. This is made possible by technological innovations aimed 
at disease prevention, technologies which are embedded in the paradigm 
of evidence-based medicine with its emphasis on biology and biopolitics 
(Rose, 2007). This embeddedness impacts on everyday living, making 
us seemingly willing to explore and receive the technology offered by 
biomedicine. For instance, we follow calls for screening and we undergo 
genetic tests, sometimes deliberately, sometimes merely out of fear, or at 
times based on the rationale that “I better do it, because if..…” (Lou, Dahl, 
Risør et alii, 2007). The focus on symptoms and the general context of risk 
discourses related to the abundance of screening programs, testing and 
use of technology are modes of creating diagnostic evidence that medical 
anthropologists often study critically. Some medical specialties such as 
family medicine and community medicine too have recently begun to 
focus on overdiagnosis as a central phenomenon. Overall, these positions 
critically view the volume of biodata that govern ordinary people’s lives 
through self-monitoring via counting, weighing and numbering. They 
also consider technology to enable diagnosis through the increasing use 
of testing and regard the excessively widened disease definitions as key 
contributors to a culture of diagnosis and pathologization. 
Similarly, but arguing from a more discursive position for a “somatic 
ethics” that governs bodies and lives, Nikolas Rose’s (2007) work is 
central to an understanding of disease in terms of biopolitics. According 
to Rose, we interpret our lives based on an understanding of bodies as 
biological entities. This basic orientation relates to a dominant discourse 
of molecules and biomarkers and to the optimization of lives (not only 
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the treatment of diseases) through, for example, the monitoring of bodies. 
In turn, this prompts the proliferation of professionals with somatic 
expertise. Rose’s arguments sustain the idea that biomedicine contributes 
to pathologization (cf. Brinkmann, 2010), while also making it possible 
to see the part played by multiple actors in this process, including the 
pharmacoindustry, patients, and patient organizations. Notably, the 
ways in which complex diagnostic processes configure new subjectivities 
under the influence of biopolitical bureaucracy also take place at a more 
individual and practice-oriented level (Andersen & Vedsted, 2015). 
Technology not only frames new types of diseases; it also differentiates 
diseases like breast cancer into new layers of specificity, according to 
tissue, tumor size or gene expression (Jutel, 2011b). Risk detection, the 
increase of disease specificity and new diagnoses are expansions of the 
biomedical regime and knowledge approaches related to processes of 
medicalization. According to Peter Conrad “‘medicalization’ describes a 
process by which nonmedical problems become defined and treated as 
medical problems, usually in terms of illness and disorders” (Conrad, 
2007:4). Medicalization however can comprise more than these processes, 
as detailed above. It can encompass diagnostic fine-tuning and its 
impact on the persons being examined, permeating the lives of people 
and their understanding of health and disease. Biomedicine considers 
many individuals to be at the edge of a disease and at risk; many are pre-
diagnosed or being given test results in a grey zone. New technologies, 
biomarkers and the ability or wish to know and map our bodies play a 
decisive role in diagnostic work and processes. Once the specificity of 
discerning bodily malfunction increases, it is likely that more “patients in 
the waiting” will be produced (Timmermans & Buchbinder, 2010). 
As stated by Aronowitz (2009), medicalization has expanded 
due to transformations in the labeling and the production of ill health. 
Aronowitz considers chronic disease to be a special case when compared 
to individuals with an “at risk for” disease, arguing that the experience 
of chronic disease and its management resembles the experience of 
being at risk (ibid.). People living with chronic disease, he suggests, are 
exposed to the same risk approach composed of preventive measures 
used for supposedly healthy people – for example the adoption of new 
clinical interventions that change the natural history of disease, greater 
knowledge of risk for the already chronically ill, and larger and more 
intensive screening programs and testing. This has led to the emergence 
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of new types of biomedical disease management but also to an increasing 
attention and experience by the chronically ill towards surveillance and 
their often highly professional understanding of elaborate laboratory 
tests and the reading and interpretation of symptoms. Such processes 
form part of the ongoing diagnostic work, at the levels of both scientific 
achievements and in everyday life —making looping effects from one to 
the other. 
However, nosological categories at work do not necessarily present 
as appropriate or compatible. Angel Martínez-Hernáez (Chapter 8) 
departs from a historical analysis of madness and asks why it is always 
associated with the social practices of movement and confinement. 
Through his reflections on madness as “ob-scene” we gain a glimpse into 
the life of Babu, a patient in a residential treatment centre for people with 
chronic psychosis. Martínez-Hernáez elaborates, with inspiration 
from Geertz’s (1983) notion of common sense as a cultural system, how 
madness defies common sense rather than reason. This again permeates 
treatment approaches trying to domesticate patients and, notably, 
reducing social dialogue since madness is refractory and denied any social 
use. In attending to the power of societal values on the conceptualization 
of disease, and the impact this may have on objectifying human suffering, 
Martínez-Hernáez adds to the critical examinations of a specific 
process of medicalization. 
Expanding how to think about and conceptualize such processes, both 
for people who are chronically ill and those who are not yet ill, the term 
biomedicalization encapsulates an extra dimension: “…the increasingly 
complex, multisited, multidirectional processes of medicalization that 
today are being both extended and reconstituted through the emergent 
social forms and practices of a highly and increasingly technoscientific 
biomedicine” (Clarke, Shim, Mamo et alii, 2003: 162). Despite 
these developments in biomedicine, we also witness processes of de-
medicalization as Sylvie Fainzang illustrates (Chapter 1). Fainzang 
offers an example of patient agency whereby a patient challenges the 
medical advice of his doctor and engages in personal diagnostic activity, 
over time and in interaction with the doctors involved in his care. Through 
a meticulous description of the patient and his health complaints as they 
developed over years, Fainzang analyzes the turns and deliberations 
made on medication and diagnosis by the patient, and focuses on how 
he decides to discontinue a specific medication, against the advice of the 
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doctor. The paper speaks to de-medicalization and discusses authority, risk 
and pharmacovigilance in a system of hegemonic biomedical discourses 
where knowledge, diagnosis and social positions are challenged by patient 
agency. This example complements, but also differs from, instances where 
the biomedical narrative and medical diagnosis do not resonate with the 
patient’s experience (Jutel, 2011b). 
Fluidity in diagnostic time and space
The focus and interest in diagnostic processes enables us to scrutinize 
what we perceive as fluidity in several modalities of diagnostic work. This 
fluidity is linked with the temporality and spatiality of multiple diagnostic 
processes, and belies the apparent stability of diagnostic categories. 
Medical categories are an attempt to grasp and pin down shifting illness 
phenomena, in order to manage and treat systematically. Yet, diagnostic 
categories are seldom stable, neither as facts nor in practice, whereby the 
variability of diagnoses is shaped by the various perspectives in the clinic 
and beyond. As Nettleton, Kitzinger & Kitzinger note, a “diagnostic 
illusory” captures “the ambiguities and nuanced complexities associated 
with the biomedical imperative to name and classify” (2014: 134). With the 
development of biomedicine and the growing blurring and convergence 
of disease and risk of disease (Aronowitz, 2009), diagnostic boundaries 
become increasingly more fluid and permeable. In this development, the 
power of diagnostic designation is promoted through ongoing efforts to 
classify increasingly minor and numerous bodily states as disease. At the 
same time, these efforts also ironically underscore the “diagnostic illusory”. 
The growing specificity also paradoxically introduces ambiguities and 
uncertainties into the clinical and practical settings where biomedical 
investigation takes place. On the one hand, this ambiguity seems to expand 
—scientifically and in particular clinical practices— while on the other 
hand, the stricter practice, management and bureaucratization of clinical 
investigations try to contain and limit its expansion. Rosenberg (2006) 
eloquently asserts that even though the boundaries of disease expand they 
also remain contested and ambiguous. The growing specificity, despite 
its advantage of mapping disease and shaping a tool for management of 
disease, will remain reductionist and inconsistent with the cultural work 
of diagnosing. 
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Fluidity also denotes that diagnostic work is an on-going process of 
trial and error where knowledge and action are intertwined in practice 
and are not merely the enactment of a linear logic following from pre-
set classifications or solutions (Moser, 2010). From the above outline of 
nomenclature and the link between category and process, it is tempting 
to stay within a conventional notion of information processing that 
accentuates the idea of diagnosing as logical, mostly cognitive individual 
steps. An almost archetypical image of this is the medical anamnesis 
that is depicted as a unidirectional, one-person process of gathering 
information upon which to base a decision, a diagnosis, of the patient’s 
problem. However, the chapters in this anthology move beyond this focus 
on skills, cognition and often context-free and temporally discrete views 
of diagnostic work. Rather, the authors recognize the complexity and 
ongoing dynamic of this work (Büscher, Goodwin & Mesman, 2010; 
Risør, 2017). They point to the many-layered negotiations in diagnostic 
work which expand the patient’s story and examination results through 
multiple perspectives, including patients’ and professionals’ medical 
knowledge and experience, the range of health personnel involved, 
routine practices, available technology, and bureaucratic structures. 
These, in collaboration, bring a diagnosis into being. Laurence Tessier 
(Chapter 4), attends particularly to how clinicians work with uncertainty 
and instability when diagnosing dementia. Drawing on fieldwork in a 
US Memory Clinic, she takes us through sequences of the medical team’s 
interactions and conversations with a patient, her partner, and among 
themselves to show how a diagnosis is made, how evidence is created and 
how epistemic difficulties are dealt with. Tessier asks how it is possible to 
reach a diagnosis based on very uncertain and even contradicting evidence 
and argues that “the burden of genetics” stands out as one criteria while 
the emotionally charged encounter between the clinic director and the 
patient provides another. In this encounter clues and signs of the person 
sustain a semiology that gives way to a “Gefühlsdiagnose” where feeling is 
an instrument and a mediator of diagnosis. Setting a diagnosis based on a 
mixture of interrelational work and a medical framework is also a theme 
in Mara Buchbinder’s analysis (2011) of the explanatory models used in 
a pain clinic for children in the US. To legitimize the patient’s suffering, 
the clinician uses neurobiological tropes to explain pain, but at the same 
time the clinician ties the patient’s suffering to her/his personality. The 
patients are smart kids and smartness may make neurobiological circuits 
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go faster and cause pain. “Being smart” is then employed by the clinician 
to involve the patient as capable of learning to make the pain disappear, 
thus engaging moral judgments of being a virtuous and capable person. In 
other words, a personality is cast while enacting the explanation/diagnosis, 
and at the same time a personhood diagnostics and a therapeutic resource 
are mobilized (Buchbinder, 2015). Embodied and relational work of 
diagnostics is also at the core where the reading and vigilant sensing of 
an aesthetized patient is shown to be essential to the work of anesthetists 
(Goodwin, 2010), as well as where the mutual configuration of patient-
body and clinician comes forward in an analysis of physiotherapy work 
emerging from a specific diagnostic space (Gardner & Wlliams, 2015). 
Medical practices do not simply discover, define and interpret 
diagnostic issues. They instead act upon them and by enacting them they 
also process them into being, differently in different spaces and situations 
with an impact on how they become and what their consequences are 
(Mol, 2002; Moser, 2010). As the above indicates, fluidity exists on 
several levels and becomes apparent in a number of ways. The mere 
involvement of people other than biomedical personnel in enacting 
diagnoses is one way of pointing to a re-understanding of the boundaries 
of a diagnosis. For example, parents, relatives, patient activists, and social 
networks are the main actors in all aspects of health where negotiations of 
diagnoses take place. Anna Witeska-Młynarczyk (Chapter 2) takes the 
example of ADHD (Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder), a contested 
and ambiguous diagnosis that invokes moral values, and shows how this 
diagnosis is undertaken in the familial context of one child. Situated in a 
Polish context, the author scrutinizes the interactions between the different 
family members, and between family members, teachers and psychiatrists 
to show the stances and positions of each person and the collaborative but 
not always uniform process of doing an ADHD diagnosis. 
Not only families engage as main protagonists in collaborative 
diagnostic work with relevant others. Health professionals too interact 
with a range of others within their professional contexts, as well as with 
the patient himself/herself or relatives in decisive ways. In addition, 
specific spaces and organizational contexts shape how doctors and 
nurses of different medical specialties arrive at a diagnosis, as explored 
by Torsten Risør (Chapter 7), who examines the diagnostic reasoning 
of hospital staff surrounding a patient in need of emergency care. Risør 
discusses the diagnostic work done by the intern, the attending nurses and 
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the patient as drawing on two different logics: the logic of pathology and 
an organizational logic. The latter is shown to overrule the former, and 
this observation provides not only a critical reflection on pathology as 
knowledge basis but also positions organizational logic as ubiquitous and 
necessary for diagnostic work. 
Sylvie Fortin, Annie Gauthier and Liliana Gomez Cardona 
(Chapter 3) also evoke different spaces and pathways to diagnosis and 
care. The authors explore how medically uncertain and indeterminate 
symptoms are understood in both migrant and non-migrant families 
and within biomedical spaces. Through the examination of children’s 
complaints of stomach pain and their care seeking (with their families), 
differences in explanatory models for stomach pain emerge. These direct 
the ways of handling children’s complaints within the family as a space of 
care and in the clinical encounters. The authors argue for a need to improve 
the quality of the clinical encounter and to take into account culturally 
vested modes of expression. Both the organization in emergency units and 
the pediatric clinics are spaces ripe with normativity, moral issues, social 
habits and cultural imaginaries that drive and influence medical decisions 
and diagnostic work. These examples also foreground the social inherent 
in any diagnostic work which in turn highlights the importance of the 
clinical space and how spaces of diagnostic work extend beyond the clinic. 
The fluidity illustrated in these studies highlights that the order of things 
is not predetermined. It denotes change, points to flows and interactions 
between and across actors, bodies, technologies, knowledge and practices 
in the context of time and space. Fluidity also points to the collaborative 
nature of diagnosing. Any of these dimensions are socially dense and 
socially informed. Hence, the social processes inherent in diagnostic work 
underscore interaction, intersubjectivity and relations. 
But what happens in these fluid practices and what are their 
consequences? Some contributors to this anthology specifically address 
how affect and/or emotion, used as analytic lenses to explore the fluidity 
associated with diagnostic processes, configure social relations and 
define diagnostic meaning-making. Previous anthropological work has 
been dedicated to the analysis of emotions, affect theory and possible 
differences between affect and emotion (Beatty, 2014; Lutz, 2017). 
One central strand in these discussions argues that emotions are “the 
very stuff of social relations” (Lutz, 2017: 183). Emotions are not private 
property or individuated, nor are they states that pertain to the inside or 
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outside of the body (Lutz, 2017; White, 1994); rather, emotional life 
is social life consisting of emotional communication and exchange. In 
this way, emotions are conceptualized as capable of being makers of the 
world, a social power and a response that constitutes any action based 
on knowledge, experience and cultural preferences, including diagnostic 
situations. Emotional discourses organize the moralities and politics of 
everyday life (Lutz, 2017), create social realities and direct social behavior. 
They carry moral implications in language and expression, and are thus 
more than merely culturally interpreted expressions. Particularly relevant 
for diagnostic work is the understanding that emotions are fundamentally 
relational and transpersonal. Emotions are embedded in interpersonal 
relations and actions and emerge in these, refer to them, and become 
meaningful in such relations while also having the power to constitute 
these relations qua emotional actions. 
The implications of genetic testing and the estimation of genetic 
risk for diagnostic meaning-making are central to the contribution from 
Bernhard Hadolt (Chapter 5) in his analysis of a genetic counseling 
consultation. Drawing on recent work on affect and emotion in the 
humanities and social sciences, Hadolt explores whether affectivities 
are a generative force for creating socialities and meaningful diagnostics. 
He proposes that “affect and emotion happen relationally between people 
as an intrinsic part of the social”, and that affect constitutes an integral 
part of the counseling interaction. This affectivity is further understood as 
“affective coordination” that relies on the understanding that affect creates 
affordances and opportunities to react, and so underlines the reciprocal 
coordination of affective responses. This coordination, Hadolt suggests, 
guides and performs certain diagnostic practices, favored by specific 
affective styles, affordances and knowledge claims, whereby “…feelings of 
hope and fear, strain and relief are ‘built into’ genetic counselling as social 
practice and hold together its doings and sayings” (ibid.). 
Marian Krawzcyk (Chapter 6) explores the diagnosis of total pain 
within palliative care and its impact on particular forms of care, while 
also addressing issues of emotion. Like Hadolt, Krawzcyk considers 
emotions to be intrinsic to social relations. In a detailed case study of 
a critically ill patient, total pain emerges as conducive to ordering both 
emotions and conduct towards a good death. At the same time, end of life 
management is often seen as “affective labor” through which patients and 
health carers collaboratively create and perform affective environments. 
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Krawzcyk argues that despite tensions, resistance and ambivalences 
in the very process of diagnosing total pain, the affective practices for 
resolving pain help patients and their relatives to find meaning and 
achieve emotional closure. 
In other words, diagnostic work, combined with affective labor 
or emotional work, creates realities and subjectivities. Processes of 
subjectivization are interwoven with the practices of doing diagnosis, 
with fluidity and permeability in the contexts of ambiguous scientific 
knowledge, enactments in clinical practice, and negotiations and 
enactments in everyday life. 
Drawing on the above inspiring rich debates involving and 
surrounding diagnosis, the following chapters showcase new directions 
and open up innovative perspectives to further understand, analyze and 
conceptualize diagnosis. This includes a detailed focus on diagnostic work 
and processes; an emphasis on social interactions - between professionals, 
between patients/relatives and between patient and professionals; and the 
integration of affect and emotion as central to the topic of diagnosis. The 
emerging patterns and fluidity of processes and practices identified in the 
chapters brought together here evoke scenes of diagnosis as contested 
and in-the-making, as well as informed, shaped and manipulated by 
permeable classificatory categories, where subjectivity, intersubjectivity 
and emotional work become central to the configurations and power of 
diagnosis. 
In the organization of the anthology, we have considered the spaces 
in which diagnostic work takes place. The chapters in Part 1: Tensions in 
everyday diagnostic work foreground the importance of domestic settings in 
individuals’ and families’ everyday diagnostic work, including the diverse 
sources of influence and information they draw on, and they interrogate 
the intersection of everyday diagnostic work with the diagnostic work 
dominant in the clinic. In doing so, the authors draw attention to the role 
of power and distributed knowledge. Part 2: Diagnostic negotiations in the 
clinic moves to diverse clinical settings. The chapters brought together 
here examine the ways in which diagnostic work is carried out and shaped 
in these different contexts, raising critical questions about the notion of 
evidence, the role of diagnostic technology, the significance of emotion 
and affect, and the implications of organizational structures to diagnostic 
processes. The chapters in Part 3: The power of changing diagnostic 
categories investigate nosological categories. By attending to the social 
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construction of diagnoses and the historical process of medicalization, 
these chapters highlight the existential meanings of diagnostic categories, 
and the significance of how nosology and its sociocultural sources have 
manifested across time and space. By making spatiality a guide to our 
reading of the chapters and other themes, we illustrate the decisive role 
of space, setting and knowledge context to making, performing, enacting, 
contesting, rejecting and living a diagnosis.
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A DEVIANT DIAGNOSIS? DOCTORS FACED 




Abstract: Based on a case of a “lay” diagnosis that questions a treatment 
and leads the patient to decide to cease taking it, this paper examines the 
patient’s protracted journey, the conditions in which he made the diagnosis, 
the reasons for his decision and the doctors’ reactions to this. This case 
study allows us to investigate the patient’s relationship with medical 
authority and to reflect on fundamental issues such as pharmacovigilance, 
demedicalisation and patient agency. 
Keywords: diagnosis, demedicalisation, medication, pharmacovigilance, 
patient agency, empowerment
¿Un diagnóstico puesto en duda? Los médicos frente a la diagnosis de un 
paciente
Resumen: A partir de un caso de diagnóstico ‘profano’ que pone en duda 
un tratamiento y lleva al paciente a decidir interrumpirlo, analizamos aquí 
sus andanzas, las condiciones de elaboración de su diagnóstico, los moti-
vos de su decisión, y las reacciones de los médicos. Este caso plantea pre-
guntas sobre la relación del paciente con respecto a la autoridad médica, y 
aborda cuestiones fundamentales como la farmacovigilancia, la desmedi-
calización, y la pacient agency.




« Le propre du savoir n’est ni de voir ni de démontrer, mais d’interpréter » 
(“The peculiarity of knowledge is not to see nor to demonstrate, but to 
interpret”),
Michel Foucault, Les mots et les choses, Gallimard, 1966 : 40.
In their endeavour to lay the groundwork for a sociology of diagnosis, 
Nettleton and Jutel, following Phil Brown (1990) highlighted that 
diagnosis “forms the foundation of medical authority”, while adding that 
“medical diagnoses are also contested, socially created, framed and/or 
enacted” (Nettleton and Jutel, 2011: 793). They noted that: “even in our 
contemporary era, where a greater emphasis is placed on the lay person to 
play a more active role, the diagnostician in the medical setting remains 
a key arbiter and thereby still holds significant jurisdictional authority” 
(Nettleton and Jutel, 2011: 796). 
Though diagnosis usually forms the foundation of medical authority, 
it can challenge this authority when it is made by the patient against 
medical advice. While diagnostic activity is normally undertaken by 
health professionals, the task can also be assumed by patients, especially 
when the doctors have failed to find the cause of an ailment. In self-
medication in particular, the patient makes a diagnosis as one of a series 
of stages: clinical self-examination, self-diagnosis, self-prescription and 
self-medication (Fainzang, 2016). But this activity can also occur while 
receiving healthcare from a medical institution, in parallel to assessment, 
diagnosis and therapy proposed by a health professional. 
The analysis undertaken here examines a case of a lay diagnosis and 
the therapeutic and social practices associated with it. I will examine the 
conditions in which the diagnosis was made, the role it played in the 
patient’s life, the doctors’ reactions to it and the solution proposed by 
the patient. Using this case, I will shed light on the social treatment of a 
diagnosis when it is made by a non-professional. I will show that patients 
can play a decisive role in forming a diagnosis, and yet demonstrate the 
limits of patient empowerment when they undertake diagnostic activity 
and examine how professionals receive such a “deviant” diagnosis. 
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Method
The data were collected during a research project financed by ANSM 
(The French National Agency for Medicinal and Health Products Safety) 
on lay management of medicinal risk, i.e. on the choices patients make 
to modify their treatment or the modalities of their medicine intake to 
manage the risks they associate with the drugs in question. This research 
was conducted using qualitative ethnographic research techniques. The 
bulk of the data was collected from users through interviews concerning, 
and observation of, their practices regarding drug risks. The material and 
observations presented here were gathered by spending time with the 
patients over a long period. Some were introduced to me by doctors, while 
others I met through the snowball method, whereby each informant would 
be asked to nominate one or more people they knew. As a contribution to 
research on pharmaceutical risk management, the questions at the centre 
of these interviews and observations looked at whether the treatment 
was, or was not, followed —i.e., practices where the prescribed medicines 
were modified, reduced, substituted or abandoned altogether— and 
the reasons for and mechanisms of these modifications. The research 
participants were invited to relate their health problems, the conditions 
under which they chose either to consult a doctor or to treat themselves, 
how their doctors had dealt with these problems, the medicines that had 
been prescribed to them, which of these they took or did not take or which 
medicines they modified the prescribed dosages, the resources they used 
to identify the problem and select the appropriate treatment, and the 
strategies adopted to ensure what they considered to be a satisfactory risk/
benefit ratio. My presence at the homes of these respondents allowed me 
to see the medicines they had in their medicine cabinets and the ongoing 
drug treatments they stored in various places within the domestic space. I 
could also observe the place they assigned the drugs and drug information 
leaflets in their materiality and the uses made of them.
The account given here is the result of a meticulous reconstruction of 
the episodes of illness experienced by one patient, André. I describe the 
therapeutics he undertook to resolve a painful symptom and the actions 
and reactions of the different actors (the doctors consulted and himself). 
The events described here are based solely on the patient’s accounts. It was 
very tempting to also ask the doctors for their accounts but I eventually 
decided against this out of respect for André (to not appear to be assessing 
his discourse with regard to what the doctors would say), and out of 
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consideration for the doctors who could perceive my questions as a 
criticism of their behaviour. I also wanted to avoid interfering with the 
doctor-patient relationship or modifying the situation being studied.
The fruitful nature of an analysis based on a case study has been 
comprehensively demonstrated. Gareth Williams (1984; 1993) showed 
that collecting illness narratives, and using one individual case study, 
allows us to see not only how people assess the origin of their illness, but 
also to analyse the wider social cultural values in which it is situated. The 
heuristic value of using one individual’s story resides in the fact that the 
story itself contains a collection of information on the values, norms and 
models of the social world into which it fits. In this regard, M. Blaxter 
(2004) also showed that the stories told by people are a demonstration of 
a broader cultural world within which their story takes place and, writing 
at an earlier date, that the narratives are as much accounts of a particular 
culture and period as of individuals (Blaxter and Cyster, 1984).
However, this article is not a study of a narrative. The case study is 
based on different pieces of information that the participant provided 
over the course of multiple interviews. It means that, on the one hand, 
the subject reconstructs his history (Bourdieu, 1986). Bourdieu showed 
that, in creating a narrative, the subject relates lived events, but not 
necessarily in their chronological order. The subject chooses certain 
meaningful incidents and links them, in order to justify their coherence 
and assign them a meaning. This is what led Bourdieu to consider the 
life story to be a biographical illusion. But this means, on the other hand, 
that the subject’s reconstruction is paralleled by that undertaken by the 
anthropologist to determine the chronological thread. At no point did 
André provide the entirety of the account as it is described here, and 
in this regard, my approach is distinct from that of C. Riessman (1990; 
1993), who, in her reflection on narrative analysis, explained that she 
was told lengthy narratives that she transcribed prior to textual analysis 
of biographical accounts of illness. My work of reconstruction did not 
consist of transcribing a long story, but of slowly and patiently building a 
story whose thread was reconstituted through numerous interviews. This 
prevented me from relating a continuous account in the first person and 
in quotation marks, but did nevertheless allow me to highlight the causal 
relationships established by the interviewee and the logics underpinning 
the social practices at work. It was thus a case of respecting, not the way in 
which the interviewee organised and constructed his account, but the way 
in which he attributed meaning to his experiences. 
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The Odyssey of a lay diagnosis
André, now 85 years old, experienced extreme pain in the stomach as a 
14 year old when his parents were deported to Auschwitz. He attributes 
the emergence of his pain to his family history and associated distress 
and trauma. Doctors discovered he had a stomach ulcer for which he 
received medicinal treatment (a gastric bandage) for several years, but 
without significant effect. A few years later, after having suddenly lost 7 
kg in weight, the doctors decided to operate. His duodenum was removed 
and the pain subsequently stopped. When he was 42 years old, André 
had a heart attack, and was then prescribed a number of drugs, including 
Kardegic® (a medicine based on aspirin used to thin the blood and thus 
prevent the formation of blood clots in the arteries). At the age of 74, André 
moved to another town and changed his GP. While consulting for stomach 
acid reflux, his new doctor decided to prescribe Omeprazole (an anti-
ulcer agent in the protein pump inhibitor family), having learnt of André’s 
gastric history. Regular intake of Kardegic® was likely to lead to stomach 
inflammation, and the Omeprazole prescription aimed to mitigate this 
risk. It was even more necessary in the doctor’s opinion because André’s 
medical history made him particularly vulnerable to stomach problems, 
and thus the prescription was regularly renewed. 
A few years later, André began to experience increasingly severe 
stomach pains and pains in his pelvic bones. The pain was such that he 
couldn’t sleep (“It was like lying on knife points!” he explained). His GP 
referred him for various tests (x-rays, MRI scans) and when he found 
nothing to explain such symptoms, sent him to see a rheumatologist, 
thinking he was probably suffering from arthritis. But the rheumatologist 
found nothing to explain such pain. André then consulted several more 
specialists. On the advice of his cardiologist, to whom he had spoken about 
the pain, André also consulted a gerontologist, who could not find the 
cause of the problem either, and referred him to another rheumatologist. 
André’s pain continued for several years. André underwent various tests 
(blood tests, x-rays, pelvic scans, bone scans, MRI scan of the pelvis and 
hip, osteodensitometry, etc.). But all the results showed negative. The 
radiologist proposed a hypothesis of Paget’s disease (a bone disease). But 
this was soon refuted by other doctors since the relevant tests did not 
confirm it. During this time, André’s pain became more and more severe. 
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One day, his GP changed the wording of his prescription, writing 
Mopral® (the commercial name under which Omeprazole is sold on 
the French market) instead of the molecular name (the international 
non-proprietary name). When André noticed that it was not the usual 
packaging, he thought it must be a generic and decided to read the 
accompanying leaflet. There, he read that: “Longterm use of Omeprazole 
(for over a year), or other protein pump inhibitors, can lead to an increased 
risk of fractures of the hip, wrist and vertebras”. The leaflet did not mention 
the potential for extreme pain, but said that the risk of fractures increased 
when the drug was taken for longer than one year. Intrigued by this 
information of a potential for the drug to have a negative effect on bones, 
he did some research on the Internet to find out more about the drug. His 
online wanderings took him to a forum where many people described the 
adverse effects they had suffered which they attributed to this molecule. 
Although no-one reported the same symptoms as André, the description 
of these numerous adverse side-effects led André to think that what he 
was experiencing was another side-effect of the drug. He found an account 
from a woman pointing to a government Canadian website describing the 
risks of osteoporosis from taking Omeprazole over long periods. This site, 
hosted by the Canadian Ministry of Health, published an Incident Report 
on 4th April 2013 entitled: “Protein pump inhibitors: bone fracture risk”. 
The report said: 
Health Canada would like to inform Canadians and Canadian health 
professionals of the risk of bone fractures associated with the use of medicines 
known as proton-pump inhibitors (PPIs) […] Health professionals should 
closely monitor patients with risk factors for osteoporosis who take PPIs, 
and must report any adverse effects to Health Canada […] and they must 
prescribe PPIs at the lowest dosage and for the shortest possible time period 
in relation to the affliction being treated [<http://canadiensensante.gc.ca/
recall-alert-rappel-avis/hc-sc/2013/26523a-fra.php>]. 
On reading what he called “the Canadians’ article”, to which he paid 
particular attention because it came from an official authority, André 
commented: “They say to take it for a maximum of one year, otherwise 
it attacks the pelvic bones! And that’s just it, I’ve had terrible pelvic pain 
for 4 years now! I’ve been taking it for 6 years!” Once he became aware of 
the risks of taking the medicine over the long term, he decided to discuss 
this with his GP, to whom he explained that he suspected Omeprazole was 
causing his severe hip pain. But the doctor replied: “No, there is no risk 
with that; this drug poses no risk at all.”
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Nevertheless, the pain continued. So André decided, on his own 
initiative, to stop taking Omeprazole, “just to see what happens.” He told 
his cardiologist who he saw shortly after. As he explained, this revelation 
was easier to make since it was not this doctor who had prescribed the 
treatment. The cardiologist replied: “You did the right thing, we’ll see now 
what happens”. He did not however tell his GP. At their next consultation, 
he asked the doctor what he thought about stopping this treatment, 
without saying he had in fact already stopped, for fear of the doctor’s 
disapproval. The doctor replied: “It most certainly is not that! If you are 
taking Kardegic (the aspirin), you absolutely have to continue with the 
Omeprazole”. 
André’s decision to stop the treatment was intended as an experiment. 
Two months in, he was feeling much better, and the pain lessened each day 
that passed. He had less and less bone pain, and no more heartburn. Four 
months later, he saw his GP again, and “confessed” that he had completely 
stopped taking Omeprazole. The doctor proved sceptical and warned 
him: “You are running the risk of having a hole in your stomach if you 
don’t take it!” raising the prospect of a recurrence of an ulcer. André then 
answered that he was willing to start taking Omeprazole again to see if the 
pain returned, but the doctor replied, “no, best not,” while nevertheless 
maintaining that this drug could not be causing the pain. As a precaution, 
he referred him for a gastroscopy to assess the state of his stomach, which 
showed no lesions. 
Later, André consulted his rheumatologist, to whom he also revealed 
that he had stopped his Omeprazole treatment and that he had been 
feeling much better since. This doctor also appeared doubtful. He said to 
André: “No, there is no problem with this medicine. No, no, I would have 
heard about it!” Once again, André answered:
Doctor, four months after stopping the treatment, the pain has disappeared. 
It must be that, isn’t it? I don’t know. I am a philistine, I’m not a specialist, 
but there really must be some link! Isn’t it possible that my body has finally 
eliminated the Omeprazole?
In response to the doctor’s incredulous expression, he added: “I 
could start taking it again if you want, to see if it is that!” But again the 
rheumatologist responded: “Hmm, I would not advise that”. Later, André 
consulted his gerontologist, to whom he explained the situation, but once 
again, the specialist answered that it could not be that.
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Today, the pain has completely disappeared. André says he is 
astonished both by the side-effect of the treatment and by the doctors’ 
attitudes since all (generalist, gerontologist, rheumatologist) except the 
cardiologist refuted his hypothesis the origin of his pain was long-term 
intake of Omeprazole. His opinion of their reactions is:
They all say it isn’t that, but when I say that the best way of knowing is to start 
taking it again, they don’t want me to. I don’t know, but if I heard a patient 
saying that, I’d look into it, I’d check it out. But maybe they are too scared 
that it will start again and that will prove me right! They don’t want to learn 
anything from a neophyte!
None of this has eroded André’s trust in doctors; nor has it led him to 
distrust biomedical or scientific expertise. He simply condemns the lack 
of regard given to his reasoning, which he says modestly, is the opinion of 
a non-expert, a neophyte ‒ but nevertheless thinks he is right. 
This case provides a particularly interesting exploration of the stakes 
and social implications of doctors’ attitudes towards both the medicine 
and the diagnosis proposed by a patient. How can the disagreement 
between André and his doctors be understood and what conclusions can 
be drawn from it? What does it say about patient empowerment? What 
can we deduce from it about the process of medicalisation? 
A “lay” diagnosis
Firstly, I will explain my use of the term “lay”. The notion of “lay” knowledge, 
brought to prominence by Freidson (1984), has seen great popularity in 
the social sciences. Many studies have used it as distinct from scholarly 
knowledge, and have undertaken analysis of the relationship between 
expert categories (professional knowledge) and non-expert categories 
(Beck, Giddens, and Lash, 1994; Mesny, 1998; Wynne, 1996). The 
category of “lay knowledge”, referring to what patients know (McClean 
and Shaw, 2005; Bureau-Point and Hermann-Mesfen, 2015; Britten 
and Maguire, 2016), has nevertheless been disputed by some sociologists 
(e.g. Eideliman, 2008) because it implies a reduction of the patients’ point 
of view to a subjective one and thus disqualifies the non-medical point of 
view. But the notion of “lay” has also been criticised by anthropologists, 
who believe it involves seeing the patient through the doctor’s eyes, which 
goes against the emic position required in the anthropological method. We 
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can add to these criticisms the fact that, considering that expert knowledge 
is frequently appropriated by lay knowledge, the result is no longer truly 
“lay”. Or again, the fact that the notion of expert-patient now in common 
usage (Epstein, 1995; Bolam, Gleeson, and Murphy, 2003; Fox, Ward, 
and O’Rourke, 2005) leads to a blurring of the distinction between lay 
and expert knowledge. The notion of expert-patient was dismissed by 
Prior (2003) who, in a more nuanced way, demonstrated the limits of lay 
expertise since lay people “are not (as lay people) skilled and practised in 
the diagnosis and management of illness” (Prior, 2003: 53).
However my intention is not to voice an opinion on the concept of a 
lay expert which, as Collins and Evans (2002) pointed out and as Prior 
(2003) reiterated, sounds like an oxymoron. Instead, I intend, from an 
emic position, to consider André as lay in that he himself defines himself 
as such. Lay is the appropriate term here to account for the respective 
positions of André and his doctors, and to qualify the diagnostic work 
undertaken by this patient. Because his opinion is lay, the doctors object 
to the diagnosis. Moreover, he describes himself as a philistine, a neophyte 
and a non-specialist, in contrast to experts. Here, I will examine the social 
treatment of this lay diagnosis to explore the extent to which the patient’s 
discourse on his affliction is judged legitimate. 
Agency and empowerment: the patient’s diagnostic work
Medicines can play a significant role in diagnosis, notably when 
practitioners identify an illness based on the patient’s response to treatment 
since the diagnosis is guided by the disappearance of a symptom (Nichter 
and Vuckovic, 1994). Drugs can also play this role in the patients’ eyes, 
when the person undertakes the treatment of the symptom him/herself 
(Fainzang, 2016). Within this process, the disappearance of a symptom 
can lead the patient to conclude that the medicine was the right one and 
thus he/she can identify the problem or, on the contrary, the persistence 
of the symptom can lead him/her down another route. In both cases, the 
drug helps to form a diagnosis. In the case studied here, the appearance 
of a symptom followed by the discovery of the adverse side effects of a 
drug leads the patient to conclude that it is the drug causing the affliction. 
The response to the treatment is identified with the ailment itself and the 
iatrogenic effect is an integral part of the aetiology of the illness. 
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The patient’s reasoning —based on his own bodily experience, on 
reading the information leaflet, and on information obtained through 
Internet research— is structured into two stages. André’s hypothesis that 
there is a link between the risk of the drug weakening the bones and 
his own bone pain, which leads him to stop his treatment “to see what 
happens”, is confirmed when the pains disappear. In this regard, he follows 
a line of reasoning that is similar to medical reasoning, since it takes into 
account the link between the body (appearance followed by disappearance 
of a symptom) and the presumed pathogenic agent, and is based on 
experience (Elstein, Shulman and Sprafka, 2014). However, the 
diagnostic work always involves a degree of interpretation. Not only is it 
based on the concomitance of stopping a treatment and the disappearance 
of a symptom, but it also establishes a link between the risk of osteoporosis 
and bone pain, even though osteoporosis is not considered to be painful 
as long as no fracture occurs. In the manner of professionals resorting 
to semiology in order to convert signs and symptoms into diagnoses 
(Nessa, 1996), the patient formed a diagnosis as a result of the link he 
made between a risk and a pathology based on their connection with an 
ailment of the bones. 
Here we can see the limits of the opposition between lay and expert 
knowledge, even if the two are evidently not equivalent. Besides, apart from 
the fact diagnostic activity is not a strictly individual act, in as much as the 
diagnostic process is always the product of multiple influences (discussion 
forums, personal accounts, information leaflets, official websites etc.), we 
can see that aligning the opposition between lay and expert knowledge 
with the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity is inadequate. 
On one hand, André’s lay diagnosis is neither exclusively nor necessarily 
subjective since he borrows from objective medical reasoning. On the 
other, as we will see, the doctors’ reactions to the patient’s diagnosis are 
not exclusively objective. 
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When diagnosis challenges medicalisation
The issue of medicalisation has been the focus of a number of 
scholars, whether in support of the Foucauldian perspective where 
the problematisation of phenomena is thought to be based on medical 
knowledge and categories of thinking, or to criticise the expectations and 
implications of this idea (see Berlivet’s 2011 review on the subject).
But the medicalisation and the decoding of a symptom that precedes 
the diagnosis is not the exclusive preserve of healthcare professionals. 
In the context of self-medication in particular, forming a self-diagnosis 
consists, for the patient, of converting a symptom (or a pain) into a sign 
of a pathological state, leading to the need to medicalize the problem 
(Fainzang, 2016). Moreover, once the patient makes his/her own 
diagnosis, notably when there is a disagreement between the doctor 
and the patient as to the cause of the affliction and the means of solving 
the problem, lay diagnosis can lead to recourse to a medication that 
goes against the doctor’s advice and the patient him/herself can end up 
self-medicalising his/her case, potentially carrying political meaning 
(Fainzang, 2013). 
In view of the numerous works on what is commonly called 
compliance or adherence (an idea more in agreement with the concept 
of shared decision-making in medicine [Blackwell, 1976; Dunbar and 
Stunkard, 1979; Sandman, Granger, Ekman et alii, 2011]), the case 
considered here invites us to reverse the perspective. Firstly, the diagnosis 
is proposed by the patient when no medical diagnosis has been made, 
and the disagreement on the patient’s diagnosis comes from the doctor. 
Secondly, the decision to stop the treatment does not stem from non-
compliance but rather from a decision in keeping with the diagnosis and 
critical examination of the effects of treatment, even though this treatment, 
and so medicalization, was preventative. Here, the patient’s diagnosis gives 
rise to demedicalisation. The lay diagnosis brings the prescribed treatment 
into question, and this questioning challenges the doctors’ knowledge. 
The patient responds to the doctor’s preventative medicalisation, with a 
preventative demedicalisation.
While the diagnostic process is a central feature of debates on 
medicalisation (Nettleton and Jutel, 2011), it has not been explored in 
terms of its impact on demedicalisation. Yet, here, the diagnosis leads to 
the termination of a treatment. In this regard, in counterpoint to Nicolas 
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Rose’s claim that “diagnosis leads to treatment” (Rose, 2006: 466), the 
diagnosis can have the opposite effect and lead to the withdrawal of a 
treatment. But the difficulty here is that the diagnosis was made by the 
patient and went against the doctors’ opinions. At stake is not only what 
the diagnosis says and the etiology of the affliction in question, but also 
what the lay diagnosis tells us about patient agency and the power relations 
between patients, doctors and authoritative bodies. 
It is often underlined in the literature that patients are social actors. 
The configurations described sometimes underline the patients’ reluctance 
to accept a medical diagnosis. Rose (2006) noted that patient responses 
to medicalisation are not necessarily passive. He shows moreover, 
with nuance, not only that patients may express resistance and tension 
linked to being labelled as ill but also that, in engaging with the images 
and narratives created by “Big Pharma,” individuals play their own part 
in the medicalisation of problems of living. Other works highlight the 
complementarity of the patient’s role with the doctor’s one. A. Mol (2002) 
thus showed that patients not only experience bodily states or “have” a 
disease, but, like the physicians, they “do disease” since they undertake a 
series of practices, connected to physicalities, that influence the process: 
“The “disease” that ethnographers talk about (…) depends on everything 
and everyone that is active while it is being practised. The disease is being 
done” (Mol, 2002: 32). Equally, when Jutel (2015) recognises the patient’s 
role in diagnosis, this role is defined more precisely as pre-diagnostic 
work: “The lay person does pre-diagnostic work as he or she decides to 
seek medical attention for what ails him” (Jutel, 2015: 847). The pre-
diagnostic work is subject to the doctor’s opinion and can sometimes form 
the first step in a medical diagnosis. 
Yet, the case discussed here is different. There is neither resistance to 
nor complementarity with the doctor’s diagnostic work. Consequently, the 
mechanism examined here is a double reversal of the situations described 
in the literature: on the one hand, the diagnosis is the patient’s work; on 
the other, it is not the use of the drug that leads to a diagnosis but the 
identification of a risk linked to its use which forms a de facto challenge 
to the doctor’s clinical, diagnostic and therapeutic practice. Although 
the diagnosis is deemed to be the foundation of medical authority 
(Nettleton and Jutel, 2011) and of the medicalisation it may entail, it 
can, paradoxically, be the foundation of a demedicalisation.
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Risk management: half-hearted pharmacovigilance
Today, more than ever, pharmacovigilance is highly valued by the health 
authorities (Who, 2008) and various measures have been taken to 
enable citizens to contribute. In France, while the 2011 law designed to 
strengthen health safety requirements for medicines and health products 
obliges health professionals to report all serious or unexpected adverse 
effects not mentioned in the patient information leaflet, it also made it 
possible for all actors in the medicine chain to report any adverse effect 
suspected of being caused by medication. Users are also encouraged 
to contribute, either by informing their doctor or pharmacist (patient 
information leaflets are required to include the following: “If you notice 
any adverse effects not mentioned in this leaflet, please inform your doctor 
or your pharmacist.”), or by reporting directly to a pharmacovigilance 
centre, as they are invited to do by the ANSM [<http://ansm.sante.fr/
Declarer-un-effet-indesirable/Pharmacovigilance/Centres-regionaux-de-
pharmacovigilance/(offset)/4>].
Yet, although André made his doctors aware of the harmful effects 
that he believed to be caused by the drug, and even though they refused 
to let him take the drug again, these doctors did not reported these side-
effects —not mentioned in the leaflet— to a pharmacovigilance centre. The 
exception was the cardiologist, who was not the prescriber and who told 
André that he had communicated his problem to the pharmacovigilance 
service at the hospital, although André was never contacted by this 
service). The invitation made to patients and the obligation made to 
health professionals to report any unknown adverse side-effect does not 
seem to produce results as regards professional behaviour. No better 
results are achieved in encouraging patients to become actors in such 
reporting: when I asked him whether he himself had reported the effect 
on the ANSM website, André answered that he did not know about the 
site and he hoped the doctor or the pharmacist would do it. It should 
be noted here that, according to a study carried out over 8 years at a 
regional pharmacovigilance centre (Guédat, Gouraud and Ramiah, 
2012), under-reporting remains a significant obstacle to evaluation in 
pharmacovigilance. Pharmacists report very few adverse side-effects 
in France and very few of the reports made lead to a side-effect being 
validated by the CRPV (primarily because pharmacists believed there was 
no causal link between the adverse side-effect and intake of the medicine). 
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Should we see the doctors’ denial of André’s diagnosis as a tendency 
to reject any discourse that goes against expert knowledge, or as the result 
of doctors lacking information about pharmaceuticals and their tendency 
to be passive recipients of pharmaceutical laboratory information diffused 
by medical sales representatives (Greffion, 2014; Mintzes, Mangin, 
Hayeset et alii, 2013 [2009])? In support of the assumption that the 
pharmaceutical industry would organize an intense promotion of this 
drug to doctors because of the commercial interest of its sale, it should 
be noted that the anti-ulcer family of drugs, of which Omeprazole is a 
member, is one of the main expense items for health insurers and the 
second most sold family of medicines in France, with sales figures of 1 
billion euros in 2006 (Romand, 2009).
The lost authority of the diagnostician?
Because diagnosis “forms the foundation of medical authority” (Nettleton 
and Jutel, 2011: 793), health professionals dismiss lay diagnosis. In taking 
hypotheses made by patients into consideration, doctors see a risk of the 
lay diagnosis being confirmed, and this would shake the foundations of 
their authority. André’s diagnosis is rejected because it is at odds with 
expert knowledge. The patient information leaflets and the information 
diffused by medical sales representatives or through studies published in 
medical journals appear to be the only acceptable sources of information. 
However, not only do they refute the diagnosis of iatrogenesis proposed 
by the patient, they also paradoxically advise him not to start taking the 
incriminated medicine again. The doctors’ simultaneous refusal of the 
patient’s diagnosis and refusal to let him return to taking the drug he 
suspects is causing the pain renders the situation more complex and makes 
the status of patient empowerment uncertain. Although the doctors do not 
share André’s point of view and reasoning, they take note of them, refuting 
and validating them at the same time. The health professionals accept the 
patient’s diagnostic activity on a practical and empirical level, but reject it 
on a theoretical and cognitive level.
We should stop a moment on this paradox that while the doctors 
refute André’s diagnosis, they validate his decision to not take the 
medicine again. The situation here results from a combination of denial 
of the patient’s reasoning and fear that his symptoms may return. Thus, 
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beyond the iatrogenic risk, the doctors appear to want to avoid a social risk 
—the risk of losing face in front of the patient, whether by accepting his 
diagnosis or permitting him to take the medicine again. For the doctors, 
admitting that the diagnosis made by the patient is correct or relevant 
would challenge their own competence and amount to a recognition of 
their own fallibility (unfamiliarity with the contents of the information 
leaflet or the adverse side-effects of the drug, lack of awareness of the 
documents and recommendations discovered by the patient on the 
Internet, and persistence with the prescription). It is thus a matter of 
simultaneously managing two risks from two different registers: one 
physiological and one social.
This case study illuminates the limits of the role as an actor in 
diagnostic work granted to the patient. This role appears only admissible if 
it complements that of the doctor. Not only does the lay diagnosis challenge 
medicalisation since it gives rise to a demedicalisation, but it also tells us 
something about the power relations between patients and representatives 
of medical authority and about the social treatment of patient agency 
when medical knowledge is questioned. In response to the biopower held 
and embodied by the prescriber, the patient wields a counter power, the 
strength of which lies in his diagnostic reasoning. The lay diagnosis, by 
positing an iatrogenic effect denied by the doctors, undermines the very 
structure that dictates the positions and roles of the actors involved.
The subversive nature of a diagnosis
The notion of deviance, as devised by the second Chicago school (Lemert, 
1951), involves three elements: a norm, a transgression of this norm and 
a social reaction to the transgression of this norm (Mucchielli, 2014). 
The contradictory elaboration of a diagnosis by André (and the challenge 
it implies to the prescribed treatment) is deviant in that it transgresses the 
positions assigned to doctors and patients, and the fact that the diagnostic 
activity is considered to normally come within the competence of the 
doctor alone, as the classification tool of medicine (Goldstein Jutel and 
Dew, 2014).
On this subject, some authors (Sommerhalder, Abraham, 
Zufferey et alii, 2009; Romijn, 2016)  record numerous patients not 
letting the doctor think that they have made their own diagnosis and not 
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communicating this diagnosis when they have made one, in order to avoid 
being in the position of competing with the doctor and not damage the 
doctor’s authority. 
Not only does André’s diagnosis not conform with the doctors’ 
diagnosis, he proposes an alternative explanation, challenging their ability 
to ascertain the cause of the affliction. Moreover, he questions the doctors’ 
behaviour in not anticipating the termination of an iatrogenic treatment 
and in not validating his diagnostic hypothesis. The lay diagnosis thus 
becomes subversive, not only because it threatens the doctors’ authority and 
knowledge, but also because it goes against the phenomenon described by 
Ebeling (2011), where the marketing of self-diagnosis by drug companies 
aims to create well-educated consumers who demand medical diagnoses 
in line with a drug company’s objective.
The doctors’ reluctance to investigate the validity of the diagnosis 
proposed by André, and his disqualification from the start, are neither 
exclusively nor necessarily objective. These are expressions of their 
subjectivity, constructed by their socialisation in a world dominated 
by pharmaceuticalisation and the hegemonic discourse of the 
pharmaceutical industry. Lay appropriation of expert knowledge (Beck, 
Giddens and Lash, 1994) is verified by the type of diagnostic reasoning 
André undertakes, and is matched here with what we could call an expert 
expropriation of lay knowledge, in accordance with Mesny’s (1998) 
observation that: “showing that lay people appropriate expert knowledge 
has often been a way to oppose the view that expertise “expropriates” lay 
people, by undermining their own “local” knowledge, and by depriving 
them of their capacity to deal with the problems that they encounter in 
everyday life” (Mesny 1998: 32). 
The quest for a diagnosis is not considered to be something the 
patient should take on, despite increasing calls for ill people’s voices to be 
heard (Bray and Casal, 2014). The idea remains that the doctor should 
know how to listen to the patient, his/her history, complaints, etc. to be 
able to form a diagnosis. But this listening rarely includes taking into 
account any diagnostic reflection. While it is now accepted that patients 
possess experiential knowledge (Jouet, Flora and Las Vergnas, 2010), 
this leaves little space for a rational, analytical, even diagnostic, lay 
knowledge. Attributing an exclusively objective approach to the illness to 
the doctor and an exclusively subjective one to the patient contributes to 
constructing the basis for failure in pharmacovigilance. While the notion 
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of health democracy now seems to be accepted and validated, one of its 
forms —which could be called pharmacovigilant democracy— remains 
the object of great resistance, since it threatens the social role assigned to 
patients. 
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ENACTING ADHD DIAGNOSIS 




Abstract: I present a case study of one boy’s ADHD diagnosis understood 
as a collaborative, dispersed and asymmetrical social process marked by 
uncertainty and conflict. I explore the ways in which the psychiatric label 
is enacted in the everyday life of a middle-class family in a medium-sized 
Polish town. The paper adds to the literature on contested illness as well as 
foregrounding the significance of the non-medical in a diagnostic work. 
Key words: ADHD, Poland, medical anthropology, psychiatric diagnosis, 
contested illness.
Realizar el diagnóstico del TDAH en el contexto de la sanidad en Polonia
Resumen: Presento el estudio de caso de un niño al cual diagnosticaron 
TDAH entendido como un proceso social colaborativo, disperso y asimé-
trico marcado por la incertidumbre y el conflicto. Analizo las maneras en 
que se pone esta etiqueta psiquiátrica en la vida cotidiana de una familia 
de clase media en una ciudad polaca de tamaño medio. Por un lado el 
artículo se inscribe en la literatura de las enfermedades cuestionadas; por 
el otro, destaca la importancia de los aspectos no médicos en el proceso 
de diagnóstico.
Palabras clave: TDAH, Polonia, antropología médica, diagnóstico psi-
quiátrico, enfermedad cuestionada
1 This research was financed by the National Science Centre (Narodowe Centrum Nauki, 
NCN) in the FUGA scheme (grant number: 2015/16/S/HS3/00150).
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The encounter between childhood and psychiatric knowledge and practice 
is rapidly expanding in the contemporary world (Conrad, Bergey, 2014). 
Among other things, advances in developmental science, neurobiology 
and pediatric psychiatry have resulted in a new way of becoming for 
contemporary children – ADHD, i.e. through the diagnosis of Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (Conrad, 1976; Rose, Singh, 2009). 
This psychiatric diagnostic category involves symptoms of hyperactivity, 
inattention and impulsivity that are scrupulously described and quantified 
in the diagnostic manuals2. The label, which itself has a long social and 
conceptual history (Conrad 1976), has found a home in Poland3 where 
both the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) and the before 
Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM) are used in psychiatric practice; 
they also inform the bureaucratic and legal management of “special 
educational needs” of children in schools. The epidemiological data on 
ADHD prevalence in this country are limited. Medical experts claim that 
3-5% of children in elementary schools in Poland “malfunction” due to the 
ADHD symptoms (see: Kołakowski, Wolańczyk, Pisula et alii, 2010: 
30). According to the data from the National Health Protection Fund 
(Narodowy Fundusz Zdrowia, NFZ), in 2015 Polish doctors4 diagnosed 
hyperkinetic disorder5 in 13,827 children aged 6-13 (approximately 0.5% 
of the overall primary school population). The data also suggest that the 
number of children diagnosed is steadily increasing. Between the years 
2009 and 2015, there was a 100% increase in diagnoses. 
2 Both the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD) classify inattentive, hyperactive and impulsive 
behaviors in children respectively under the label of ADHD and the Hyperkinetic Disorder.
3 The Polish medical research has a modest history of applied research on hyperkinetic 
and inattentive behaviors in children (Nartowska, 1972) dating to before the ADHD and 
hyperkinetic disorder nomenclature became settled.
4 The number is underestimated. It counts diagnoses made by child psychiatrists and 
neurologists who work in health centers contracted by the National Health Protection 
Fund. It does not include diagnoses made by doctors working in private practice or those by 
educational psychologists or therapists working in both private and public entities. 
5 In Poland, the National Health Protection Fund (Narodowy Fundusz Zdrowia, NFZ) 
uses the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) nomenclature in the process of 
bureaucratic management of healthcare. This does not imply that psychiatrists do not use 
DSM in their diagnostic work. 
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ADHD – a contested diagnostic process
For social scientists, ADHD brings in an immediate association with the 
concept of medicalization, which challenges the growing extent to which 
medical knowledge and practice infiltrate the everyday lives of children. 
As described by David Armstrong for Britain the twentieth century 
development of the child as an object of medical concern meant, among 
other things, establishing what could be referred to, in the language of 
developmental psychopathology, as “a normal child” (Armstrong, 
1983: 55-56). Mass and compulsory education resulted in the growing 
“visibility of childhood” as well as enabling the “gaze over the mind of the 
developing child” (59-60). American sociologist Peter Conrad provided 
a critical reflection on such a process through which various deviant 
behaviors by children, including hyperkinesis, have come under medical 
jurisdiction in the United States of America. The ADHD diagnosis, in his 
view, has constituted a new form of social control. The medical discourse, 
tightly linked to the workings of state bureaucracies, provided a material 
from which the boundaries of pathology and norms in children’s bodies 
and behaviors have been drawn (Conrad, 1976). From this critical 
perspective, the ADHD diagnosis medicalizes what is in fact normal 
childhood behavior, in boys in particular (Conrad, 1976; Conrad & 
Potter, 2000). 
Other sociological works on ADHD have traced the ways in which 
medical definitions of children’s deviant behaviors have advanced in 
non-medical spaces, such as educational and domestic spheres, changing 
both the environments and the interactions that unfold within them 
(Malacrida, 2004; Allan & Harwood, 2016; Rafalovitch, 2001). 
Recent neuropsychiatric findings and diagnoses, such as ADHD, transform 
the everyday lives of people involved in the diagnostic processes, molding 
their thoughts and ways of understanding children, directing their 
actions and feeding their anxieties. Sociologist Linda Blum expresses her 
reservations about a strictly constructionist view of “invisible disabilities” 
such as ADHD, arguing that they are both real and embodied and should 
be understood as “cultural inventions specific to our time and place” 
(Blum, 2015: 7). I share her conviction that what we research is a real 
lived experience anchored in the dialectics of biology and culture. The 
ethnographers’ analytical engagement with the interactions taking place 
between developmental psychopathology, family systems, communities 
and culture may prove very fertile (Guzder & Rousseau, 2010: 683).
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A number of detailed ethnographic and sociological accounts present 
the voices of parents raising children with “invisible disabilities” (Blum, 
2015; Francis, 2015; Garro & Yarris, 2009; Malacrida, 2001). These 
works shed light on the organizational routines and the sense-making 
activities undertaken around ADHD in the North American context. 
Writers using the feminist sociological lens gave us some careful insights 
into the struggles of variously positioned mothers, who navigate the lives 
of atypical children while facing the social stigma associated with the label 
(Blum, 2015; Malacrida, 2001). These accounts allow us to listen to the 
voices of women who are the primary caregivers of “difficult” children, 
and whose care work is central to the local construction of normative 
femininity. These women carry an unusual burden of moving between 
and negotiating the complex medical and educational bureaucracies in 
the name of the wellbeing of their children (Blum, 2015; Malacrida, 
2001). When contextualized, their stories provide a critical commentary 
on life in the era of the neoliberal economy marked by the lack of 
public provisioning, changes in family structure and gender roles, and 
pharmaceutical innovations progressing along the logic of commercial 
interests (Blum, 2007: 203). In this book chapter, I dialogue with the 
aforementioned works by paying close attention to the figure of a mother 
and the acts of care she performs. In the post-socialist context of Poland, 
the neoliberal values and the grammar of Western lifestyles clash with the 
traditional, conservative images of family life and gender roles, while the 
ideas of rights to proper child care in public institutions intermingle with 
new notions of individualized parental responsibility for a child’s success. 
This analysis will treat the maternal voice as one of many that mold 
the ADHD experience. After Linda Garro, I “broaden the analytic lens to 
explore health and well-being as ensconced in everyday family life and as 
bound up in relational connections with other family members” (Garro, 
2013: 193; Garro & Yarris, 2009). A family-level approach differs from 
an individual-level approach as it reveals the complexity of health and the 
diagnostic process. It makes it possible to focus on their embeddedness 
in everyday family life, as well as to flesh out the interactional aspect of 
“doing” (Mol 2002) or “undoing” the disease. As I will illustrate, much of 
the framing as well as contesting the illness label takes place outside the 
medical spaces. 
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Ethnographic accounts exploring the social life of ADHD as it unfolds 
in various localities constitute fascinating diagnostic stories6 due to the 
uncertainty and contestation of the label (Trundle, Singh & Bröer, 
2014). Such stories foreground multivocality, ambiguity, asymmetrical 
power relations and indeterminacy. The controversies surrounding the 
label are well-voiced in public debates. Joseph Dumit (2006) pointed 
to five features of contested illnesses that partially fit the experience of 
ADHD diagnosis in Poland: they are often chronic, medics cannot easily 
determine their causes (their symptoms are “biomental”), their treatment 
includes a wide range of options including biomedical, complementary 
and alternative medicine, their boundaries are “fuzzy” (the symptoms 
can be attributed to other illnesses), and they are “legally explosive” (it is 
difficult for the sufferers to gain recognition) (Dumit, 2006). Catherine 
Trundle, Illina Singh and Christina Bröer, in their discussion on 
ADHD, suggest broadening Dumit’s category of “contested diagnosis” “to 
incorporate all of the contests, challenges, and disagreements that occur 
during the diagnostic process” (166). I align with this broad definition 
which allows for bringing to the fore the ways in which the contest over 
medical meaning evolves in the territory of ordinary life. 
ADHD is recognized as a contested disorder, among other things, 
because of the diagnostic ambiguity, the wide use of pharmacotherapy, and 
the reliance on historical and cultural norms set for childhood behaviors 
(Trundle, Singh & Bröer, 2014: 176). For many, ADHD became 
almost synonymous with what Parens (2014) calls “bad” medicalization, 
Breggin labels it as unnecessary pharmaceuticalization (2014) or what 
Horwitz describes as a situation in which “non-disordered people are 
treated as if they are disordered, social behaviors are defined as individual 
pathologies” (2003: 20). While burgeoning diagnosis is worthy of critical 
attention (Trundle, Singh & Bröer, 2014: 177), some scholars advocate 
6 Peter Conrad and Meredith Bergey (2014) recognize the growing significance of the 
ADHD diagnosis outside the American context, calling for social research into the diversity 
of ADHD experience as it develops in different cultural landscapes. Existing research 
demonstrates that ADHD diagnosis can be differently enacted in various national and socio-
economic contexts (Trundle, Singh, Bröer, 2014: 176), including the cases that fall outside 
the English-speaking world (Filipe, 2016; Navarro, Vrecko, 2017). This article expands the 
discussion by presenting a detailed ethnography of a Polish family and the ways in which it 
facilitates the process of applying a medical framework to a child’s behaviors in the context 
of transforming post-socialist society and its healthcare. 
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balancing the critical take on child psychiatry with careful ethnographic 
research concerned with the actual diagnostic process and what it does to 
children and their carers. They extend this call to include such questions as: 
what happens when the diagnosis is not given, when certain groups remain 
underdiagnosed and do not enter treatment? (Singh & Wessely, 2015). 
The ADHD diagnostic process stretches over various medical and 
non-medical spaces. It involves numerous actors situated within the web 
of asymmetrical power relations. The children who are the central objects 
of the diagnosis are rarely involved themselves in discussions about the 
medical opinions, the prognosis, the treatment or the nature of illness 
(Trundle, Singh & Bröer, 2014, Witeska-Młynarczyk, 2017). The 
diagnostic work can be viewed as a collaborative process of establishing 
an interpretation of the origins of the illness, defining the factors that are 
responsible and identifying appropriate interventions. At every step of 
this dispersed process “there is a space for contested meaning” (Trundle, 
Singh & Bröer, 2014: 179). Both the increasingly active role taken by 
lay actors in diagnostic processes and the ambivalences embedded in 
psychiatric practice7 add more layers to the ADHD experience. 
In this paper, I tell the story of a family whose child was diagnosed 
with ADHD in a medium-sized Polish town called Malden8. I chose 
to devote close attention to one case study because it makes it possible 
to follow the emergence of the meanings and uses of the psychiatric 
diagnostic category. Furthermore, it permits me to highlight how the 
diagnosis influences actual lives. How it is communicated and lived 
with are nevertheless indeterminate, socially negotiable and rooted in 
materiality and historical time. This chapter aims to examine the status of 
the real in order to foreground the processual, collaborative and dynamic 
nature of the diagnostic process (Gardner et alii, 2011; Goodwin & 
Mcconnel, 2014; Olson & Abeysinghe, 2014). In particular, I propose 
a careful analysis of everyday interactions generated around the behaviors 
7 Psychiatry is recognized as “a second-class citizen” in medicine. Because it lacks the means 
to precisely identify disorders such as ADHD (Rose, Singh, 2009), it is said to be marked 
by a diagnostic uncertainty. Hence, what needs to be addressed in the actual ethnographic 
research on ADHD are the ways in which this vulnerable status of psychiatry influences the 
everyday lives of people who receive a psychiatric diagnosis. Another question to attend 
to is whether the new term “neuropsychiatry” fulfills its promise of a novel explanatory 
framework and diagnostic reliability (Abi-racked, Rose, 2013) or, more precisely, how it 
actually impacts upon the acts of diagnosis and care. 
8 Malden is a pseudonym. 
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of one child in one family with whom I spent time during 2015-2016. 
This interactional focus allows me to show a diagnosis of a contested 
disorder as a dynamic and fluid process that exceeds what happens in 
the medical spaces (Jutel & Dew, 2014). I will explore various social 
forces, organizational routines and social agents whose interactions lead 
to a particular framing of ADHD and produce an elusive outcome of this 
diagnosis. 
The chapter is based on my recent fieldwork9 designed as a multi-sited 
ethnography (Marcus, 1995), in which I examine various enactments of 
ADHD in one locality. Telling one story, I will comment on how ADHD 
came to be pronounced as a diagnostic category and was later tinkered 
with by multiple actors to coproduce the ADHD experience. I will draw the 
contours of particular cultural understandings and social circumstances in 
which decisions were made, actions were taken and affects arose. Finally, 
I will look at the diagnostic work taking place in both the clinical and 
non-clinical spaces, imagining it as a production of social order through 
the interactional acts building upon each other over time. Particularly in 
the case of ADHD, much of the diagnosing and healing takes place in 
non-medical contexts. Collaboration between lay-diagnosing and clinical 
pronouncements may be intentional and non-intentional. It may take 
place in proximity and at a distance. Families and doctors may experience 
stages of certainty and uncertainty (Olson & Abeysinghe, 2015). The 
pace and the movements become apparent when we carefully follow one 
story. The story gains depth when we place it in larger contexts. 
9 Between 2015 and 2017, I followed the practices evolving around ADHD through different 
field sites in Malden. I gathered the material around a few focal children (with different 
levels of intensity, I gathered the material about the experiences of 11 boys). I conducted 
ethnographic work in familial, educational, medical or counseling spaces used by these boys 
on a regular basis. I used mixed methodology depending on what was possible in each case. 
I conducted ethnographic interviews with the carers: the family members, the teachers, the 
school directors, the psychologists, the psychiatrists. In a few cases, I regularly visited children’s 
homes. In five cases I did participant observation in schools and in two cases I conducted 
research in focus groups with the focal child and his/her classmates. With one teacher and 
one mother, I worked using autoethnographic diaries. Over the course of six months, I 
participated in a therapeutic group for ADHD children run in a public psychological center. 
In this very center, I participated in educational meetings organized for parents and teachers. 
Where possible, I participated in diagnostic, therapeutic meetings or consultations with 
parents and/or children. I traced the academic research conducted in this town on ADHD 
when it spilled over into the educational spaces. I interviewed the few child psychiatrists 
working in this town. Finally, but no less significantly, I worked with the diagnosed children 
using participatory methodology derived from the new childhood studies. 
62
Anna Witeska-Młynarczyk
The macro landscape of care
Milligan and Wiles suggest that engagement with landscapes of care 
as an analytical framework requires “an understanding of macro-level 
governance or social arrangements that can operate at either (or both) 
the national or international scales as well as the interpersonal” (2010: 
738). The landscape I will describe here has its peculiarities. Since the 
collapse of the socialist regime, like other countries in the region, Poland 
has undergone rapid transformations in the areas of economy, lifestyles, 
values, social norms and care. Poles have been building a multifaceted 
relationship with Western medical cultures, their own socialist past and 
the heritage that reaches beyond that period. Among other things, the 
consumption of pharmaceuticals in Poland has grown rapidly since the 
1990s. The country is recognized as a part of a “pharmerging group,”10 
which in 2016 reached 30% of global spending on medicines, compared 
to 14% in 2006 (Medicines Outlook Through 2016 Report). Along with 
the striking increase in the consumption of pharmaceuticals came the 
advance of “a new awareness”, i.e. the growing engagement with the 
ecological movement or a dialogue with a critical view of ‘technochemical’ 
medicine (Piątkowski, 2012: 21). 
Since the 1990s, among other things, the cultures of therapy came 
to play a more significant role in the lives of the people in the region. 
Psychological discourse about the self filled conversations and internal 
dialogues of Poles, who now could easily access self-help manuals and other 
forms of psychological and psychiatric knowledge present on the Internet 
and in parenting guides, lifestyle magazines or other media. This discourse 
valorizing self-responsibility, autonomy and prudentialism (Raikhel & 
Bemme, 2016) infiltrated contemporary Polish families and influenced 
how proper parental care, gender roles, the normal child, the good family 
life, proper parental intervention, and desirable education started to be 
imagined. The expansion of biological psychiatry found fertile ground 
in the field of poorly developed child psychiatry, as much as cognitive-
10 Pharmerging countries are defined as those with >$1Bn absolute spending growth over 
the period 2012-16 and which have GDP per capita of less than $25,000 at purchasing power 
parity (PPP). Pharmerging markets include China, Brazil, India, Russia, Mexico, Turkey, 
Poland, Venezuela, Argentina, Indonesia, South Africa, Thailand, Romania, Egypt, Ukraine, 
Pakistan and Vietnam (Medicines Outlook Through 2016 Report: 5).
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behavioral models were eagerly applied in the fields of psychology, child 
therapy and parenting. The post-socialist landscape of mental healthcare 
in Poland is characterized by its rapid privatization, a growing plurality of 
state-financed and private services and entities available on the market to 
the patient-client, who is solely responsible for choosing the right option. 
Notable is the emergence of spaces devoted exclusively to diagnosing and 
treating the mental health of children, bringing together experts who are 
trained to help families design the proper child-centered interventions. 
Psychiatric and psychological care is currently in high demand. 
Yet, being exposed to the new models does not imply an easy realization 
of these ideals or an absence of critical commentaries stemming from the 
previous cultural formations. Poland retains its distinctiveness, among 
other things, through “the persistent influence of religion on social life, 
the importance of the Church in public life, the size and importance of the 
peasant class, or the deepening social differences” (Piątkowski, 2012). 
Old and conservative structures of family and gender relations, traditional 
schooling, rigid patient-doctor relations, to name a few, are changing more 
slowly than individual desires. As Piotr Sztompka (2003) puts it, Poland 
is characterized by progressive “cultural disorientation”—as new ways of 
living and thinking need to be measured against traditional structures and 
values negotiated in everyday life. This tension is apparent in the lives of 
families whose children are diagnosed with ADHD. 
The micro-landscape of care
I met Leo’s family through a pediatric psychiatrist who consults families 
and children in a number of medical spaces in the city – both private, 
such as a psychological centre, and public, such as a psychiatric hospital. 
The Catholic, female doctor, in her seventies, with an eccentric outfit and 
decisive and authoritative way of talking to people, introduced me to an 
energetic and sociable mother in her early thirties and an eight-year-old 
boy, who seemed very shy and was completely silent. The mother, Agda, 
was very eager to learn about my research. She invited me home for an 
interview. Soon, I got to know other family members —the father, Bart, 
and a younger brother, Michael. I started to make regular visits to their 
temporary apartment and, later, their newly built home— a small house 
with a garden —a middle-class dream taken from a prospectus with 
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trendy modern designs. Over time, I attended Leo’s classes at school and 
met his classmates and teachers. I joined Agda and Leo at some of the 
psychiatric consultations. I maintained regular contact with both parents, 
although mainly with Agda, who frequently called me to talk about the 
current state of Leo’s affairs, and to share what worried her11. Throughout 
our consecutive meetings, Agda appeared to me as a patient/consumer, 
who holds not only biomedical knowledge but also a knowledge of the 
healthcare system and how to navigate within it. 
Both Agda and Bart hold university degrees. Agda is a pharmacist 
and Bart works as a sales representative in a large company manufacturing 
food products. They can afford to run two cars, have a newly built house, 
go for holidays twice a year and arrange their children to enroll in private 
extracurricular activities. Bart’s work requires him to travel frequently. 
He stays away from home a few days a week. After Leo was born, Agda 
stayed home with the baby for a few months and then returned to her 
full-time job in a pharmacy. It was important for her to be professionally 
active. When Agda was at work, Bart’s mother took care of Leo. Tensions 
arose between the women with regard to their visions of proper childcare 
and upbringing. At the same time, Leo’s grandmother was considered 
a natural replacement for his mother and the couple did not consider 
seriously other care solutions. After becoming pregnant with their second 
child, Agda decided to leave her demanding job in a pharmacy and stay 
home to care for her newborn son, Michael. This dual-income family 
transformed into a single-earner family because of the moral imperative 
Agda generated while going through the diagnostic process with Leo. In 
Agda’s retropective narrative, some blame for Leo’s ADHD problems is 
ascribed to the mother-in-law and what Agda considered her incorrect 
care practices, while other factors include her own absence from home 
which precluded her from noticing when things started to go wrong. She 
did not want to repeat the same mistake with Michael. Moreover, her work 
11 I visited Leo’s home a number of times over a period of two years (the visits resulted in 
485 minutes of audio recordings and one notebook of field notes). I played with him and 
did some schoolwork, I talked to the family members, I walked him to school, I maintained 
regular contact with his mother, I used visual assignments for the boy and his family 
(131 minutes), and I had access to his medical and educational records. I participated at 
psychological consultations twice and at a psychiatric office three times. I also undertook 
observations at school and I conducted seven focus groups with children from his class. I 
interviewed the school director and four of Leo’s teachers. 
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in the pharmacy was not fulfilling. She felt rather exhausted by working 
late hours and she complained about being forced to talk people into 
buying certain drugs that she considered somewhat ineffective. 
Looking at the story of this young married couple and their children, 
I am interested in what Milligan & Wiles (2010: 739) call a micro-
landscape of care. In their understanding, a micro-landscape of care 
could include “the reorganization of specific rooms, social arrangements 
and work practices within and beyond the home to accommodate the 
performance and paraphernalia of care as well as shifting power relations 
they imply” (Milligan & Wiles, 2010: 793). In everyday settings, policies 
and values constructed on a scale beyond home influence how the micro-
landscape of care is produced. With such a focus, ambivalences become 
more visible and a researcher can turn his/her attention to the clashes of 
values and meanings that are enacted in a domestic space. In this micro-
landscape, care has been constructed in reference to a socially contested 
medical framing which became available for interpreting and negotiating 
the meaning of atypical child behaviors. 
The story of this family uncovers innumerable details of this landscape 
of care. Here, women are more likely to take a greater caring role (Agda 
often underlined how she took on all the care work, including concerning 
building the new house). Yet, the father also aspires to greater involvement: 
Bart stressed how important it was for him to spend weekends at home 
and involve himself in leisure activities with the children. The traditional 
family-based system of care-giving is still the norm with which people 
interact, and both Bart and Agda were unwilling to engage paid child care. 
The care of a child and his/her wellbeing is perceived as “a private activity 
built around values of familial obligation” (ibid: 749). This care rests on 
an individualized responsibility for decisions taken mostly by mothers, as 
exemplified by the number of extracurricular activities arranged for Leo 
by Agda. Yet, at the same time, the people involved in this care network 
interact with more “progressive” images of family life and of care practices. 
In particular, Agda interacted with an image of a “progressive”, working 
and educated mother. In this case, opposing social norms and discourses 
have shaped family and personal decisions about the provision of care 
and brought tensions into the household. This ambivalent landscape was 
perforated by concrete interventions related to ADHD, and the continously 
unfolding acts of care in which the positions of the actors and their voices 
become clarified, empowered, weakened or reformulated. 
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The road towards the diagnosis: dispersed enactments emergent in a field of 
sociality and materiality
The diagnostic moment is not as discrete as it would appear (Goodwin 
& Mcconnel 2014). It stretches over a number of spaces, people and 
ideas interacting in time. Stories about difficulties with a hyperactive 
child usually take a more decisive shape when a child starts to attend 
an educational institution. Within institutional walls, the picture of 
abnormalities emerges more clearly. This is how Agda recalled Leo’s initial 
years in the kindergarten: «And during the first year in the kindergarten 
the problems started. He began to disturb other kids, push them, hit 
them, he was so naughty. He did not want to sit. He rejected paperwork. 
He drew sloppily. He drew outside the lines. We did not know what 
was going on with him». The disclosure of diagnosis “doesn’t come in a 
discrete moment but is a part of series of interactions and encounters with 
a variety of health care personnel” (Jutel & Nettleton, 2011: 796). It 
requires pre-diagnostic work. For Leo, a number of acts of pre-diagnostic 
labeling took place between his years in the kindergarten and his first 
two years in school. These pre-diagnostic actions, well evidenced in the 
medical and educational records I looked through, were performed in 
a spatially dispersed cooperation between the mother, the educational 
staff, the various psychologists and, later, the psychiatrists. Agda brought 
into our conversation the idea of her being the first who thought of this 
particular diagnosis: “[…] and he in the kindergarten, he was like this, and 
we, I asked that psychologist to talk to him, perhaps he has, maybe there is 
something pointing towards ADHD”. Yet, she needed much collaborative 
work for the idea to become materialized. 
The diagnostic preliminary (Dew & Jutel 2014) is a period in which 
a shared and negotiable nature of diagnosis becomes evident. We have 
the non-medical context of a kindergarten in which adults elaborate on 
the behavioral and emotional problems of a child. Organizational routine 
guided this collaborative process. The immediate elaboration was possible 
because Leo attended a private kindergarten with an inclusive approach 
to various kinds of disabilities. The staff members tried to solve problems 
in situ instead of referring the parents to another building and to experts 
who were not participants in the everyday life of the institution, as often 
happens in public kindergartens with no psychologist physically present 
in the building. Since kindergarten, Leo’s difference was tacitly underlined 
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through corridor conversations between the mother and the educator and 
during parents’ meetings with the psychologist. The adults looked at the 
behaviors, tried to find a name for them and then tried to manage the 
apparent difference. Leo’s transgressive behaviors and frequent visits to 
the psychologist’s office at the kindergarten implicitly pointed to him as a 
person “at risk of illness” (Jutel & Nettleton, 2011: 795). At the same 
time, the period between kindergarten, where Leo did not receive any clear 
label, and the moment he entered school should be recognized as liminal. 
The female psychologist in the kindergarten did not clearly endorse the 
ADHD idea suggested by the mother. She preferred to use the safer label 
of “emotional immaturity” and to mark Leo as in need of observation. 
The ADHD diagnosis was not pronounced at that point. This liminality 
generated uncertainty and anxiety instead of hope. Agda was influenced 
by an image of Leo as at risk of disorder. She talked to me about the time 
in the kindergarten as being full of worries about the failure of her child 
(imagining Leo as a drug addict or a failure at school). These worries led 
her to strengthen practices around Leo and his behaviors and to look for 
available expert knowledge that might have helped manage his unruliness 
through specific care techniques. 
When Leo entered school these worries intensified. 
Agda: And I started the search. I got interested that something wrong was going 
on, because doing the homework, I am saying, doing one single homework 
assignment took over two hours. […] When he was to write something, he 
took and he was writing and he was staring wherever, somewhere else. I am 
saying: Leo, write. – What? He started to lag behind in writing the things 
down from the blackboard. 
School means more elaborate administrative procedures. There are 
specific rules for evaluating children, for seeking support for a child who 
is atypical, for stating his/her needs. In addition, the practical difficulties 
of daily life with a child who attends school increase. 
Agda: And I am saying, I also started, I started to search. I was coming back, 
how did it all start? Because I became more nervous. I started to disintegrate 
[…]. Because non-stop I heard that he does not want to learn, that he does 
not work properly, he does not want to do things. In the classroom kids were 
also complaining about him… and he was also more nervous. And I went to 
Dr Glusek, to Morwin. 
I: What kind of specialist is she?
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Agda: She is a psychiatrist […] I trust her. So, I went there firstly alone. 
In two weeks again. And she said – “Come with Leo”. She started to talk to 
him, look at him, observe him and, it was still in the previous year in June, 
and now somehow, at the end of August, I went there again, for a check-up 
and I reported to her about the problems with Leo […] she said – “Well, Leo 
is hyperactive, it is easy to notice, but Leo, Leo has serious attention deficits. 
She started to do some tests with him, worked, asked questions and she told 
me it was noticeable that there was something. And she suggested I went to 
Dr Markowicz. 
Framing Leo’s unruly behaviors as a neurodevelopmental disorder 
should be considered an action taken jointly by Agda, the private 
disability-friendly kindergarten, the schooling system, the easily 
accessible popular psychological knowledge filling the bookshelves in 
Agda’s house, everything that enabled Agda’s mobility and, eventually, a 
psychiatrist whom Agda consulted initially because of PTSD following 
her involvement in a car accident. Yet, such a framing was enabled by the 
existing biomedical practice and the infrastructure of psychiatric care. In 
this framework, the young child was placed at the center of psychiatric 
testing and interventions. He was separated from his family and from his 
mother in order to be understood as an autonomous subject/object inside 
of which certain biological processes took place, producing unruly effects 
that could nevertheless be managed if a proper therapy was applied. 
Dr Gluska works in a private clinic located in a villa with a garden 
in a small town outside Malden. Together with her husband, a professor 
of psychiatry, she created a kind of private asylum for people seeking 
psychiatric and psychological support. Dr Gluska, having listened to Agda’s 
reports about Leo, subtly and temporarily included the child in a therapeutic 
process of the mother in order to quickly detach him and navigate his 
autonomous diagnostic track. She made a pre-diagnostic pronouncement 
and defined another point of the psychiatric infrastructure, where Leo’s 
deficits might have been explored with greater confidence. A few months 
later, Leo was diagnosed with ADHD by the recommended child and 
youth psychiatrist. Because no pediatric psychiatrist was employed at Dr 
Gluska’s private asylum, in order to have Leo’s pre-diagnosis confirmed 
Agda needed to find a specialist in Malden12. Dr Gluska gave her the name 
12 In fact, in Malden, there are not many doctors with these qualifications. To my knowledge 
there are a dozen.
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of the recommended doctor, and she had to decide where she wanted to 
benefit from this psychiatric care. Her financial status enabled her to make 
a choice. The psychiatric hospital in Malden has a counseling centre and 
is located a short distance from Agda’s home. It is a public institution. It 
turned out Agda would have to wait two months for a visit. She decided 
to make an appointment at a private psychiatric healthcare center where, 
nonetheless, corridors become overcrowded with parents and children 
from all walks of life and from both rural and urban areas. 
Multivocality, hierarchy and dissolved authorship: 
the social life of health records
Agda, coordinating Leo’s dispersed diagnostic process, was looking for 
ways of establishing a legitimate explanation for the difficulties they 
were experiencing. She moved between spaces like a patient between 
wards, trying to collect and then hand in notes by various authors to 
different figures who would undertake some interpretational work. She 
registered her son for a visit to the recommended Dr Markowicz. She 
asked the psychological and pedagogical counseling center to test her 
child’s emotions, competencies and abilities, as well as to issue an official 
psychological opinion for Leo —the only one acknowledged by the 
public schooling system. She also took a written opinion about Leo from 
Madame Alice, Leo’s teacher, who served as an intermediary between the 
psychiatrist and the teacher. Madame Alice generated more diagnostic 
evidence. For example, Agda arrived at the psychiatric office with a 
notebook for communication with the parents filled out by Madame Alice, 
and presented it to the doctor. She traced a number of sad faces attached 
with glue and read through the phrases written by Leo: “I ran to the toilet 
and yelled”, “I must work on complying with the discipline”. These words 
and graphic signs were interpreted as proof of ADHD symptoms13. Such 
reported voices were relied upon by the psychiatrist in the process of a 
diagnosis. Concurrently, the health and educational records became an 
attribute of Agda’s competence, a tangible sign of good care. During a 
few consultations I attended with Agda, she always appeared prepared. 
13 However, as I observed while spending time with Leo’s class, in a classroom context, they 
did not differentiate Leo from most of the other boys.
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This is what is expected from her. She knows that, in the encounter with a 
psychologist or a psychiatrist, a good mother is a mother who is prepared, 
who knows, who is able to quickly locate a document for the specialist. 
After a number of medical examinations, the results of which were 
presented during the second visit (EEG, blood tests, blood pressure tests), 
the psychiatrist determined that Leo was suffering from ADHD. She gave 
Agda a small piece of paper on which was written the child’s name, his 
address, and the name of a disease —in this case, a Hyperkinetic Disorder. 
Agda brought this small piece of paper to the psychological and 
pedagogical counseling center, whose staff knew that Leo was being 
examined by the psychiatrist. They would want to issue an official 
document stating their opinion about Leo’s functioning only after Agda 
had brought in the document with the psychiatric diagnosis. As one of 
the psychologists working in the public psychological center explained to 
me, the professionals working in such spaces do not feel competent to 
diagnose this disorder as it is perceived more as a neurobiological one 
than a psychological one. This is the case mainly because they do not have 
access to the diagnostic tools (the psychologist mentioned the Conners 
rating scales14) and to the norms valid for this age group. They also 
consider themselves insufficiently trained. This lack of tools is explained 
by the financial shortages suffered by the public institutions. In this city, 
only one public psychological center structurally tied to the education 
system is equipped to diagnose and issue an ADHD diagnosis. Otherwise, 
a child may be diagnosed only by a psychiatrist (often), by a neurologist 
(rarely), or by a pediatrician (almost never). The psychiatrist’s paper is 
most authoritative as it has the power to pronounce the final diagnostic 
category. From the moment Agda brought the diagnostic pronouncement 
written in the psychiatrist’s hand to the psychological centre, this category 
started to exist outside the psychiatric office as a name. The people from the 
counseling center took this document, read it, and interwove its meaning 
into their own text without acknowledging a psychiatric authorship. The 
final opinion given by the psychological and pedagogical counseling 
center to the parents, under the rubric the position on the matter, says: 
“After conducted examinations, mixed Hyperkinetic Disorder with deep 
attention deficits as well as developmental deficits pointing to the risk of 
dyslexia was found”.
14 Conners Comprehensive Behavior Rating Scale, Conners CBRS, is a protocol used by 
psychologists for assessing ADHD. 
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This diagnostic story demonstrates the power of the psychiatrist’s voice. 
From what I understood from Agda’s account, this diagnosis was taken 
by default by the psychologists working in a small building remote both 
from the school and from the private psychiatric practice. During initial 
consultation, these same experts had expressed doubts about whether 
there was a reason to talk about ADHD in Leo’s case. A certain hierarchical 
order is evident here. These variously situated voices eventually fused and 
became indistinguishable. A focus on the circulation of diagnostic papers 
reveals the relevance of the form of the historically emergent infrastructure 
of psychological and psychiatric help for the micro-landscapes of ADHD. 
The well-established diagnostic and consulting formats, the physical 
disconnection of psychiatrists, educational psychologist and therapists, the 
economy of diagnostic tools and knowledge, and the historically delimited 
lines of professional competences give shape to individual experience. 
The diagnostic documents eventually merged into a final format legally 
demanded and recognized by the schooling system. 
The pronouncement and its contested life
Agda: You did not know, you did not pay attention to his [AWM – Leo’s] 
behaviors, you thought it was laziness15. That sometimes you shouted at him, 
well, you shouted at him all the time, because, you demanded something from 
him and he, as if, did not react, as if he did not feel like. And it turns out that 
it was not it. It is simply something different. And now when we really know 
it is necessary to learn to live with it somewhat differently.
These are the words through which Agda describes a diagnosis as a turning 
point in her care practices. A diagnosis understood as a pronouncement 
can serve as “a starting point, a foundation from which sense-making 
and experience are crafted” (Jutel & Nettleton, 2011: 794). In Agda’s 
narrative, the ADHD diagnosis constitutes a turning point, a moment 
which legitimates a switch from a moral to a medical framework of 
interpretation of Leo’s behaviors. Yet, the diagnostic label can also become 
an actant in the affective performance of familial relationships. It should 
15 Agda’s utterances are characterized by indirection. She repetitively used a personal 
pronoun “you” instead of “I”. This linguistic strategy shows her desire to distance herself 




be perceived as an element reconfiguring larger networks of care that 
surround Leo in terms of the ways in which actions are directed, the 
kind of frameworks used and the emotions felt. The opinion will become 
a resource in the mother’s fight for the improvement of Leo’s learning 
conditions. Yet, this psychiatric technology will also turn into a resource 
through which the power positions, hierarchies, responsibilities and 
blame will be negotiated within the family. The main tensions appear here 
on the mother-father line of interaction, as the child is left out as a “non-
person” (Goffman, 1958)16.
Bart: We had a difficult situation, because Agda later got pregnant [after she 
gave birth to Leo – AWM], she miscarried, and later she had such problems 
that she herself needed help and I think that Leo felt very lost, because, well, 
he wanted to be with his mother, and the mother, she rejected him because 
she was unable to help herself, so she rejected him and he was very lost. It was 
a very difficult period for him. 
As exemplified by the above, Bart frequently talked about Leo and 
his problems in relation to Agda’s transgressions of the mother-child 
relationship. During the research, I could see how, in Leo’s family, two 
divergent explanatory stories emerged. In reply to the diagnostic practices 
initiated by Agda, there grew an oppositional version worked out by Bart 
and his family. In this version, the child was demedicalized and described 
as normal, while the mother was seen as in need of medicalization and 
labeled as abnormal, more specifically as a borderline personality17. 
Bart’s family considered Agda’s moves towards diagnosing Leo as an 
unnecessary folly. They also thought Agda herself should seek professional 
help. Both parents struggled to negotiate their own and Leo’s positions – 
trying to locate and name the problem. Bart, influenced by his mother and 
sister, as well as by an anti-pharma episteme and discourse on attachment 
16 His role during such conversations resembles what Goffman called a position of “non-
person”. “Those who play this role are present during the interaction but do not, in a sense, 
take the role either of performer or of audience, nor do they pretend to be what they are not” 
(Goffman, 1958: 95). I write more about the position of a child in this family in an article 
entitled “Competences as a form of situated practice. Ethnographic reflection on enacting 
ADHD in Poland” (Witeska-Młynarczyk, 2017).
17 Agda often referred to a day when Bart’s mother gave him a book about life with a person 
who has a borderline personality diagnosis. She explained to me that this was a hint about 
her. Bart did not reject this statement. 
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parenting, argued that Agda created artificial problems. Yet, Agda did not 
want to align with this explanation. She wanted to regain lost status as 
a competent mother. Bart, on the other hand, did not participate in the 
diagnostic work. 
I: Did you decide together about consulting a psychiatrist with Leo?
Bart: You know what, well, no, no […] at the beginning of the year, Leo went 
back to school and he could not, I do not know, find his place and at that point 
all that action with the counseling centers started. But I also was not convinced 
that all these come from this ADHD or, or from a sort of, or, whether this is 
connected to, is it more about rebelling, so as to show that, because this little 
Michael was already there, so I will, at least, bring their attention to myself in 
this way. I am not completely sure, so that, all, all of that therapy, giving these 
medicines, whether it is necessary. Agda was going to all those doctors alone. 
Bart hinted at the big life event as a possible explanation for Leo’s 
problems. Again, reading between the lines, there is a mother-blame-
narrative (see: Blum, 2015; Singh, 2004), in which Agda favored the new 
baby and again did not give enough time and love to Leo. Bart distanced 
himself from the diagnosing process, introducing it as Agda’s business 
in which no one else had ever participated. Meanwhile, Bart did not 
seem interested in taking control of medical care – he never attended 
psychiatric consultations, yet at the same time he was tacitly complicit in 
giving Leo psychostimulant drugs when Agda was away from home. Apart 
from his family, Bart gained one more ally strengthening his not very well-
articulated oppositional voice —Madame Alice, Leo’s teacher. One day, 
Bart recalled in front of Agda and me the conversation they had with the 
teacher concerning Leo and his readiness to pass on to another grade: 
Bart: She even said something like, that we should also be careful with these 
opinions from these kinds of psychological centers, because the child can be 
stressed out […]. Or that someone is giving a medicine, she also said this, 
that someone is prescribing a pill for a child, even when he does not know the 
child and after one or two meetings, so that we should be careful. […] That 
this opinion may be unreliable. 
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School and less palpable ways of elaborating the diagnosis
Varied opinions may surround uncertain diagnostic categories, and 
conflicts over meaning may arise in various phases of the diagnostic 
work. Landscapes of care in which children with ADHD diagnoses dwell 
are quite complex. In the case of ADHD, school is a crucial element of 
the landscape of care. It is a space in which the agency of the diagnostic 
category is further elaborated. Most of the children in Leo’s class did 
not know what ADHD meant. Those who knew said that ADHD was 
“a disease, when someone does not know how to control himself ”, was 
“when someone gets crazy”, “when someone cannot sit in one place”18. 
One girl explained to me: 
Busia: I know what ADHD is. It is when kids get crazy. I watched one movie. 
It was that children were fighting, kicking and talking to themselves and 
crying. They behaved in a weird way. 
Me: Did you watch this film alone?
Busia: No, with my mother. And they did not want to eat something. 
Me: Was it explained why they behaved this way?
Busia: No. I do not know. But it was said that these children had ADHD. 
Me: How would you know it was ADHD?
Busia: Because it was written: “Children with ADHD”. 
Those children who knew the abbreviation associated it with something 
that they could have used as an insult or with something that could have 
made them laugh or with something weird. Some of them eagerly imitated 
behaviors produced by ADHD and used it as a resource for playing out. 
Yet, they did not know the causes of this “weird” condition. Importantly, 
those children in Leo’s class with some knowledge of ADHD, had no idea 
of Leo’s diagnosis and would not have pointed to Leo as an ADHD child. 
As noticed by his teachers, Leo did not stand out in the class in terms of 
everyday behaviors. My observations conducted in school confirmed that 
he did not break up the normative order in any unusual way. His disability 
did not manifest in a way that could be perceived by his peers. Nor did Leo 
use the label in interactions with his classmates because he lacked precise 
knowledge of the connection between the abbreviation and himself. He 
learned about it indirectly only during encounters with a psychiatrist, 
18 The citations come from the research I conducted with Leo’s classmates in the form of 
focus groups composed of 2-3 children. 
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overhearing his parents talking to each other, or listening to them talk to 
other adults. He also figured out his difference through regular everyday 
practices mediated by medical technologies such as pill taking, measuring 
his blood pressure, and tapping his feet on a scale. He made attempts to 
take the ADHD name into his possession by confronting his parents. Yet, 
the mother clearly denied the relevance of the concept. She reported: 
“Maybe he heard somewhere because one day he told me something… 
not that he had ADHD, but he asked what ADHD was. No, no, Leo, this 
is just an abbreviation, not important, yeah? I passed it over.” In another 
conversation with me she confessed: “We do not tell him he has ADHD 
because we are afraid that, if he knew, he would have abused it —I will not 
do something because I have ADHD”. Leo’s father also reported situations 
in which Leo visibly struggled with his difference and implored the adult 
carer to help him work out what was going on. «He asks me sometimes: 
—Am I sick? Because when he, for example, does something wrong: —I 
am a psycho! —he yells, I am stupid!» 
In a classroom, it was possible to keep the name away from Leo because 
Leo’s biology did not manifest itself in any overt fashion and because he 
obeyed the social norms. Another crucial element in this landscape was 
the position taken by the principal teacher. Madame Alice perceived Leo 
as a normal child and she did not distinguish him from other children on 
an everyday basis in the classroom. Other teachers had a similar approach, 
such as a football instructor, who came up to me in school to ask about 
my research: “Look [showing Leo and other boys from his class sitting in 
a gym], they all sit calmly – does anyone there have ADHD? … I do not 
see. A normal kid [talking about Leo]”. Similarly, an English teacher, while 
talking to me about Leo, recalled the first months when Leo started to take 
psychostimulants —“He was like frozen”. He thus voiced his criticism of 
the medicalizing of children. 
The legal discourse dictates that the school must accept the opinion 
issued by the psychological center allocated to the school. The teachers 
must treat Leo as a child with special educational needs. If such an 
opinion is issued, the teachers must adjust their work according to the 
recommendations. In the case of ADHD, such recommendations written 
on a piece of paper by an employee of a psychological center include the 
following: the pupil should sit in the front row and be allowed to move 
frequently, e.g. go to moisten the board eraser, the teacher should check 
whether the pupil has noted down a homework assignment, and tap the 
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pupil’s arm to refocus his attention. Madame Alice did all this in a subtle 
way, but not because she had received a piece of paper from a psychological 
center. From what I observed, she did this with every child she recognized 
as being in need of repetition, attention or movement. 
The psychiatrist’s office
The literature on diagnosis explains that the nature of the medical 
encounter is dialogical. The process of “organizing illness” depends on the 
ways in which the attention is directed, the symptoms are talked about or 
the evidence is displayed (Olson & Abeysinghe 2014). In the case of Leo, 
it was Agda and the psychiatrist who, on a regular basis, negotiated the 
meaning around ADHD. 
During visits to the child psychiatrist’s office, the mother and the 
female psychiatrist acted in ways that confirmed the diagnosis and the 
chosen treatment. During the interaction, Agda performed her role of 
a competent mother. From my conversations with the psychiatrist and 
observations made over three visits, I saw clearly that the medics’ motive 
was to provide Agda with some support, confirm that her efforts were taking 
the proper direction, and acted as a backing for “the overtired mothers”. 
The visit and the social acts performed can be read as an expression of 
solidarity between the mother and the medical authority. This medical 
figure strengthened the mother’s position in the given constellation. The 
dynamics are visible in the following passages uttered during the visit. 
Agda opened the meeting by expressing her satisfaction with the 
pharmacotherapy: “When he does not get the pill he is, evidently, a kind… 
even my mother noticed […] [when he takes the pill] he calms down, even 
Madame Alice said, he could concentrate OK. He works with Miss Martha 
[a tutor who comes to their home once a week] —very nicely”. She also 
talked about her efforts to support Leo: “I do not hide, the physical stuff he 
has provided – the skiing, the football, we skate […]. I even introduced a 
plan of a day, there is for each day a plan, it hangs on the wall. For each day 
separately, it is written down – what he will do, how many hours”. During 
this meeting, Agda repeatedly showed her engagement and competence. 
She had hired a private teacher, Miss Martha, who visited their home to 
work with Leo on his deficits. With this move she gained much favor from 
the doctor who made a few positive comments on her report. 
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As I understood from my conversation with her, the psychiatrist 
felt that Leo was in good hands and that his mother, who she saw as 
an exemplary caring mother, was performing the required technical 
tasks well. She weighed Leo, she took his blood pressure every day, and 
she experimented with the quantity and frequency of medication. Her 
education as a pharmacist helped her perform the medical tasks that 
were expected to be carried out by a mother. Agda was very eager to take 
them up. She left the psychiatrist’s office with a sense that an authoritative 
voice spoke for her. Listening to her reporting about the consultations, 
I interpreted her experience of these interactions as generative of good 
feelings —that she was performing well as a mother, for which she was 
valued. 
While the ADHD label was attached to Leo through indirect 
communication, leaving him no space to fully interact with it, his mother 
was empowered by the diagnostic category both in educational and 
domestic spaces. Yet, by taking it up, she also entered an emotionally 
unstable, socially contested territory. As I learned from my observations in 
the home and from conversations with Bart, he saw no benefit in holding 
to this diagnosis. To the contrary, he felt it would have been beneficial for 
his child to oppose it. At the same time, however, he lacked the power to 
turn it into an invalid pronouncement or a sham. Instead, he played with 
the meaning of the diagnosis through indirect everyday communication, 
such as when he criticized Agda for giving little Michael a tranquillizer 
when he had trouble falling asleep. His anti-pharma episteme pronounced 
in this specific situation was just a tiny example of an extension of the 
criticism directed at Agda’s engagement with the psychiatric treatment of 
Leo’s behaviors. 
In this chapter, I have provided an ethnographic description of 
an instance of ADHD diagnosis enacted in a medium-sized town in 
contemporary Poland. I looked at the practices that are persistently 
uncertain, loaded with affect and co-produced by differently positioned 
actors and resources. I chose the story of Leo to talk about caring practices 
involving a contemporary Polish family in the context of reforming and 
increasingly privatized mental healthcare, where psychological discourses 
permeate intimate lives and shape people’s fantasies of a good family and 
what a properly behaving child should be. It is a landscape of a constantly 
reforming conservative schooling system, where psychiatric labels have 
become a legally binding resource, although the people who make up the 
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everyday life of an institution do not necessarily enter into an extensive 
dialogue with the label. Eventually, it is a landscape in which traditional 
gender roles continue to shape family life, where the figure of a mother 
is particularly loaded with expectations. This landscape of care, as noted 
by Milligan & Wiles (2010: 740), comes as “a complex embodied and 
organizational spatiality that emerges from and through the relationships 
of care” (2010: 740).
I offer this story as a critical reflection on the new medical 
developments (e.g. neuroscience, pharmaceuticalization in pediatric 
psychiatry, expansion of diagnostic practices into schools) that affect lives 
of children in the formerly socialist countries of East Central Europe. I 
bear in mind that Leo’s story is just one possible configuration of how 
ADHD is enacted in Malden. It seems to me that in this landscape of care 
the local solutions to specific problems of unruly children have not yet 
been stabilized. The neurobiological framework is available as a resource 
and comes in as an actant, yet ADHD remains a controversial label which, 
once received, opens up a way for various socially situated enactments. 
Surprisingly seldom do we raise questions about the consequences of such 
contested diagnostic processes for the children themselves. 
Coda
My last visit to Leo’s house took place when Leo was at school. Agda, 
Bart and Michael received me with a cup of tea. Unexpectedly, the 
micro-landscape of care gained another dimension. When I asked about 
Agda’s pharmacotherapy (she visits a psychiatrist regularly and takes 
antidepressants with various effects), she laughed and exclaimed that 
she had a new form of therapy. She called her husband, who was sitting 
in another room: «Honey, is it true that I have a new sort of therapy?» 
When Bart came over to the kitchen table, Agda took out a little booklet 
and started to explain what had replaced her psychiatrist and at the same 
time helped her to finally accept that she has «such a child». Now, the 
story had turned into a tale of becoming a part of a religious movement 
within a catholic church that enabled “the renewal” of the entire family. 
I found it captivating that this new extension was so neatly interwoven 
by Agda and Bart into the practices of caring for and about an ADHD 
child. Agda now argued that her fate as an ADHD mother was chosen 
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by God, and her most burning task was to face it and care for Leo just 
the way he was —hyperactive, inattentive and impulsive. For Bart, God 
and religion were always dear, just not practiced, and they helped him to 
grasp his love for Leo. The new religious component did not eradicate the 
pharmaceutical agent that helped Leo perform at school, but it allowed the 
family to embrace the conflicting narratives and understand that the ways 
in which each family member struggled with Leo’s difficult behaviors had 
a meaning and made sense. Hence, whatever they had lived through thus 
far was meant to be. 
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DIAGNOSTIC UNCERTAINTY AND PATHWAYS 











Abstract: Stemming from a study with families of migrant & non-migrant 
backgrounds in Montréal on children’s stomach pains, this paper questions 
how ways of dealing with medical uncertainty has bearing on pathways to 
care. These pathways are enacted within and beyond the family space as 
well as in medical settings. While acknowledging that group practices call 
for nuance, non-migrant children lead a greater quest for legitimacy of 
their pain while most migrant families place stomach aches in the range 
of normality. 
Keywords: uncertainty, pain, care pathways, migrant & non-migrant 
children, agency
Diagnóstico incierto e itinerarios terapéuticos de niños de familias 
inmigrantes y no inmigrantes
Resumen: Tras estudiar la percepción y tratamiento de dolores estoma-
cales de niños de familias nativas y migrantes en Montréal, indagamos la 
respuesta a la incertidumbre médica y cómo afecta los itinerarios terapéu-
ticos. Aunque cada grupo es diverso, las familias nativas tienden a dudar 
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de la veracidad de la queja de los niños mientras las migrantes ven sus 
dolores dentro de lo normal. Nos cuestionamos si todas son escuchadas 
en la clínica y cómo esto altera los itinerarios terapéuticos.
Palabras clave: incertidumbre, dolor, itinerario terapéutico, niños de 







“Ouye, it hurts”, Simon, 10 yrs, FQ 
“It’s like swelling up and exploding” (Armanda, 10 yrs, LA) 
“I don’t know how to explain it. In my head, I want to, but I can’t put it into words. There are no 
limits! It’s like being stabbed” (Valérie, 16 yrs, FC)  
“It’s like being hit by a ton of bricks” (Simon, 10 yrs, FC) 
“It’s as if someone was hitting me with a stick, eating me from inside” (Florence, 12 yrs, H)  
 
 
The nature, causes and treatment of functional gastrointestinal disorders and related symptoms 
(FGDs) are unclear and place “stomach pains” in a wider area of medically unexplained 
symptoms. These disorders are medically defined as recurrent gastrointestinal dysfunctions with 
no apparent physiological lesions, organ deficiency or pathological findings of the digestive tract, 
and are often referred to as “stomach-aches”, “abdominal pain”, “stomach gas” or “heart burn” 
(DROSSMAN, 2006).1 As with chronic pain, FGDs are widely associated with persistent sensations 
that cannot be related to tissue damage (JACKSON, 2005), and still little is known about the 
factors involved in the onset and evolution of FGDs (WALKER and JONES, 2005; ROSH, 2010). 
From an anthropological perspective, FGDs are not solely confined to the abdominal region. 
They embrace personal experience, life trajectories and social relationships in diverse settings, 
																																																						
1 The generally accepted hypothesis to explain the pain is that there is a combination of sensory and motor 
activity along the brain–gut axis. It appears that the information we get from the outside through our senses and 
perceptions (emotions, thoughts, smells, sights), by the nature of the neural connections in the higher centers, can 
affect gastrointestinal sensations (FORTIN, GOMEZ and GAUTHIER 2013). In other words, stressful situations or 
sensory stimuli may affect hormonal secretions, degree of inflammation, and gastrointestinal sensitivity and motility. 
These internal phenomena combine with individual characteristics (e.g., clinical history, distress) and group 
characteristics (e.g., societal norms, culture), to influence the behaviour of sufferers (YAMADA 2005).  
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words. There are no limits! It’s like being stabbed” (Valérie, 16 yrs, FC) 
“It’s like being hit by a ton of bricks” (Simon, 10 yrs, FC)
“It’s as if someone was hitting me with a stick, eating me from inside” 
(Florence, 12 yrs, H) 
The nature, causes and treatment of functional gastrointestinal disorders 
and related symptoms (FGDs) are unclear and place “stomach pains” in 
a wider area of medically unexplained symptoms. These disorders are 
medically defined as recurrent gastrointestinal dysfunctions with no 
apparent physiological lesions, organ deficiency or pathological findings of 
the digestive tract, and are often referred to as “stomach-aches”, “abdominal 
pain”, “stomach gas” or “heart burn” (Drossman, 2006).1 As with chronic 
1 The generally accepted hypothesis to explain the pain is that there is a combination of 
sensory and motor activity along the brain–gut axis. It appears that the information we get 
from the outside through our senses and perceptions (emotions, thoughts, smells, sights), 
by the nature of the neural connections in the higher centers, can affect gastrointestinal 
sensations (Fortin, Gomez and Gauthier 2013). In other words, stressful situations or 
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pain, FGDs are widely associated with persistent sensations that cannot be 
related to tissue damage (Jackson, 2005), and still little is known about 
the factors involved in the onset and evolution of FGDs (Walker and 
Jones, 2005; Rosh, 2010). From an anthropological perspective, FGDs 
are not solely confined to the abdominal region. They embrace personal 
experience, life trajectories and social relationships in diverse settings, 
including the clinical space and broader healthcare environments beyond 
the material body. In turn, these dimensions colour the interpretation of 
FDG symptoms, their meanings and the actions undertaken to alleviate 
suffering, that give way to an array of healthcare pathways. 
Montreal is a cosmopolitan city that welcomes between 40,000 
and 50,000 migrants each year from over 100 different countries. Even 
though 31% of the population is born abroad, only a small percentage 
(9%) of patients of a paediatric gastroenterology hospital clinic seeking 
consultations for symptoms associated with FGDs are migrants (Caplan, 
Walker and Rasquin, 2005). The prevalence rates of FGDs are 13–20% 
in the general Canadian population, 10–15% in the global population, 
and approximately 10% in the paediatric population (Fortin, Gomez 
and Gauthier, 2013). So…. if both migrant and non-migrant children 
can experience FGDs, and mostly non-migrant children attend a 
specialized hospital clinic for this pain, what do migrant children do when 
experiencing “severe” stomach pain and where do they go? 
Stemming from a study on how children’s stomach pains are 
understood and treated, in this chapter we focus on paths to care of 
migrant and non-migrant children and their families, with particular 
attention to biomedical spaces. We examine the interpretative and 
pragmatic aspects of migrant and non-migrant patient and family life 
with FGDs and discuss how symptoms, meanings and actions taken to 
relieve them are shaped by a diversity of relations, within and outside the 
family. Non-migrant children seem to encounter more difficulties when 
seeking parental recognition of their pain at home, while most migrant 
families talk with what we perceived as greater “acceptance” of their child’s 
stomach-aches. We find that non-migrant families are more likely to 
sensory stimuli may affect hormonal secretions, degree of inflammation, and gastrointestinal 
sensitivity and motility. These internal phenomena combine with individual characteristics 
(e.g., clinical history, distress) and group characteristics (e.g., societal norms, culture), to 
influence the behaviour of sufferers (Yamada 2005). 
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consult “formal” health professionals while migrant families more readily 
rely upon home remedies and family support. In conclusion, the medical 
encounter is reaffirmed as a space permeated by relational uncertainty, 
reflecting the different registers of expression inherent to cosmopolitan 
milieus. Narrative practices are an essential dynamic of this encounter, 
and we question whether migrant and non-migrant families’ voices are 
equally heard in these clinical spaces and how this impacts diagnosis (as 
an intersubjective process) and care. But first, a few words on the study 
that fostered these ideas; we follow this by a rapid overview of diagnostic 
uncertainty and help seeking patterns.
The study
This study was supported by a Québec funding agency (FRSQ, 2008-2011) 
and carried out with fellow anthropologists and medical colleagues.2 We 
met with 43 children (8-16 years of age) and 38 families of migrant (16/38) 
and non-migrant background (22/38) (Haiti [H], North Africa [NA], Latin 
America [LA], Eastern Europe [EE] and French speaking Québécois [FQ]) 
(total  : 81 interviews).3 All children had experienced severe abdominal 
pain over the last two months. Nine families were recruited in a paediatric 
gastroenterology clinic and the 29 others, in the community. The main 
themes documented were the development, perception and expression 
of the children’s abdominal pain; explanations and meanings attributed 
to the symptoms; actions4 undertaken to relieve the pain, and families’ 
2 Gilles Bibeau, Andrée Rasquin, Christophe Faure and Sylvie Fortin (principal investigator) 
with strong support of research assistants Annie Gauthier and Liliana Gomez Cardona. 
3 The study was approved by the ethics research committee of both the paediatric hospital 
where some of the families were recruited and the principal investigator’s university ethics 
board. Consent was obtained by every member of the family taking part in the family 
interview including the child or children experiencing stomach pains. Drawings as well as 
verbal exchanges (verbatim) were an integral part of the interviews with the later.
4 The signs, meanings and actions model (Corin et alii 1992) was used for the analysis, 
in order to better understand the health care pathways of our participants. The semiologic 
variables (signs) are the symptoms characterising the child’s experience of FGDs. The 
interpretation variables (meanings) are the patients’ and families’ own representations of 
the onset and evolution of the symptoms. The pragmatic variables (actions) are the many 
different methods used to relieve the child’s symptoms, whether home or medical treatments 
or paramedical services. In short, how one identifies different manifestations of “stomach 
aches”, as well as their meaning(s) and takes action to relieve the pain are socially, culturally, 
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relationships with medical services. The collected narratives were analysed 
thematically, with data compared on three levels: between respondents in 
the same family, between families of the same ethnic group (and in a more 
inclusive way between migrants and non-migrants) and between families 
who consulted the paediatric gastroenterology clinic and those who did 
not. In this chapter, we focus on paths to care.
The complexities of uncertainty… and diagnosis
In 1988, Renée Fox confirmed what other researchers had found 
previously: despite formidable scientific progress, the practice of medicine 
was permeated with insoluble uncertainty. She distinguished two types of 
uncertainty. The first results from the impossibility of being familiar with 
all medical knowledge and techniques. The second arises from the inherent 
limitations of medical science and the fact that there are questions about 
the human body that no doctor, however qualified, can solve. When she 
revisited her work in 2003, the literature revealed signs of deep uncertainty 
that went to the very foundations of medical thought. She wrote about the 
insistent questioning of the links between the scientific and non-scientific 
aspects of the practice of medicine; between theory and its applications; 
and between knowledge, perceptions and beliefs. 
These thoughts have been furthered by many, as medical uncertainty 
gives rise to a rich body of literature (Jutel 2011, 2010). For Babrow and 
Kline (2000), the desire to eliminate uncertainty is rooted in a belief system 
that holds medicine as an objective practice where causal determinism can 
be elucidated with certainty, and the possibility of developing definitive 
tests for specific diseases (the key to diagnosis and treatment). On the 
contrary Kirmayer, Groleau, Loper et alii (2004: 664) remind us that 
as medical knowledge and technology evolves, diagnosis uncertainty may 
diminish but that “fundamental epistemological constraints on what can 
be know in the clinical context will persist.” Diagnostic systems are rooted 
in ideal types that can be very different from individual illness experiences, 
while clinical medicine applies general knowledge to specific patients. 
an often politically based. Also, this analytical model does not necessarily infer a linear model 
of explanation or action but suggests, rather, that all three dimensions must be examined 
in order to better grasp the trajectories at hand as well as the variations within each facet 
(Bibeau and Corin, 1995).
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While both doctors and people who suffer from FGDs share the 
hope that symptoms can be explained and treated, many clinicians 
define FGDs from a variety of points of view, often presuming that the 
pain is imagined (Schurman, Heather and Craig, 2010). Given the 
typical absence of apparent organic lesions, functional gastrointestinal 
disorders are conceptualized and studied largely from a biopsychosocial 
perspective (Drossman, Creed, Olden et alii, 1999). As in the wider 
area of the medically unexplained symptoms (MUS),5 clinicians, patients 
and researchers remain uncertain about the nature, causes and treatment 
of FGDs (Rosh, 2010; Casiday, Hungin, Cornford et alii, 2008; 
Walker and Jones, 2005). The Rome Foundation, an international non-
governmental organization that provides assistance for the diagnosis and 
treatment of FGDs, has identified four sources of uncertainty: (1)  the 
absence of biological markers to define the pathology; (2) dissatisfaction 
with treatment; (3) not knowing what triggers the pain or whether it is 
serious, and (4)  inability to control the pain (Drossman, 2007). And as 
in MUS, lack of diagnosis, prognosis or treatment give way to “embodied 
doubt and uncertainty” (Nettleton, 2006:1167). 
Many studies also underline how diagnostic uncertainty generates 
clinical uncertainty (Talley, 2004; Cash, Schoenfeld and Chey, 2002). 
As well, diagnostic uncertainty can make parents anxious, especially if 
they feel that doctors may be missing a serious illness causing their child’s 
symptoms or if the doctor suggests that the symptoms are emotional and 
psychological. According to Boyle (1996), this climate of anxiety triggers 
or reinforces the child’s pain, while denying the social recognition of their 
suffering (Dumit, 2006). It may also be a site of tension among caregiver, 
sufferer and other family members. 
Help seeking
Beyond diagnostic uncertainty though, what do we know of help seeking 
behaviours in relation to FGDs? Medical consultations are thought to vary 
with the severity, frequency, duration and repercussions of the “disorder” 
on children’s everyday activities (Hyams, Burke, Davis et alii, 1996); other 
5 According to Kirmayer, Groleau, Loper et alii (2004), patients with MUS in Denmark, 
UK and Canada account for 15% to 30% of all primary care consultations.
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studies show that the decision to seek or not to seek medical attention is 
embedded in the mother’s perception. If she believes that her child displays 
psychological distress (Levy, Whitehead, Walker et alii, 2004), perceives 
that her child’s symptoms are severe (Lane, Weidler, Czyzewski et alii, 
2009), or that the stomach aches will persist and disrupt her child’s everyday 
activities (Venepalli, Nan Tilburg and Whitehead, 2006) she is likely 
seek medical advice. On the other hand, mothers who consider their child’s 
stomach aches as normal or believe that the symptoms will disappear may 
not seek medical attention (Venepalli, Nan Tilburg and Whitehead, 
2006). In line with Bluebond-Langner (1996) for whom family dynamics and 
care paths are interwoven, the perceived intensity of symptoms is stronger 
in families who are more likely to attribute the symptoms to a biological 
cause as well as with families who experience conflicting relationships. In 
turn, in a diversity of national contexts, clashing family relationships are 
associated with more severe gastrointestinal symptoms while supportive 
family relationships are associated with less severe symptom manifestation 
(Gerson, Gerson, Awad et alii, 2006). 
The quality of a family’s past biomedical encounters may also have 
a bearing on the child or family’s pathways to care. In cosmopolitan 
contexts, differences in interpretation and narrative practices can result in 
communication difficulties within clinical encounters (Gauthier, Bibeau 
and Alvarez, 2008; Fortin, 2008) leading to inequalities in the evaluation 
of the condition and treatments offered (Crowley-Matoka, Somnath, 
Dobscha et alii, 2009). Beyond communication issues, pathways to care, 
therapeutic itineraries and choices can resonate with multiple rationales 
that stem from structural issues (healthcare systems, medical traditions, 
social status) and other circumstances (financial issues, social networks 
and familial contexts). As well, former encounters with illness and how it 
is perceived in prior homelands may come into play. What do our stories 
reveal? Were the children listened to? How did the families respond? And 
the clinic? Were all voices heard?
Pathways to care
Two main therapeutic spaces emerged from the parent’s and children’s 
narratives of FGDs: home remedies and care and biomedical treatments 
(see table 1). Many families (29 out of 38) regardless of background or 
place of recruitment turned to biomedical health services (paediatricians 
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and general practitioners, hospital emergencies, as well as paediatric 
or paediatric gastroenterology clinics) at least once for their child’s 
stomach-aches episodes. However, fewer migrant families (2/11) than 
non-immigrant families (9/11) were referred to a specialized paediatric 
gastroenterology clinic.6 As we discuss further, non-migrant children 
lead a greater quest for legitimacy of their pain at home; doubts as to the 
authenticity of “real pain” are only mentioned by parents of non-migrant 
background. In contrast, most migrant families place stomach aches in the 
range of normality and come up with all sorts of tentative explanations, 
namely food and stress, always framed with uncertainty.7 
Table 1. Actions and Spaces of care 
Home-family space Biomedical space Alternative space
Rest
Getting closer to other 
family members (mostly 
mother) – or - isolation 
from family members 
Changing eating habits
Getting warm (ex : warm on 
stomach, hot showers)
“Over the counter” medication
Tea, herbal tea 
Belly massages
Going to the toilet
Trying to think of other 
things 
GPs or community 
paediatrician 
Hospital emergencies and 








Yoga and meditation 
Terms in bold letters were mostly mentioned by parents. 
Terms in capital letters were mostly mentioned by children. 
Italic terms were put forth by both children and their parents.
Top terms where mentioned more frequently. 
6 In Québec, in order to access third line health care (specialized medicine such as 
gastroenterology), one must first see a GP or an emergency physician and then be directed 
to a “specialist”. 
7 Food, for example, is often questioned, but no consensus is achieved as to what is “good 
food”. For some, the good is “traditional” and the bad, “local”. For others, good or bad food 
practices may be features of the same food, within a given family.
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In addition to providing home remedies, one third of the families (all 
backgrounds) also sought help from non-medical resources (meditation, 
acupuncture, prayer, massages). These therapies were perceived as 
partial, offering temporary relief in comparison to a more formal, 
curative biomedical approach. Religion (and the church as a gateway 
for community life and social solidarity, as well as a place of healing and 
hope) is an exception for Haitian families, for whom prayers are intricately 
woven into treatment. “When we’re sick, before going to the doctor, we 
pray to God. I think God is the only one who can cure me and then the 
doctor with his medication can help” (Mother, H). 
migrant families (2/11) than non-immigrant families (9/11) were referred to a specialized 
paediatric gastroenterology clinic6. As we discuss further, non-migrant children lead a greater 
quest for legitimacy of their pain at home; doubts as to the authenticity of “real pain” are only 
mentioned by parents of non-migrant background. In contrast, most migrant families place 
stomach aches in the range of normality and come up with all sorts of tentative explanations, 
namely food and stress, always framed with uncertainty.7   
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“ Sometimes, I feel really really bad and sometimes it hurts so much I cry”, Grace, 9 yrs, H  
 
Rel i ev ing pain in the family  space 
All families use some form of home treatment, such as rest, dietary changes, herbal tea, or 
warmth on the child’s abdomen. “As did my parents and my grandparents, when someone has a 
																																																						
6 In Québec, in order to access third line health care (specialized medicine such as gastroenterology), one 
must first see a GP or an emergency physician and then be directed to a “specialist”.  
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“Sometimes, I feel really really bad and sometimes it hurts so much I cry”, 
Grace, 9 yrs, H 
Relieving pain in the family space
All families use some form of home treatment, such as rest, dietary changes, 
herbal tea, or warmth on the c ild’s abdomen. “As di  my parents and my 
grandparents, when someone has a belly ache, we give him tea, we brew 
orange leafs” (Mother, H). For many, these treatments and the recognition 
of pain, bring comfort. In some ways, this pain is “normal”. Yet there is a 
limit  to the normality of this pain: “For some people, the stomach pain 
never stops, it goes on and on. Then we must go to the doctor and see 
what is happening. We must have an ultrasound to see what is happening.” 
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(Mother, H). A Haitian mother refers to tea leafs she imports (through 
family and friends) from her homeland. This home remedy for stomach 
pains has been in her family for generations. She also mentions lying down 
with her 10 year old daughter, massaging her belly until she feels better. As 
another Haitian mother says: “Often, when the girls don’t feel well, they 
get close to me. I want to sooth the pain. It helps when they find affection, 
it sooths the pain” (Mother H). Other ways of dealing with FGDs create 
tension within the family or lead a child to go off by himself: When I have 
a stomach-ache, I don’t want anyone to talk to me” (David, 15 yrs, FQ). His 
parents are often mad at him for missing school (due to stomach pain). 
He talks of shame, being ashamed of missing school because of stomach 
pains: “ I make up more manly reasons for my friends because I don’t want 
to say I was in my bed, not that I was crying, but really not feeling well.”
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David, 15 yrs, FQ,  entitled his drawing “shame” 
 
David’s story 
David loves to play hockey. He has a girl friend with whom he shares “almost everything” and 
an older sister he says to be “the brain of the family”. Their mother, a primary school teacher, 
recalls David being a “late talker”. He was three years of age when he started to talk. “He did 
not make the effort,” she says. When David refers of his stomach pain he mentions “burns” 
and “stabbing pains”. His first memory of such pain was prior to a hockey game when he was 
9 years of age. His father had then suggested he take “Tylenol”. David was later hospitalized 
with severe pain, “difficult to cope with”. He is “ashamed” of not being able to tolerate such 
David, 15 yrs, FQ, entitled his drawing “shame”
David’s story: David loves to play hockey. He has a girl friend with 
whom he shares “almost everything” and an older sister he says to be “the 
brain of the family”. Their mother, a primary school teacher, recalls David 
being a “late talker”. He was three years of age when he started to talk. “He 
did not make the effort,” she says. When David refers of his stomach pain 
he mentions “burns” and “stabbing pains”. His first memory of such pain 
was prior to a hockey game when he was 9 years of age. His father had then 
suggested he take “Tylenol”. David was later hospitalized with severe pain, 
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“difficult to cope with”. He is “ashamed” of not being able to tolerate such 
pain (whether in this specific circumstance or in general). David’s father 
(also a primary school teacher) affirms he must keep an eye on David who 
misses too much school: “I want to see his books, I want to see him work. 
It is very difficult to get him to work”. The father says his wife is too lenient 
with David, and she agrees, saying she does not punish David enough. 
This said, mother and daughter share the idea that punishing David will 
get him nowhere. When he is punished, he develops a stomach-ache and 
when he is in pain, he misses school. David prefers to be alone when 
in pain, without witnesses. He watches TV to “make noise around me”, 
reads something “that is so interesting that it will keep my mind busy”, 
“crying and falling asleep”. He sometimes shares the pain episodes with 
his parents, with some girl friends, but never with his teachers and never 
with boys. At one time David’s gastroenterologist suggested psychological 
therapy, to which he complied reluctantly: “I did not want to do it but the 
doctor wanted me to, so I did it, it looked better”. Commenting on this, 
David’s father recalls how his son was not taking the therapy seriously: 
“He did not do the work that was asked, he did not write down what he 
was as asked to, he does not write well”. 
David has no formal diagnosis. His sister associates his stomach pain 
to stress while he does not share this point of view. David thinks it is 
linked to some kind of depression. His mother associates her son’s pain 
episodes to family arguments. He acknowledges this pattern but says it is 
not unique. She also wonders if he does not have an undiagnosed cancer 
(having had one herself a few years back). From a GP to an emergency 
ward and later to a specialized gastroenterology clinic, David’s father 
claims, “they don’t know, he goes from protocol to protocol (for the last 
three years now)”. “They (the specialists)” must find a cause. There must 
be a cause. David hopes someone will “heal him”. 
Yet, for pain to be addressed, it first has to be acknowledged as “real” pain. 
In our study 8/38 families shared doubts on the authenticity of their child’s 
complaints: “the child is faking, trying to get attention, being oversensitive 
or trying to get special treatment”. In a family interview, Louis’ mother (9 
yrs old boy, FQ), asks him “to tell the truth about his stomach-ache, or else 
he will be punished”. Marc’s (9 yrs, FQ) parents say they don’t always take 
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his complaints seriously. According to Marc’s father, Marc often says he 
feels sick to his stomach, that he is worried and afraid of vomiting, when in 
fact he never vomits. Jeanne’s (10 yrs, FQ) mother asks her daughter if “it 
is always really, really, really true” when she says she has a stomach-ache, 
or whether sometimes it is because she has not done her homework and 
doesn’t want to go to school. In some ways, Jeanne shares this disbelief and 
acknowledges only partially her stomach pains: “You know my stomach 
hurts and then in my head everything becomes confused. Like lets say 
I have homework and then my stomach hurts. I become anguished, I’m 
not able (to do it) or something like that”. Another mother also seems 
somewhat doubtful of her daughter Nadia’s (10 yrs, FQ) complaints: “I 
wasn’t really worried because I thought she was just being manipulative, 
because she always wants to stay home with us. So it was an excuse”. In 
short, parents may think the child is faking, trying to get attention, being 
oversensitive or trying to getting special treatment. 
Seven out of these eight families were non-migrants (FQ), many of 
whom attended the paediatric gastroenterology clinic. One could ask if 
these doubts are generated by the clinic and the diagnostic process itself, 
as medically unexplained symptoms are known to generate uncertainty 
amongst clinicians and can sometimes be dismissed by them as “emotional” 
or “psychological” problems.
Turning to the biomedical healthcare services
Many families (29 out of 38) regardless of background (migrant or non 
migrant) turned to biomedical health services (paediatricians and general 
practitioners, hospital emergencies, as well as paediatric or paediatric 
gastroenterology clinics) at least once for their child’s stomach-ache 
episodes. While some families may be referred to specialized clinics, 
others never go beyond the general practitioner (GP). In our study fewer 
migrant families (2/11) than non-migrant families (9/11) were referred to 
a specialized paediatric gastroenterology clinic. 
For the families (18/38) who, at one time or another, consulted a GP 
for their child’s abdominal pain, the outcome was not always sufficiently 
informative. These parents were dissatisfied with the prescribed 
medications and medical advice, as there was no long-term pain relief for 
their child. In fact, seeing a doctor (GP or specialist) rarely eliminates this 
diagnostic uncertainty, even when medical tests are done or medical advice 
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is given. Half of these families (9/18) from all backgrounds (migrant and 
non-migrant) recalled being told that either there was “nothing wrong” 
with their child, or that it was a “mild case of reflux, a stomach bug or 
anxiety”. This situation puzzles parents, as shows Victoires’ (13 yrs, H) 
mother: “They told me they couldn’t find anything, that everything was all 
right, but she still has stomach pain”. 
The narratives reveal two contrasting strategies in dealing with this 
uncertainty. The first is to doubt the need to seek further medical help. 
Victoire (13 yrs, H) relates how she ended up lowering her expectations: 
“They never found out what was wrong or why I had it, so, no, I don’t 
think they’re going to find out what I’ve got”. Jessica’s (8 yrs, FQ) mother 
shares similar feelings: “They say, it’s all right, there’s nothing. Maybe it’s 
because she’s constipated? But she’s never been constipated. Never! That’s 
not it” (Mother, FQ). She feels helpless dealing with her daughter’s pain. 
She doesn’t know “what to do about it”. Feeling powerless, she says pain 
is “part of life” and simply has to be endured. In Nadia’s case (10 yrs), her 
pain is left unbelieved and unrelieved: “Everytime she cries, she screams, I 
don’t go to her. ‘Listen, you have nothing’ ” (Mother, FQ). 
The second strategy, in contrast, consists of persevering in the search 
for medical expertise. Faced with his son’s repeated complaints and the 
lack of satisfactory answers from their family physician, Marc’s (9 yrs) 
father thinks it is time to turn to specialists: “We need to consult other 
people, to find out, as they say, why it hurts” (Father, FQ). This being said, 
the decision to seek health-care advice (in a specialized hospital clinic) is 
always made when parents are at a loss of what to do, after many consults 
amongst general physicians or paediatricians: “Sometimes, the more we 
look for answers, the less we find them. It’s like with our daughter, we 
don’t want to lose her. Sometimes life brings you cancer or other problems 
you know? So when something happens, whoooo - what does she have? It 
makes us worry” (Father of Loïse, 9 yrs, FQ). Geneviève’s [13 yrs] mother 
(FQ) shares Loise’s father perspective “When are they going to find out 
what he has? It makes me mad. It can be anything, but find it”.
The Issues
Attempting to understand why some parents of children with FGDs seek 
medical attention while others do not, we must recall the social nature of 
all medical encounters, where children, parents and medical professionals 
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engage and negotiate different illness experiences and explanatory models. 
These encounters are shaped by the opportunities afforded to children 
and their parents to discuss their problems in ways that both clinicians 
and families can understand, respective to their individual backgrounds 
(Fortin, Rietmann and Duclos, 2011). 
From this point of view, an important issue emerged from both 
children’s and parent’s narratives--the need for a therapeutic space that 
is receptive to the authenticity of a child’s complaints for gastrointestinal 
disorders. Perhaps non-migrant FQ families find this receptiveness more 
easily within the clinical encounter (with gastroenterologists and general 
practitioners) and are therefore more comfortable seeking biomedical 
advice. 
In general, migrant families welcomed that their children sought care 
and attention from their parents. This attitude is fostered by relationships 
within the nuclear family, community networks (churches, friends) and/or 
the extended family. In our data, this form of receptiveness means allowing 
children to describe complaints in their own words, acknowledging their 
pain, diligently caring for them in a healthy (rather than tense) emotional 
atmosphere, and allowing these children to temporarily withdraw from 
other social obligations (such as attendance at school).8 
To enable children to express their pain and intensity requires a 
complex intersubjective process involving the co-construction of a 
shared representation of pain. Receptiveness within the family as well as 
in the clinical encounter accommodates the child’s experience without 
immediately labelling it as false or abnormal. Furthermore, being attentive 
to narratives in the clinical encounter allows patients to become partners 
in care (Good & Good, 2003), acknowledging diversity in the individual 
and collective resources that children and families draw upon in their 
environments in coping with FGDs. Yet, if “feelings imbue subjectivity 
with a character reflective of our embodied being in the world” (Cromby, 
2007: 234), David’s story, as many collected in this study, talks of pain in 
multiple ways.
8 This may appear as parental indulgence that goes both ways: it could aggravate the 
condition by giving it undue importance or rewarding it (Walker and Jones, 2006). 
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Concluding remarks
If we were to try answering our initial questions of what migrant children 
do when experiencing severe stomach pain and where they go, our 
study shows that migrant children share with their family who seem to 
be generally more receptive to their stories of pain and attempt to find 
answers in diverse ways. The specialized biomedical path is less likely to 
be theirs. In contrast, non-migrant families seem more reluctant to believe 
the child or any diagnosis that involves non-organic causes but seem to 
access more easily specialised care. They are perhaps more permeable to 
care providers uncertainties in regards to the pain and its meanings. 
Diagnostic uncertainty is a space into which migrant and non-
migrant parents and children can project their fears, anxieties and desires. 
Whether they accept or doubt their child’s complaints, whether they insist 
on trying to find out the cause, whether they rely more on inner resources, 
extended family, friends, the community, or experts, both parents and 
children take variable positions towards uncertainty. 
For pathways to care, family network support, one’s capacity to 
negotiate uncertainty and, in some ways, trust in the child’s expression of 
distress seem key features in the necessity felt by parents and children to 
reach certainty, while everyone wishes to alleviate pain. Nevertheless, we 
question the quality of the encounters with healthcare providers, as most 
families did seek medical advice at one or another time. All narratives 
reveal uncertainty a propos the medical advice they received. We did not 
document these encounters directly (no observations were done in the 
clinic). But as wider literature supports, narrative practices in the clinic 
are an essential part of the medical encounter (Good & Good, 2000). This 
said, Kleinman (2012, 2013) questions contemporary medicine’s ability to 
listen (and more broadly “care”). The ever-increasing expertise (inherent 
in the evolution of medicine) separates, perhaps definitely, treatment from 
care (Fortin, forthcoming). This knowledge remains disease focused 
rather than illness (and person) focused. In a way, the families more 
closely attuned to biomedicine seemed to share this same paradigm. 
It is not only a question of sharing the family’s and children’s concerns 
but also how this sharing is done, that make sense for patients and 
clinicians, given their respective backgrounds (Fortin, Rietmann and 
Duclos, 2011). Families may not have equal voice as they may not express 
themselves in the appropriate manner in the medical milieu. Uncertainty, 
98
Sylvie Fortin, Annie Gauthier, Liliana Gómez Cardona
then, is associated with medical practice, symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis 
and treatment. It can also be relational and here, migrant families may be 
at a disadvantage given culturally invested modes of expression and the 
symbolic resources they may or may not have.9 
Lastly, in documenting the disparities between migrant and non-
migrant families in a hospital clinic, the different pathways to care help 
us grasp, in part, these patient’s social world, while shedding light on the 
intricate relationships between values and social milieux, between culture, 
practice and the logics that guide individuals to act.
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Abstract: The diagnosis of neurodegenerative diseases is characterized 
by a persistent degree of uncertainty and instability. Based on fieldwork 
conducted at the Memory clinic, a world-famous US clinic for the 
diagnosis of dementia, this paper aims to understand the work of clinicians 
given and despite uncertainty through the unfolding of one case-study. 
Particular attention is given to the gradual production of evidence, to the 
epistemic indecisions that appear at different moments and to the way 
clinicians actively work with —rather than work around— uncertainties. 
Key words: Alzheimer’s disease; neurosciences; medical knowledge; 
experience; feelings.
De la evidencia a la experiencia: el diagnóstico de la demencia en una clínica 
de los Estados Unidos
Resumen: El diagnóstico de enfermedades degenerativas se caracteriza 
por un grado de incertidumbre. Basado en una etnografía en la Memory 
clinic, el objetivo de este estudio es entender el trabajo de los médicos 
cuando su juicio no está completamente avalado en herramientas 
tecnológicas y en evidencia médica. Para eso, recurro al desarrollo del 
estudio de un caso y se da particular atención a la producción gradual 
de evidencia, a las indecisiones epistémicas que aparecen en diferentes 
momentos y la manera en que los médicos trabajan activamente alrededor 
de la incertidumbre. 




A doctor consulted in a case like this must be more than just well versed. In 
the face of symptoms which may be those of three or four different illnesses, 
the thing that enables him to decide which of them he is most likely to be 
dealing with, behind appearances which are very similar, is ultimately his 
flair, the sharpness of his eye. This mysterious gift implies no superiority in 
other aspects of the mind, and may be found even in a person of the utmost 
vulgarity, someone who is devoid of intellectual curiosity and who enjoys the 
most dreadful painting or music.
Marcel Proust, In the Shadow of Young Girls in Flower. 
The Memory clinic, where I did fieldwork, is a world-famous US centre 
specialized in the diagnosis of dementia. Patients travel to this clinic 
from all over the country because “it’s the best”. They come because 
they, their spouses or their doctors are worried that they might have this 
widespread disease  —according to the Alzheimer’s Association, it is an 
“epidemic” — called Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Neurologists at the Memory 
clinic diagnose not only Alzheimer’s but also all sorts of neurodegenerative 
diseases (dementia with Lewy Bodies, semantic dementia, Amyotrophic 
Lateral Sclerosis), and have actually built their international expertise 
on the diagnosis of frontotemporal dementia (FTD)1. These diseases all 
cause “dementia” but present at first with different symptoms, hit different 
parts of the brain, and are suspected to be caused by the anomalies of 
different cerebral proteins. To make a diagnosis, neurologists use 
several technological means in addition to the history of the patient’s 
symptoms: a score on a standardized psychological test, measurement of 
specific biomarkers in the cerebrospinal fluid of the patient (Lock 2007, 
Moreira et alii 2009), genetic testing (Lock 2011) and the assessment 
of cerebral atrophy with various techniques of brain imaging (MRI, PET 
and PiB imaging). Despite these tools, the diagnosis of neurodegenerative 
1 Frontotemporal dementia is a neurodegenerative disease characterized by a predominant 
neuronal loss in the frontal and the temporal part of the brain (whereas Alzheimer’s is 
characterized by neuronal loss in the back of the brain). Described by the Czech neurologist 
and psychiatrist, Arnold Pick, in 1892, it was first called Pick’s disease. While Alzheimer’s 
disease is primarily characterized by disorientation and memory loss, memory is at first 
preserved in FTD. What characterizes FTD (at least its most frequent form) are changes in 
social behavior and conduct, with apathy, loss of social awareness, lack of empathy and poor 
impulse control. FTD is the second most common form of dementia after Alzheimer’s. Like 
Alzheimer’s disease, its cause is unknown and it is incurable. 
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diseases remains rather uncertain. In The Alzheimer Conundrum, Lock 
(2013) illustrates how conceptual problems and uncertainties endure in 
the “Alzheimer’s world” (and this is also true of other neurodegenerative 
diseases which are not of the “Alzheimer’s type”): from the difficult 
concept of “normal aging” to the still unknown causes for these diseases 
and the impossibility of establishing a diagnosis other than retroactively, 
by post mortem autopsy of the brain. In addition, the diagnosis of these 
brain affections cannot be put to the test by a medication —unlike other 
uncertain diagnoses, like depression for instance (Ehrenberg 2009)— 
since Alzheimer’s disease, frontotemporal dementia and other types of 
dementia cannot be treated today by medicine as curable illnesses. To 
diagnose dementia, neurologists therefore rely on a probabilistic reasoning, 
based on the results of various tests (brain scan, neuropsychological test, 
lumbar puncture, etc.) combined with the assessment of clinical signs.
In my 16 months of fieldwork at the Memory clinic, one particular 
question stood out in Lock’s account of this prevailing uncertainty: how 
is medical work actually possible when doctors are not supported by a 
standard body of knowledge? For, uncertainty notwithstanding, doctors 
ultimately need to take a decision. What do they use as a guide or as 
evidence in order to make a diagnosis, if their medical judgment is not 
fully sustained by technological tools and evidence-based medicine? 
What do we learn about the type of knowledge that constitutes medical 
expertise, that is, about the ability (or the talent) of the clinician to respond 
to new situations? 
To answer these questions, I draw on observations of team meetings, 
clinical consultations and patient interviews at the Memory clinic, and 
on the development and unfolding of a case study. From 2010 to 2013, I 
observed about 150 patient consultations with the neurology fellow, the 
neuropsychologist or the nurse, and attended their “case-conferences”, 
during which the team discussed their cases. I progressively shared a 
form of life with this American team: I tried to be up to date about what 
was going on in the clinic, I took notes, I asked questions, I asked for 
explanations, I was surprised and sometimes this led to comments, and I 
learned about the way of making a diagnosis. After the first six months of 
fieldwork, the director, Dr. Daniel, granted me a moment alone to talk to 
the patient and his or her family. The case study that I describe and analyze 
opens with a sketch of the patient and of her husband —reconstituted 
from small hints dropped here and there when I personally met with 
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them— and then follows with the staging of the medical team during 
its discussion of the patient’s case. To keep the “spectacle of the clinic” 
(Featherstone et alii 2005) alive, with its theatrical arrangement and 
dramatic effects, I present this “clinical case” as a scene2 divided into 
different sequences. Each sequence describes the medical team’s context 
of interaction and consists of conversations as well as silences, attitudes 
and nonverbal communication. Through three sequences I study the role 
of the “informant”, a member of the patient’s family, in diagnostic work; 
the importance, in clinical medicine, of analogical reasoning between the 
case of one patient and another; and the clinicians’ judgements based on 
their emotional proximity with the patient. The analysis of the sequences 
that follows their description pays particular attention to the epistemic 
difficulties that arise at different points of the diagnostic work, and to 
how clinicians experience, deal with and interpret these difficulties. 
I detail how, in the process of the making of a diagnosis, clinicians use 
contemporary instruments of objectification and standardized concepts3 
(the MRI, the neuropsychological test, genetics), along with more elusive 
impressions. Through the description of the case, I will endeavor to 
understand how these impressions arise from the “affordances”4 (Gibson 
1979) provided by the empirical context. The work of the expert will be 
understood as an assemblage, or a composition (Dodier 1993), between 
2 I have transcribed the dialogues for this article in several ways: in direct speech as well as 
in indirect speech (both free and normal). Nevertheless, most dialogues in direct speech 
between clinicians are modeled on the structure of theater scenes: they are presented as 
typically done in a play (no introductory verb —such as “he said”— and dashes replace 
inverted comas). Indications about the context of interaction such as the place of action, 
character’s mood, affects and gestures are written in italics. 
3 In saying that these instruments allow for “objectification”, I follow Bessy and 
Chateauraynaud (1995: 307): I do not mean that these instruments are not “constructed” 
or “performed” in certain ways (see Mol 2002, for an example of the study of the construction 
of atherosclerosis), but that they preexist the work of the expert, under the form of codified 
methods, spaces of calculus and specialized processes. 
4 Affordance is a word made up by Gibson from the verb to afford. It refers to the 
information that arises from the environment when an agent (or an animal) engages in an 
action; it lies neither in the animal nor in the environment, but between them, within the 
perception by the animal of its environment. Gibson introduces the word “affordance” in the 
following way: “I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the animal 
in a way that no existing term does. It implies the complementarity of the animal and the 
environment” (1979: 127). 
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pre-existing standards of qualification and a process of adjustment to 
the environment, here constituted by the specific encounter and by the 
concrete relationships between one medical team and a particular patient 
(and her husband). 
Because this chapter aims to understand the work of medical experts 
given (and despite) uncertainty, it dwells on the interactional dynamics of 
the medical team in situations in which opacity reigns. I here follow the 
lead of pragmatic approaches (Boltanski 2009, Dodier 2005, Rabinow 
and Stavrianakis 2016, Remy 2009) that place the notion of “test” 
(“épreuve”) at the centre of their analysis. Studying the ways in which 
people dynamically respond to situations marked by uncertainty and 
tension, and where moral dilemmas are often present, has indeed been 
fruitful in documenting modalities of learning, knowledge and expertise 
(Bessy and Chateauraynaud 1995, Hennion 2015). Following the work 
of Strong (1979), Heath (1986), Cicourel (1985, 1987), Mol (2002), 
and Jutel and Nettleton (2011), which share an approach to medical 
diagnosis as a “process” with movement and temporality, I emphasize 
the processual dimension of diagnostic practices. Particular attention 
is hence given to the gradual production of evidence, its unfolding over 
time, the epistemic indecisions that appear at different moments, and the 
way clinicians actively work with —rather than around— uncertainties 
(Carey 2012). Nevertheless, the uncertainty of the diagnosis itself will be 
left untouched at the end of this story. I will not provide supplementary 
information regarding the veracity of the diagnosis relative to the 
incomplete set of evidences produced by this medical team. I will rather 
focus on understanding the solidity, or the fragility, of the ways in which 
forms of certainty and uncertainty are made visible. 
Sequence 1. “I feel strange”
When I enter her hospital room, Cheryl Joe is sitting on her bed, a foot 
on the floor, the other swinging. I ask her how she is. “I feel strange” she 
answers. She feels spacy all the time. It’s a sort of lightness in the brain, she 
says, while brushing the back of her head: “it’s like being cooped up”.“It 
means, tight, in a small space: like a chicken” her husband, sitting on a 
chair next to her, explains to me. 
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Cheryl Joe is a slim and tall woman who does not talk much. When 
she does talk, she measures her speech and her gestures so as to give 
herself time to voice her thoughts. Neurologists say that she is slowed. 
Her answers to their questions are brief, precise and sometimes curt. Her 
dry humor, condensed in a short line and spoken with a thin voice, strikes 
all the doctors of the clinic who examine her. Mr. Joe remembers that 
ever since he has known his wife, her humor has surprised many. Some 
do not understand it. Mr. Joe smiles: “The doctors of the Memory clinic 
might impute this to her disease!” He himself enjoys his wife’s jokes and 
welcomes them with a hearty laugh that resonates in the hospital room.
They met forty-five years ago at a football game in college. He fell in 
love with her right away. This morning when John, the neurology fellow5, 
asked Mrs. Joe what she still enjoys doing today, she answered: walking, 
swimming, being in love with my husband. Mr. Joe too, from the way 
he listens to his wife, appears to still love her. This visit to the Memory 
clinic is their last attempt, he says, “to understand why a high functioning 
person suddenly crashed in the space of one month.” “But, let’s not get 
depressed!” adds Mrs. Joe stoically. 
Sequence 2. The Informant.
Patients like Mrs. Joe, who stay a few days and nights at the hospital, take 
part in a research program of the Memory clinic. All the tests, the imaging, 
and their stay at the hospital are financed by this research program. The 
team conference for these patients —supposed to be more complex 
cases than others— is often run by Dr. Daniel, the chief of the Memory 
clinic. Later in the afternoon, in the room without windows on the eighth 
floor of the hospital, we are all waiting for Dr. Daniel, the director of the 
Memory clinic. Bruno, a medical student, is connecting the computer to 
the screen to have the MRI of Mrs. Joe’s brain projected on the wall. John, 
the neurology fellow, is laying out his notes. Olivia, the neuropsychologist, 
finishes grading a pile of tests. The nurse Beth is not there but she has 
given her report to Bruno. Two other individuals with pens and notebooks 
are also waiting around the table: Leticia, a resident in neurology, and me, 
5 A neurology fellow is in a period of medical training in neurology after having completed 
his or her residency.
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the anthropologist. Some medical school students and monthly visitors to 
the clinic are seated behind the table, on chairs and filing cabinets. “We 
expect to be a full house”, someone comments. 
Dr. Daniel comes in, smartly dressed with a white shirt and a grey 
linen jacket. He closes the door. 
Daniel. — What have we got?
Bruno [the medical student]. — Ah! Very tough case. 
John. — Yeah, she is puzzling… Bruno might have something…
Daniel (to Bruno). — You think you’ve got the diagnosis? 
Bruno (serious). — I have my hypothesis. 
Daniel (kindly smiling). — All right. 
John (to Daniel). — I think… well, we’ll see what you think, but 
certain things make her hardly fit in anything in particular… actually one 
question is whether this is neurodegenerative… 
John turns to the sheets of paper laid out in front of him. 
John (reading his notes). — So, this is Mrs. Joe, a 63 year-old woman 
who is here for a two-year history of memory loss and functional decline. 
These changes were initially associated with anxiety and panic attacks, 
although over the past year the anxiety totally resolved… (After a pause.) 
According to her husband…
Daniel (to John). — Trusting?
John. — Um… hard to say… I would say yes but… there’re reasons to 
feel that her husband might not be particularly perceptive.
Daniel (impassive). — Have we ever had a perceptive husband? 
John (laughing). — I’ve seen more or less… But just from gestalt: she’s 
described as being the normal one … and she’s not normal. 
Bruno [the medical student]. — He is definitely an odd informant. 
When I was talking to them, first, I thought he was the patient! 
Someone laughs in the back of the room. 
One crucial step in the making of a diagnosis of dementia is the 
assessment of clinical signs, symptomatic of these cerebral afflictions, and 
their unfolding over time. These signs, which are most often trivial events, 
are not always clearly identifiable as dementia symptoms. Losses (of keys, 
glasses, some words, somebody’s name), small changes in character, 
sadness, anxiety, excessive purchases, an incongruous remark: are these the 
germs of an imminent metamorphosis due to a neurodegenerative process, 
are they symptoms, or are they mere difficulties, effects of a “midlife crisis” 
or of “normal aging”? To decide, the neurologist needs to turn back to 
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the entire life of a patient in order to ask if these small changes in habits 
and tastes are in conflict with “who” the person is. At the Memory clinic, 
this historical work mainly proceeds from the accounts of the patient’s 
family. In this US center, as in other dementia diagnostic centers (see 
Brossard 2013 for a French example), patients’ voices have no authority; 
even though they speak, their words are not taken at their face value. Why, 
one may ask, would patients be deprived of the capacity to give an account 
on their disease? First, as a result of their possible cognitive disorders, 
what these patients say might not reflect reality. Second, it would be in the 
nature of neurodegenerative diseases to cause “anosognosia” [a- “without”, 
nosos “disease”, gnōsis “knowledge”]: denial of the disease is one of the 
symptoms of the disease itself. Progressing brain diseases would deprive 
persons from their ability to know in general, but also from the possibility 
of knowing how the disease affects them in their own flesh and blood. As 
patients are a priori regarded as unable to narrate who they are, it is their 
“loved ones” accompanying them at the consultation who recount; at the 
Memory clinic, the identity of the patient and its possible metamorphosis 
are always uttered by the other6.
6 That the patient is considered as unable to speak for herself is contested by studies 
(Graham and Bassett 2006, Sabat 1998) that have been preoccupied with giving a voice 
to the person with Alzheimer’s —as opposed to giving only voice to his or her caregiver—
and which describe how persons affected by Alzheimer’s disease do express insight despite 
decline. From the practices that I document, the neuroscientists at the Memory clinic do 
not share this view —nor do the neurologists from a French diagnostic center (Brossard 
2013). What may remain surprising to us is the fact that the patient is considered to not 
have insight prior to the actual making of a diagnosis. This might be especially surprising 
if we know that many patients who make an appointment with the expert diagnosticians 
of the clinic do not actually seem sick. At the Memory clinic, I rarely met patients who 
could be said to be those “dead without cadaver” like Lula, the wife of Serge Rezvani, whose 
“neuronal soul” had inexorably been destroyed by the cerebral disease (Rezvani, 2007). 
Most patients I encountered at the Memory clinic, seemed to live a fairly normal life and 
generally struck me as being the people Herskovits speculates about, “afraid, sometimes 
terrified, of losing their minds as they grow old” (1995: 153). The suspicion of “anosognosia” 
that explains why patients’ voices are not attended to, could be a first manifestation of the 
“social death” of dementia sufferers described by Annette Leibing (2006) and Janelle Taylor 
(2008). This term was initially used by David Sudnow (1967) to define the threshold from 
which someone, before being physically dead, is no longer considered as a “person”. In the 
dementia world, this threshold would be overstepped at the very moment someone worried 
of having Alzheimer’s, crosses the doorstep of a memory clinic.
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The person who recounts the habits, preferences and dispositions of 
the patient and who portrays the metamorphosis of her or his character 
is defined at the Memory clinic by the somewhat special status of “the 
informant” (also sometimes called “the historian”). This status is 
nevertheless quite ambivalent, as the clinicians of the Memory clinic 
clearly acknowledge. On the one hand, the informant is considered to be a 
diagnostic tool like any other (the MRI, the neuropsychological test) and 
is assumed to skillfully allow the clinician to objectify a disorder. On the 
other hand, the role of the informant is occupied by someone who has 
affective relationships with the patient: the ones who know the patient, 
also exist through the relationships they have with him or her. As a result, 
the informant can be affected, and even suffering in this relationship. This 
raises (as raised by Dr. Daniel in Scene 1) the question of trust that can 
be granted to the informants’ accounts. And to be sure, every now and 
then this team of clinicians believes that their informants are unable to 
tell what “really” happened: because they seem to be myopically in love 
or, to the contrary, indifferent to their spouse; because they somehow 
give the impression of being “bad informants”; or because they appear 
“not deeply psychological”, “anti-western medicine”, “prickly”, “odd” 
or “weird”. Sometimes like Mrs. Joe’s husband, they even look as if they 
could be the patient. In these cases, the team implements what Peräkylä 
(1989) and Dodier (1994) have called a “psychological framing” (in their 
ethnographies this framing is done on patients, not on their informants): 
clinicians scrutinize the informants’ psychology and attribute to them a 
psychiatric label (based on a quite vague symptomatology). The one who 
is usually seen as a key means for the diagnosis is thus exposed as a subject 
of a diagnosis. 
My inquiry, situated in a dementia clinic, is not the first to describe how 
the loved ones, who accompany the patient to the medical consultation, 
may fall under the medical gaze. Ethnographies that broaden the analysis 
of medical interactions to the triadic (patient-doctor-family circle) 
relationship, do describe how parents are suspected of being affected, like 
their children, by “pervasive development disorders” (Buchbinder 2012: 
116) or chromosomic deletion syndromes (Dimond 2014). The parent 
plays a crucial role in the diagnoses of psychiatric or dysmorphology 
syndromes of their child, not only as a narrator of the child’s story but 
also as a “quasi-patient” (Dimond 2014: 11). At the Memory clinic, 
the informant may become a full-blown patient and would be better 
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described as a “co-patient” than as a “quasi-patient”. In this example, 
especially, Mr. Joe is so “odd” that he could be the patient: according to 
Bruno, the informant might be the demented one. For Daniel, who raises 
the question of trust, Mr. Joe’s “perceptiveness” is at stake: because he is a 
“husband” (a man? a man in love?), Mr. Joe seems as “anosognosic” as his 
wife. These impressions (“odd”, “unperceptive”) that John “felt” (thanks 
to his “gestalt”), are adjustments that go against a preestablished plan, 
according to which the informant is meant to help the medical team in the 
making of the diagnosis. In Mr. Joe’s case, the “affordances” selected by the 
medical team during its encounter with the couple, disqualify him from 
his role as informant. As we will see in sequence 4, such disqualification 
will actually be put into action since some of Mr. Joe’s remarks will not be 
taken into account for the elaboration of the diagnosis.
Sequence 3. The Doppelgänger.
John proceeds with the presentation of the case. 
John (monotonous voice). — Panic attacks started two years ago when 
her ophthalmologist diagnosed her with a corneal disease7; at least this 
is how they [Mrs. and Mr. Joe] think about this… They feel that the eye 
problem triggered anxiety, which seemed to set everything off. It’s sort of 
curious, because her father had ALS [Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis8] and 
his case also seemed to be precipitated by some emotional stressors…
Daniel looks at Bruno who is silently smiling. 
Daniel (to Bruno). — I know what you think, it is…
Bruno and Daniel are silently thinking that there is a gene in this 
family which predisposes Mrs. Joe to a neurodegenerative disease. 
7 This disease is called FUCHS: it causes a slow progressive visual loss, which in the end 
usually results in the need for corneal transplant.
8 Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) or Lou Gehrig disease (or Maladie de Charcot), is 
a progressive neurodegenerative disease that affects motor neurons, which reach from the 
brain to the spinal cord and from the spinal cord to the muscles throughout the body. The 
brain’s ability to initiate and control muscle movements is lost: in the later stages the person 
becomes fully paralyzed. ALS eventually leads to death. ALS is a disease that is traditionally 
diagnosed on exclusive motor symptoms. Since 2011 however, a unique gene (C9ORF72) 
is considered as causing both ALS and FTD. It is possible for someone to be sick with FTD 
and ALS, to the point that at the Memory clinic, some clinicians wonder if it is not the same 
disease.
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Anxiety would be the first symptom of the cerebral disease and would 
not be related to Mrs. Joe’s eye problem or another kind of “emotional 
stressors”. One gene (called the C9) predisposes both to ALS (Mrs. Joe’s 
father disease) and to frontotemporal dementia [FTD]9. 
John continues. Today, Mrs. Joe’s anxiety has eased, but her life has 
changed10. She stopped working, she stopped driving because she cannot 
remember where she parked the car, and she stopped going to her exercise 
class because she no longer understands the instructions. Yet, she does one 
new thing: she plays Sudoku, a lot. 
Daniel. — Is that a compulsion? [compulsion is a symptom of FTD]
John. — She says she feels that’s calming… So one interesting thing is 
that she says she can still cook but she has to do it all from recipe; she can’t 
do it from memory. But she’ll work out equations: if you have a recipe that 
feeds eight and you’ve got five people, she’ll work out for each ingredient 
how much to put in. 
Daniel. — A little compulsive. Is this new? 
John. — I don’t get the sense… 
Daniel (doubtful). — Maths and cooking… that’s unusual. 
Bruno decides to intervene. 
Bruno. — Can I say my thought? 
We are all looking at Bruno. 
Bruno. –— She is the identical doppelgänger of another patient: Lea 
Strong… (Showing Beth’s report.) Comparing this nursing report to the 
one of Lea Strong, you could transplant them. 
Daniel (to Bruno). — What does Beth say in the report? 
From the discussion Beth had with Mr. Joe, the nurse reports that Mrs. 
Joe “compulsively plays Sudoku”; is “apathetic regarding the household”; 
she does “some cooking but is very methodical about it: crossing each 
step while it is completed”; and she is “methodically taking her eyes drops 
every day”. Nevertheless, Mr. Joe said that his wife “cares much about her 
family but has much less initiative”. “So more apathetic”, Bruno concludes. 
9 C9, or C9ORF72, is a gene discovered by a U.S. team of researchers (some of which work at 
the Memory clinic). It predisposes a person to a range of diseases: FTD, ALS, FTD combined 
with ALS, and Parkinson’s disease. Its penetrance is not full, which means that carrying this 
gene does not necessarily cause (any of) these diseases. See DeJesus-Hernandez (2011).
10 Mrs. Joe was first treated (one year ago) with antidepressants for her anxiety attacks, but 
they had no effect on her anxiety. Today she is not taking any psychiatric medication. 
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“Apathetic”, “compulsive”, “methodical” are adjectives chosen by Beth 
(and Bruno) to characterize Mrs. Joe’s attitude from Mr. Joe’s account of 
her everyday life. The nurse’s report, thanks to its command of a specific 
language, makes some FTD symptoms appear clearly now, whereas 
previously they were veiled by John’s hesitant report (“I don’t get the 
sense”). 
Daniel summarizes: these “symptoms” suggest “possible” FTD: “We 
have apathy, we have compulsive repetitive motor [Sudoku, crossing while 
cooking, taking eye drops]”. Some symptoms are lacking though: “We 
don’t have loss of sympathy and empathy for people”. 11
Daniel (after thinking). — But she is atypical. I cannot say that the 
genetics have not totally influenced the way I heard the story. (Pensive.) I 
keep trying to suppress it, but in my heart to heart I believe this is going 
to be that chromosome 9 gene, which our patient Lea carries. I think the 
gene carriers are not so typical of FTD, but… you know… it’s a stretch.
A silence. 
John (with animation). — One thing that struck me is that she has a 
very quick kind of wicked sense of humor. 
Daniel (intrigued). — Give me some examples. 
John. — So one example was that her husband said that they went for 
a tour in France and she said: “We must have walked by some mad cows!” 
(Laughing.) Or when I asked her to give me her thumb for the exam, she 
said: “It is attached”.
Daniel. — So she plays with words a little bit…
Leticia [the resident in neurology] (to Daniel). — This is not very 
FTD…
Daniel (to Leticia). — I mean… Sometimes people in the humor area 
are over-represented in FTD… and especially right side cases [the lesion is 
on the right side of the brain] do a lot of punning and playing with words 
… but it’s not quite that… 
Bruno. — I have seen a few FTDese in the research program who had 
a solid ironic sense of humor, including Lea.
11 Daniel bases his assessment of FTD symptoms on the revised diagnostic criteria for 
frontotemporal dementia described by Rascovsky et alii (2011). Here, Mrs. Joe symptoms 
could meet the criteria for the “possible behavioural variant FTD” (the earliest, and thus most 
uncertain, stage of FTD). 
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Daniel. — Yeah, so Lea had a real love for horror, she’d just watch 
horror movies all day long, and her dad died of something, probably ALS, 
and she had that kind of dark ironic humor, and she went very slowly 
and a lot people didn’t think she had FTD. I did. Anyway, she’s got this 
chromosome 9 gene… (To Bruno.) And she reminds you most of this…
Bruno (with great authority). — Doppelgänger. 
What Daniel “knew”, that Bruno had known since the beginning, was that 
Mrs. Joe could be affected by FTD caused by a gene. It would be the same 
gene, the C9, that Lea Strong was recently found to be carrying. The team 
at the Memory clinic often compares one patient to another one. Beth, 
the Memory clinic nurse, once explained to me that neurodegenerative 
diseases “give a coloration to the personality”: a disease gives to its bearers 
a sort of family resemblance —an air that the neurologist and even the 
novice might intuitively perceive —provided that he or she has seen 
similarly behaving patients already. The search for a family resemblance 
does not bear on any kind of formal recognition nor any meticulous 
description; it reminds us of what Wittgenstein (1973) calls “the grip 
of an expression”, that can apply to concepts, face recognition, or the 
identification of a work of art. The analogy draws mainly on the observer’s 
impression of the patient, and the resemblance, which strikes Bruno, has 
not really been explained, except for the dark humor of both women. Mrs. 
Joe has a resemblance with Lea Strong, whose case is sometimes related to 
an audience of medical students listening, fascinated, to the account of her 
“weird” symptoms (in particular her love for “horror”)12. Lea Strong and 
Cheryl Joe are seen by the clinical team to be “doppelgängers” (from the 
German: double goers) —not only “twin” but also “evil twin”, emphasizing 
the curious, even unsettling, aspect of the comparison. This term, which is 
underpinned by a logic of assemblage between patients, can be compared 
12 When Lea Strong came for the first time to the Memory Clinic, she was 48. She first saw 
Dr Blake, who diagnosed her with bipolar disorder. Six months later she met Dr Daniel, who 
diagnosed her with FTD. But the years went by: Lea was coming back to the Memory Clinic 
every year to do the same tests, to answer the same questions, and she was getting better. 
Another surprising thing about Lea is that she was using a ‘check-list’, a sort of aide-mémoire 
of commandments. She always had the list on her and referred to it to know what she 
absolutely shouldn’t say or do. For a patient diagnosed with FTD, her wish to self-monitor 
was atypical. Therefore, for five years the FTD diagnosis was challenged. A month ago it was 
finally discovered that she was carrying the C9 gene which predisposes to FTD and to ALS. 
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to the Morellian method described by Ginzburg (1992: 96-97). In order 
to distinguish original paintings from copies, Giovanni Morelli —a doctor 
and an art historian (1816-1891)— examines the most trivial details 
(such as the shape of the ears in Botticcelli’ s figures) in paintings. By 
gathering these details (as opposed to the attention to the most obvious 
characteristics), it becomes possible to isolate some standards proper to an 
artist and to identify the original from its copies. The theory of twinship 
used by Bruno and Daniel rests on the same logic: from the collection of 
these “weird” symptoms (as opposed to symptoms described in the DSM, 
for instance), the clinician aims to identify the particular “coloration” that 
a disease gives to a personality. 
The family resemblances between the patients of the Memory 
clinic’s “curiosity shop” powerfully support Daniel’s certitude that Mrs. 
Joe’s symptoms are those of FTD, against evidence provided both by the 
neuropsychological test and by the MRI. The neuropsychological test 
dispensed by Emily does not concord with the diagnosis of FTD. Emily, 
first, warns us that she had the impression that Mrs. Joe has Alzheimer’s 
disease (AD): “Interpersonally… I thought she was odd, with a strong 
AD flavor… but it’s me, I could just have missed her”. Second, Mrs. Joe’s 
test scores show a memory deficit: “So the main thing I really saw was 
memory”, concludes Emily. The MRI of Mrs. Joe’s brain is concordant 
with the neuropsychological test: it shows atrophy in the back of the 
brain and in the temporal part of the brain. Seeing the image of Mrs. Joe’s 
brain powerfully challenges Daniel’s conviction that Mrs. Joe had FTD. 
After a silence, Daniel concludes: “It looks more like AD than FTD”. But 
after thinking he reasserts: “I still think she is a gene carrier… I mean: 
the gene carriers are a little funny… They sort of are not the classic FTD 
phenotype… Which is interesting.” 
Bruno’s assessment of Lea Strong and Cheryl Joe as “doppelgangers” 
does not only lead to a diagnosis, FTD, but moreover to what might cause 
it: a gene.13 A genetic cause would justify the “atypical” presentation of 
the disease. Mrs. Joe does not present the classic range of FTD symptoms: 
she “cares”, she is “empathic”, her humor appears strange (as her husband 
13 At this point of the discussion, the team does not have the gene testing’s result, but blood 
has been drawn and the test will be done. Yet, the Memory clinic’s ethics board does not 
allow Daniel to release the results to the patient and to her family (nor to me) since this test 
is in its experimental stage. 
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predicted) but “it is not quite that”. Mrs. Joe is “atypical” just as Lea Strong 
is “atypical”. While Daniel tells us that his knowledge of Mrs. Joe’s father’s 
disease made him stray from clinical reasoning (“I cannot say that the 
genetics have not totally influenced the way I heard the story”), this 
theory of twinship helps rationalize —with “atypia” conceived here as a 
symptom— what Daniel’s “heart” believes to be true: that Mrs. Joe, like 
Lea Strong, carries a gene, one that Mrs. Joe’s father most likely carried, 
a gene that predisposes to FTD and ALS. This impression will have to be 
confronted to the test of the encounter with the patient and her husband. 
Sequence 4. Judgment of normality and emotive proximity
Daniel stands up, introduces himself and shakes Mr. and Mrs. Joe’s 
hands. 
Daniel (charming). — Nice to meet you. 
Daniel offers Mrs. Joe the seat next to his own. Mr. Joe sits down on a 
chair next to his wife. Everybody is looking at them. 
Daniel (to Mrs. Joe). — So I would like you to tell me a little bit about 
your past… 
The team’s excitement, fueled by the search for a diagnosis, fades 
slowly with the long quiet pauses and the sparse answers of Mrs. Joe. Her 
responses, disappointingly concise, force Daniel to constantly revive the 
conversation with a question that finally finds an answer in two words 
uttered in a low and smooth tone. Mr. Joe is more talkative: he describes 
his wife as “very bright, reserved, not a big talker… She likes to make 
jokes, and always has!” During the interview, Mrs. Joe makes some jokes. 
Her humor creates a diversion, as if she was trying to avoid the path 
marked out by Daniel’s questions. Daniel ignores them or meets them 
with a dismayed “Mmm”. After Daniel completes his examination, he 
recapitulates for the couple. 
Daniel (to the couple). — So I think the illness is unusual… The family 
history of ALS worries me a little bit… But I wouldn’t call the motor 
problems bad enough to be ALS and I wouldn’t call the behavior bad 
enough to be frontotemporal dementia. The image doesn’t show a lot of 
frontal problem either, so it is not classical… although it does worry me. 
What I’ve heard is maybe a little bit of apathy and compulsive playing of 
Sudoku and these sorts of things…? 
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Mr. Joe (vigorously). — Oh yeah! She graduated at UCLA School of 
Business, she worked in my office doing all the accounting…(Bitterly.) 
And now she won’t even write a check at home!
Mrs. Joe (joking). — But I’ll write one right here!
No one laughs. 
Daniel (to Mr. Joe). — So a lot of apathy.
Mr. Joe (doubtfully). — If that’s apathy…When you ask her, she’ll say 
that she is unsure of herself: that’s what you call apathy? The cognitive 
slowing is called apathy? 
Daniel. — No. I think there is a little cognitive slowing but boy! (to 
Mrs. Joe) You are quick with your wit, that hasn’t slowed at all! But I think 
the lack of interest in things sounds like a change. (To Mr. Joe.) That, I call 
apathy. (to Mrs. Joe.) Do you agree? 
Mrs. Joe. — With your definition? Yeah, I agree. 
Daniel. — Do you think you are apathetic?
Mrs. Joe (to Daniel). — About some things… (Laughing lightly.) About 
the things that may be of interest to you…
Daniel (serious). — OK… Do you think you’ve become less interested 
in a broad range of things? 
Mrs. Joe. — No.
Mr. Joe. — She has, I mean, she was very interested in politics… and 
now, not at all. She was a devout catholic, and now she doesn’t go to church.
Daniel (to Mrs. Joe). — Lost interest in church?
Mrs. Joe (discouraged). — Well… joining… the car…
Daniel. — If there were a car to drive you there, would you go?
Mrs. Joe. — Sure.
Silence.
Daniel (moving on). — Any question for me? 
Mr. Joe. — I have a couple. 
Mrs. Joe (teasing, to her husband). — About the apathy? 
Mr. Joe (laughing). — Ah-Ah! … (Serious again, to Daniel.) So apathy 
is the cognitive slowing and the memory status is…?
Daniel. — We think it is poor.
Mr. Joe. — You think it’s really poor?
Daniel. — Not really poor but…
Mrs. Joe (calmly, to her husband). – Poor.
Daniel. — Fair to poor: not terrible. (To Mrs. Joe.) I mean, it’s not like 
your memory is wiped out. But you’ve got some…
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Mrs. Joe. — …deficits. 
Daniel. — Yeah, some deficits. 
A silence. 
Daniel. — I am going to give you my card, email me whenever you 
have a question. 
Mr. Joe. — Thank you for your interest. (Bitter again.) Where she went 
to school and where she is now… so rapidly…
Daniel. — I know. It’s pretty rapid isn’t it? (to Mrs. Joe.) What was the 
hardest test you went through?
Mrs. Joe (after a silence). — They were all hard.
Mr. Joe (anxious). — She gets her spinal tap [lumbar puncture] 
tomorrow14…
Daniel (comforting). — Often it’s not too hard: a little freezing and … 
(to Mrs. Joe) Easy for me to say, uh?
Mrs. Joe (to Daniel). — Well, it is reassuring to hear.
They stand up, everyone says good-bye and they leave the room. 
John leaves with the couple, the rest of us stay around the table, in 
silence. Leticia, the resident in neurology, speaks first. 
Leticia (proudly). — Nothing frontotemporal dementia in my opinion.
Daniel. — Oh really?
Leticia (shaken). — No! Why? I think she performed well with you, 
she is very appropriate, after one year of history! She doesn’t have any 
symptoms of frontotemporal dementia! 
Several persons talk at the same time. 
Daniel (amused). — Even the image [the MRI] isn’t good for 
frontotemporal dementia. (To a resident in neurology.) What do you think 
it is? 
The resident in neurology (impassive). — I think it is FTD. 
Daniel (determined). — I think it is frontotemporal dementia with 
ALS.
14 Spinal tap (or lumbar puncture) aims to collect the cerebral spinal fluid in the patient’s 
marrow. The cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) analysis will assess the levels of two biomarkers: 
amyloid-beta and tau proteins. A low level (lower than the “norm”) for the a-beta, combined 
with a high level (higher than the “norm”) for tau, is statistically correlated with Alzheimer’s 
disease (AD). Such result means that the bearer is at risk to having AD, yet this result cannot 
be conclusive (only the post mortem autopsy of the brain can). The lack of standardization of 
the test (see Lock 2013: 114) and the number of false positive (30%) are among the criticisms 
voiced against CSF analysis for AD diagnosis. 
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A second resident in neurology (smiling). — I am changing my 
position: I think the interview…
Daniel (to the second resident). — That too. Yeah…
Both residents nod. 
Leticia (disturbed). — But why doctor Daniel? Why? 
Daniel (after a silence). — Here is why: mostly because of her father. 
Also, I think she has a very odd personality. She is pathologically cold, she 
doesn’t care about this disease: she sits around playing Sudoku, she doesn’t 
ask about the effect on the children. She isn’t concerned about anything; 
she isn’t concerned about her LP [lumbar puncture]… I think she is really 
emotionally blunt. And then, the punning, the joking… (Annoyed.) I mean 
she was more interested in thinking of making a joke than anything I said: 
that’s what her whole thought process was during all this. So I went from 
like pretty sure she was FTD-ALS on its way, to really sure. That’s me… 
Leticia (fiery, to Daniel). — How can you explain the memory deficit 
and the atrophy that we see on the MRI? She has temporal posterior 
atrophy on the left. How can you explain this if we think it is frontotemporal 
dementia?
Daniel (energetic). — This is the gene! It gets a lot of posterior atrophy! 
Me (to Daniel). — But then… what is the essence of FTD?
Daniel (smiling). — I know… I know… (Confident.) She is FTD.
Laughs.
Daniel. — The essence is there: the odd personality with all the jokes. 
I bet in six months she will be FTD-ALS and everyone will agree. 
John (pensive). — I was struck by the anxiety that sort of resolved by 
itself. I guess if she is a gene carrier… because she got very anxious, that 
was her first symptom…
Daniel (casual). — Oh, yeah…? I don’t see it now. She is flat like a 
pancake. (Joyfully.) OK! Good case! Thanks. 
Everyone starts to disperse. 
How can a diagnosis in neurology be in contradiction with what the image 
of the brain shows? Leticia, and I, wondered about this incongruity: how is 
it possible to make a diagnosis of frontotemporal dementia, a disease that 
hits principally the frontal and the anterior part of the temporal lobes, on a 
patient whose MRI does not show such geographical atrophy and —quite 
the opposite— whose posterior brain mainly is atrophic? Daniel’s answer 
—with the gene everything is possible— flouts the presupposition that 
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frames his discipline: the causal relation between, on the one hand cerebral 
anatomy, and on the other, cognitive capacities and mental symptoms. 
Challenging Joe Dumit’s account (2004) of the centrality of brain scans 
in shaping our identities, the expert neurologist ignores the significance of 
the MRI. Moreover, he turns around the image of the patient’s brain: with 
the gene everything is possible, it is even possible to observe an inverted 
image of the disease. The neuropsychological test and the informant’s 
speech —which has not been attended to (“she likes to make jokes and 
always has”)— suffer the same fate as the MRI. The three principal types 
of evidence which are typically used to diagnose dementia are therefore 
ruled out. How then is the director of the Memory clinic, Dr. Daniel, able 
to display such messianism: in six months everything will be clearer (“she 
will be FTD”), trust me (“I bet”) and you will see (“everyone will agree”)? 
Two criteria stand out: first the burden of genetics, second the 
emotionally charged encounter between Daniel and Mrs. Joe. The 
burden of genetics, supported by epidemiological methods, statistics and 
Mendelian calculus, pertains to the realm of what is called evidence-based 
medicine. Although genetics are clearly the bedrock of Daniel’s diagnosis, 
it is not genetics that allowed Daniel to answer my question (“what is 
the essence of FTD then?”) with this quite imprecise redefinition of the 
disease: “an odd personality and a taste for jokes”. This redefinition is 
based on a symptomatology that seems to go without saying, elaborated 
during Daniel’s encounter with the patient. During this encounter, the 
clinician made himself receptive to quite imperceptible clues —at least for 
Leticia and me— which allowed him to consider Mrs. Joe as “very odd”, 
“emotionally blunt”, “cold”, “flat like a pancake”. Historian Carlo Ginzburg 
would put Daniel’s attitude within “the evidential paradigm” —common 
to medicine, connoisseurship, detective work, divination, the art of 
forecasting rain and hunting— for which the analysis of specific cases 
“can be reconstructed only through traces, symptoms and clues” (1992: 
104). At the Memory clinic, these clues are however not “infinitesimal” 
like the “footprints and cigarettes ashes” (1992: 98), “excrements, hairs, 
feathers” (1992: 103), examined by the detective or the hunter. “Taste 
for jokes”, “to not ask questions”, “a lack of care”, are not “imperceptible” 
symptoms, but appear rather as a hazy semiology supported by a rough, 
rather unscientific and pop psychology kind of language —the same kind 
of semiology that allowed Mr. Joe to be judged “not perceptive” and “odd”. 
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These judgements, which seem to elude critique and justification, can 
be understood only from the specific encounter of one reality (the doctor’s) 
with another one (a particular patient); an encounter which, as Ginzburg 
has emphasized, engages an emotive proximity between observer and 
observed (1992: 112). This emotive proximity seems to lie at the source 
of Daniel’s annoyance over Mrs. Joe’s jokes (“more interested in making 
jokes than in anything I said”) and his decision to make the “taste for 
jokes” a symptom. These judgments, based on what Daniel felt, are shared 
with two residents in neurology (they nod), but not with Leticia. Leticia, 
a young neurologist, bases her judgment on diagnostic rules (the MRI, 
the neuropsychological test), while Daniel’s judgment, like that of other 
scientists’ (see Daston 1995: 4), is imbued with emotions in a way that evokes 
what the psychiatrist Binswanger (trans. Minkowski 2002) wrote in 1924 
about the “Gefühlsdiagnose” (“diagnosis by feeling”). Binswanger criticizes 
natural sciences’ method for the diagnosis of schizophrenia, arguing that 
it is often not practicable to enumerate and classify symptoms because, 
most of the time, the “striking symptoms” are not obvious (Minkowski 
2002: 96). Nevertheless, we might experience “the certitude that we are in 
front of schizophrenia”. How? “We will talk of a Gefühlsdiagnose” (2002: 
96). Binswanger explains that his certainty is anchored in the perception 
of a “lack of affective contact” or in the “distinctive expression of her [the 
person’s] gaze” that will “strike” him each time he meets that person, in a 
way that will cause him to be gripped by “a movement of interior retreat” 
(2002: 97). This is a withdrawal that should not be confused with a banal 
feeling of antipathy that anyone can experience towards anyone else. Even 
though the Gefühlsdiagnose does not call for reasoning, it is nevertheless 
the diagnosis of an expert psychiatrist (Binswanger says that it requires a 
lengthy apprenticeship). But unlike medical reasoning that comes from 
the exterior (taught in medical school), this “infallible instrument [is] in 
us. It is our own affectivity, our own personality”, as Minkowski states 
(2002: 93). Feeling then, is an “instrument”, and the goal is to objectify a 
trouble. Calling it schizophrenia is already an objectification, but feeling 
mediates the diagnosis by “penetrating” (2002: 98) a patient’s personality, 
not by “analyzing” it. “Diagnosis by feeling”, as Minkowski insists, is not 
reducible to an “impression” (2002: 95); rather, it appeals to an effort to 
establish contact between the psychiatrist and the patient. 
This effort, which has here been studied through three mediums: 
the informant, the doppelgänger and the emotive proximity with the 
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patient, emphasizes the fluidity and unruliness of diagnostic processes. I 
have documented the ways in which diagnostic work is characterized by 
the assemblage and the reciprocal interplay between stabilized concepts 
given a priori (here genetics) and a concrete and affective relationship to 
the empirical context. The presence of this effort takes into account what 
Gibson (1979) calls the “affordances” —the ensemble of signals present in 
the immediate environment of his or her interlocutors— and shows how, 
despite being driven by neuroscientific concepts, medical expertise is still 
bound to a sensible experience of the world that is never given a priori. In 
the scientific endeavor, the effort is a force that resists, and at the same time 
overtakes, the tendency to mechanize the living. It resists a conception of 
the human being that, as Canguilhem (1965) repeatedly underscored, 
may be necessary to treat diseases but is insufficient for understanding 
them. 
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A DESIRE FOR KNOWING: ONTOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY, 
DIAGNOSTIC EVIDENCE AND GENERATIVE AFFECTIVITY 




Abstract: Using pre-symptomatic genetic testing in Austria as an 
ethnographic case and drawing on recent work in the study of emotions, 
which tries to foster understanding of affect as an intrinsic part of the 
social, I focus on the entanglement of ontological uncertainty, the use of 
diagnostic evidence and the generative affectivities that are “built into” 
pre-symptomatic counselling. I argue that genetic counselling is organised 
by an affective style that stresses rationality and autonomous decision-
making and is motivated by affectivities revolving around the desire for 
knowing about individual affectedness.
Keywords: genetic testing, genetic counselling, diagnosis, prognosis, 
affect, social practice, Austria
Ansias de saber: incertidumbre ontológica, evidencia diagnóstica y 
afectividad generativa en el asesoramiento genético presintomático
Resumen: A través de la utilización de pruebas genéticas presintomáticas 
en Austria como caso etnográfico y sobre la base de trabajos recientes en 
el campo de las emociones, cuya intención es facilitar la comprensión del 
afecto como parte intrínseca de lo social, me concentro en la interacción 
que se establece entre la incertidumbre ontológica, el uso de la evidencia 
diagnóstica y la afectividad generativa que forma parte del asesoramien-
to presintomático. Defiendo que el asesoramiento genético es organizado 
por un estilo afectivo que acentúa la racionalidad y una toma de decisio-
nes autónoma y es motivado por una afectividad que gira alrededor de las 
ansias de saber si se está afectado.
Palabras clave: pruebas genéticas, asesoramiento genético, diagnóstico, 
pronóstico, afecto, práctica social, Austria.
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The striking rise of molecular genetic diagnostics since the 1990s has 
fostered novel forms of medical knowledge and a new kind of biological 
information by means of which a predisposition to future ailments has 
become diagnosable long in advance of any symptoms. Such ‘predictive’ 
or “pre-symptomatic” tests promise great advances in controlling diseases, 
but also entail new uncertainties, problematic futures and unwanted 
affective states in the present for those affected. Genetic counselling, 
which in many countries is mandatory before undergoing genetic testing, 
is intended to mitigate such problems.
In this chapter I deal with some of the implications that genetic 
testing and the estimation of genetic risk can have for diagnostic meaning-
making and for knowing the future as they are played out in biomedical 
consultations and ramify in the lives of those undergoing genetic testing, 
using pre-symptomatic genetic testing in Austria as an ethnographic case. 
I explore what can be learned about genetic counselling as diagnostic 
practice when approached via an understanding of affectivities as a 
generative force that co-constitutes socialities, as suggested by recent 
work on affect and emotion in the humanities and social sciences 
(Massumi 2002, Ahmed 2004, Clough and Halley 2007, Svašek and 
Skrbiš 2007, Seigworth and Gregg 2010, Durham 2011, Navaro-
Yashin 2012, Wetherell 2012, Beatty 2013, Reckwitz 2016). Rather 
than conceptualising emotions in the usual ways as private mental or 
somatic states of the individual, this body of work maintains that affect 
and emotion happen relationally between people as an intrinsic part of 
the social. For doctor–patient interaction, this means that the central task 
is not to search for the presence (or absence) of certain emotions (hope, 
fear, anger, despair, etc.) and to ask how such emotions influence the 
interactive pattern. Rather, the challenge is to understand the interaction 
itself as intrinsically affective. Taking affectivities seriously in doctor–
patient interactions, thus, is not about adding a level of psychosocial 
‘texture’ to such interaction. More fundamentally, it is about recognising 
the generative role that affect and emotions play for such interactions.
In the following I focus on the entanglement of ontological 
uncertainty, the use of diagnostic evidence and the generative affectivities 
that are “built into’” pre-symptomatic counselling and which organise it. 
In preference to the term “emotion”, I use the notion of “affect” here in 
a way that is inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) usage of the 
term, broadly conceived as the bodily capacity to affect and be affected 
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and the continuous experiential flow of somatic agitation, or as “embodied 
meaning-making”, as Wetherell (2012: 4) delineates affect. From a 
practice theory position I argue that genetic counselling is organised by 
an affective style that stresses rationality, client-centredness, autonomous 
decision-making and professional compassion, and is motivated by 
affectivities revolving around the desire for knowledge about individual 
affectedness. 
The empirical material stems from extensive fieldwork that Monika 
Lengauer and I did in five Austrian counselling centres between March 
2006 and June 2007 (Hadolt and Lengauer 2009, Hadolt 2011). Apart 
from analysing relevant documents (legal texts, national and international 
guidelines, etc.), we conducted 21 expert interviews (mostly with the 
heads of clinical organisations engaged in genetic testing and genetic 
counselling) and collected 37 genetic counselling cases related both to 
late onset hereditary diseases and carrier status. Concerning these cases, 
we conducted participant observation during counselling sessions and 
carried out interviews both before and after counselling sessions with 
both counselees and counsellors, at times also with family members. 
Although insights from other counselling sessions also inform my 
analysis in this paper, I only discuss three exemplary scenes from one of 
these counselling sessions. Due to space restrictions and for the purpose of 
giving the level of detail necessary for descriptions of the micro-perceptions, 
actions and shifts in the atmosphere involved in genetic counselling to be 
accessible I leave out any differentiations in terms of counselling styles, 
or the genetic conditions or demographic characteristics of counselees. 
By looking in detail at the affective movements of a counselling session, I 
also seek to contribute to the meanwhile extensive body of social science 
literature on genetic counselling (e.g. Sarangi 2003, Koch and Svendsen 
2005, Kollek and Lemke 2008, Konrad 2005, Svendsen 2006, Prior 
2007, Sui 2009, Gibbon 2013, Timmermans and Shostak 2016). 
Although questions of affect and emotions have also been taken up in this 
vibrant field of study, they have been mainly approached at the discursive 
level, by focussing either on the verbal exchange between counsellor and 
counselees during counselling session or on ex post accounts of counselees 
in interviews. Nonverbal aspects of social exchange and experiences as 
they are perceived and felt have been largely ignored. Let us first look at 
some important features of pre-symptomatic genetic testing. 
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Genetic testing and genetic counselling
Genetic tests have become available in increasing numbers since the 
1990s. They have not merely altered medical diagnostics by adding an 
additional layer of focal points to the canon of diagnostic techniques. 
More importantly, these new techniques allow the future medical histories 
of “not-yet patients” to be envisioned in novel ways as they can be used 
to make a prognosis about a person’s future diseases in the absence of 
present symptoms (including late onset diseases such as Huntington’s and 
Alzheimer’s, certain cancers, as well as a growing number of common 
diseases associated with a genetic factor, such as diabetes). 
With some rare exceptions (Huntington’s disease is the paradigmatic 
example), though, such a prognosis is not definitive, but rather is cast 
in terms of a probability statement. Despite the confirmed existence 
of a genetic indicator in the present, the prognosis remains a matter of 
probabilistic estimation concerning exactly when or whether the disease 
will manifest in the future, and how severe it will be if it does. As in the case 
of genetic counselling before the arrival of genetic testing, risk assessment 
is therefore absolutely central, but now is based on new grounds. Whereas 
genetic risk assessment before genetic testing had to be done on the basis 
of manifest diseases of a client’s parents, it now takes the diagnosable 
genetic status of the client itself as its reference point of biological 
certainty. Thus, when not-yet patients are informed about their “genetic 
risk” for a disease, they are not only confronted with general statistical 
calculations, which they have to translate for their individual situations, 
but they also learn that they are actually genetically “predisposed” to 
developing the disease in question. This turns them into “presymptomatic 
persons” (Konrad 2005), the not-yet ill who have to integrate their 
genetic status and the ontological uncertainty which goes with it into their 
everyday lives, their social relations with relatives, and their future life 
plans. What makes this more difficult is that for most diseases that can be 
genetically tested, there is no treatment or cure; prominent exceptions to 
this are certain hereditary cancers including hereditary breast cancer and 
some forms of bowel cancer. In addition, due to the inheritability of such 
diseases (“classical” genetic diseases which are passed on according to the 
principles of Mendelian inheritance, but increasingly also multifactorial 
diseases with a comparatively minor “genetic factor”) such diagnostic 
evidence not only relates to the individual tested but may concern their 
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blood relatives, who might also carry the mutation and pass it on to 
their children, thus establishing a “ommunal body” (Svendsen 2006), a 
common unity defined by biogenetic relationships. 
Genetic information, thus, is regarded as highly problematic, not least 
due to the finality of the result of a genetic test: such genetic information 
cannot be “taken back”. Related concerns include maintaining the privacy 
of genetic data and protection against genetic discrimination – issues that 
are particularly sensitive in light of the atrocities of eugenic programmes 
in countries such as the USA, Sweden, Australia, Japan, Nazi Germany 
and Austria since the beginning of the twentieth century (Kollek and 
Lemke 2008).
As a measure to safeguard patients and their families from unwanted 
outcomes of genetic testing many countries have put regulations in place 
that prescribe obligatory genetic counselling before undergoing genetic 
testing (Bourret et alii 1998). In Austria, the Gene Technology Law 
(Gentechnikgesetz) and professional guidelines prescribe that genetic 
counselling is mandatory before and after predictive genetic testing, that 
counselling must be non-directive, and that patients not only have the 
right to know but also the right not to know. In addition, the right to work 
as a genetic counsellor is restricted to specialised medical doctors, either 
medical geneticists or other medical specialists (such as gynaecologist, 
paediatricians, surgeons, oncologists, dermatologists and neurologists) 
provided the respective genetic condition falls within his/her field of 
speciality. 
In consequence, depending on the particular disciplinary orientation 
and genetic expertise, genetic counsellors usually put forward one 
of two main understandings of clinical genetics, which can be called 
“autonomous clinical genetics” and “additive clinical genetics” (Hadolt 
2011). Concerning the former, doctors with a specialisation in medical 
genetics stress the importance of their broad expertise in human genetics 
that crosscuts all other medical areas for diagnosis making and their 
sensitivity to the peculiarities of genetic counselling for the counselling 
process itself. As for “additive clinical genetics”, doctors from other medical 
specialities understand genetics as part of their main speciality that they 
only need to take into account selectively; they claim to be the best 
equipped to handle genetic issues related to their main medical field. This 
perspective is particularly prominent in cancer genetics, where the main 
aim is not merely to provide good counselling but also to enrol patients in 
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treatment programmes. This is not to say, though, that all cases of cancer 
genetics necessarily are handled in the institutional context of “additive 
clinical genetics” (as the case shows that I discuss below). In Austria, 
most pre-symptomatic genetic counselling is provided by counselling 
centres located within medical university hospitals or other major general 
hospitals that have their own laboratory facilities for genetic testing (as 
described in Hadolt and Lengauer, 2009 and Hadolt, 2011).
Genetic counselling as social practice
In our study we found a considerable variety of counselling styles and 
“logics” in how genetic counselling is organised as social practice (Hadolt 
and Lengauer 2009). Among other things, these depended on the 
professional background of the counsellor (if he/she is a medical geneticist 
or e.g. a gynaecologist) and the routines of the counselling centre (some 
centres schedule regular dedicated clinics on particular days, while others 
allow counselees to make appointments with their counsellor on a more 
ad hoc basis). In addition, counselling sessions are governed by the disease 
concerned (if medical treatment is available or not, if it is a well-known 
disease with clear heredity or a rare and ill-defined condition), and by 
the case itself (what is already known about the family medical history, 
whether the counselling is taking place before or after the genetic test, 
etc.). Notwithstanding such different “logics”, most counselling sessions 
include a minimal set of phases that must be completed: the opening 
of the session and “setting the stage”; the counsellor’s opening question 
(“Why have you come?/What can I do for you?”); the counselee’s account 
of the problem; the counsellor’s account of what they know so far and 
how they see the case; taking the family medical history; outlining the 
basics of human genetics; (preliminarily) clarifying the genetic status and 
prognosis and communicating them to the counselee; explaining relevant 
clinical findings and what tests are available; explaining and discussing the 
treatment options (or that there are none); discussing and agreeing on the 
next steps for clarifying the genetic status (if still unclear) or dealing with 
the situation (collecting more clinical family data, doing sound literature 
research, waiting for test results, making appointments for future medical 
consultations, etc.); taking the blood sample needed for the genetic test; 
and closing the counselling session. These basic phases are at times 
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complemented by offers and discussions of psychosocial support and —in 
the case of hereditary cancers— getting a place in a screening programme, 
and counselling about various non-medical issues (implications for the 
job situation and health/life insurance, reproductive decisions, if and how 
to tell relatives, joining a support group), etc.
Counselling sessions, therefore, have a complex structure and involve 
a multitude of tasks. Many counsellors explained to us that genetic 
counselling is cognitively and emotionally demanding (for both counsellor 
and counselee) due to the complexity of human genetics and of statistical 
risk estimations, the scarcity of existing medical knowledge about many 
conditions and/or the respective case, and long waiting times for test 
results (often a matter of months and sometimes even years). In addition, 
genetic counselling is challenging in terms of grasping the present and 
future implications for one’s own and one’s family’s health and life in 
general and dealing with strong feelings of loss, worry, fear, uncertainty, 
hope and relief. Furthermore, each session involves a considerable amount 
of preparation for both counsellor and counselee, including reading the 
case-related medical literature, reviewing the available medical findings, 
and asking family members about medical information concerning things 
that may have happened long ago. The session itself usually takes between 
an hour and more than two hours. Certain phases of a counselling session 
have a more general character: explaining the basics of human genetics, 
for example, for which every counsellor has a prepared lecture of about 
10–15 minutes which he/she delivers to the counselee in more or less the 
same way, with the counsellor doing most of the talking, always using the 
same metaphors and props to explain difficult matters (e.g. referring to 
chromosomes as a “library” and to genes as “books”, and showing pictures 
of chromosomes and drawings of Mendelian heredity). Other phases, 
such as the counselee’s account of the problem, are more directly related 
to the medical case concerned and grant the counselee a more active part 
in terms of explaining, asking questions and making decisions. 
In all cases we witnessed, the counsellor initiated the transition 
between phases, defined their course and direction, and led the whole 
counselling process. The counselee answered questions and talked when 
he/she was encouraged to do so (by the counsellor, who paused to wait for 
a response or after his/her direct prompt). The counsellor (and the whole 
setting of the counselling room, which is often the counsellor’s office in a 
hospital) defined the situation; the counselee followed. In any case, there 
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was no doubt that the counselling situation is a medical setting and not to 
be mistaken for psychological or religious counselling, or counselling by a 
life coach or friend. We did not witness a single counselling session during 
which something so unexpected happened that it re-defined the situation 
in a radically different way. The overall biomedical framing —in all its 
modalities— always remains intact. As I propose in the next section, this 
is so not in the least because counsellor and counselee do not simply play 
out their roles as doctors and patients, but because they interact affectively. 
Genetic counselling as affective coordination
Counsellor and counselee relate to each other not only cognitively, 
engaging in a discourse based on the exchange of rational arguments and 
pieces of information. More fundamentally, they connect and resonate 
with each other as experiencing and receptive bodies (which, of course, 
also includes the cognitive and discursive level). They are tuned in to each 
other and engage in a communal process of co-action which philosopher 
Paul Dumouchel (2015) calls “affective coordination”.
Dumouchel starts with James Gibson’s (1986) suggestion that, based 
on the idea that perception and action are inseparable, what we perceive 
in the world are not things, but “affordances”, that is possibilities for 
actively relating to things in ways that are afforded by them. Dependent 
on our bodily capacities and our positioning in a particular environment, 
affordances are “opportunities to act”. For example, for somebody who 
is tired after having walked for many hours in the woods, a log lying 
on the ground affords the opportunity to sit —one that may be taken 
advantage of or not. With affects it is similar: they create affordances, 
opportunities to act. Dumouchel refers to this modality of affordance as 
“strategic affordances”, since they involve the joint achievement of at least 
two individuals who actively relate to each other in strategic ways: “It is 
not enough for me to respond to some feature of the world, a “strategic” 
affordance also requires for my social partner play his role. Among us, 
human beings, affect, I submit, plays a central role in bringing about this 
result” (Dumouchel 2015: 7f). By means of the dynamic exchange of 
their affective expression (facial expressions, body posture, words, etc.) 
participants in a social encounter perceive opportunities for action, rather 
than simply emotions, and coordinate their attitudes and actions towards 
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each other accordingly. With such affective coordination we reciprocally 
and complementarily modulate our affective responses and grasp (or not) 
opportunities for action that arise in the flow of the exchange.
Let us consider the example of a counselling encounter that stems 
from the 45-minute Erstberatung (an opening counselling session in which 
counselees come to the counsellor for the first time). It takes place at a 
counselling centre that is located within a major general hospital and 
provides both counselling and testing services for a broad range of genetic 
conditions, thus falling in the category of “autonomous clinical genetics”. 
The counselee, Mr Richter, is a 45-year-old craftsman living in rural 
Austria who is married and the father of a 7-year-old son; the counsellor 
is a medical geneticist greatly experienced with various kinds of genetic 
conditions. Mr Richter had undergone bowel cancer surgery a few 
months before in another hospital in the area, and although the surgery 
was successful, a doctor there had recommended he go for counselling, 
because an investigation of the cancerous tissue indicated that “it could 
be genetic”. 
Part of most Erstberatungen is to take the family medical history and 
to draw the medical pedigree in order to get hints regarding a possible 
hereditary factor and to identify other family members who might be 
affected. For some counselees this specific counselling part is confusing 
because they have no prior experience of similar medical encounters 
and sometimes do not understand the underlying medical rationale. 
Accordingly, many counselees at first do not quite know what is expected 
of them and thus react in the ‘wrong’ way.
The session proceeds as follows. While drawing the family tree, the 
counsellor asks medical questions about the patient’s kin: their age, where 
exactly they come from, how many children they have, whether they are 
still alive and/or had any serious illnesses or operations, whether there 
were any signs of cancer, what the cause of their death was. Starting 
with Mr Richter’s siblings and going up and down three generations, the 
counsellor gradually lays out the family tree on a big sheet of paper in front 
of the counselee, noting down every node in the network, each family 
member’s age, marital status, number of children, suspicious diseases and 
operations. He also makes notes in cases where there exists additional, 
potentially useful clinical information to be collected in the future. 
Some 15 minutes of talking and drawing result in a kind of preliminary 
genetic family disease map (similar to those kinship maps anthropology 
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students learn to draw in introductory courses on kinship). It not only 
charts all family members and their genetic links to each other, detailing 
certain kinds of medically relevant information, but also visualises 
further diagnostic steps with the aim of supplementing relevant medical 
information and ultimately coming up with a definite conclusion about 
the genetic status in the future.
At the beginning of this phase the counsellor creates a relaxed and 
casual atmosphere. He does so by repeatedly leaning back in his chair in 
between his brief drawings on the chart, as well as by talking more in the 
local dialect (which contrasts with the Hochdeutsch he predominantly used 
in the previous phase in which he lectured about genetics and probability 
estimations), and by phrasing his questions in a humorous way (asking 
impishly: “You do know your brother’s age, don’t you?”). He makes it easy 
for Mr Richter to give the “right” answer, but also shows his compassionate 
interest in Mr Richter as a person and his life circumstances. Mr Richter 
is relaxed, smiles at the jokes, also leans back in his chair and is confident 
in giving correct answers.
Soon, the counsellor initiates a change of atmosphere to focus on 
medical issues. Similar to other counselling sessions we witnessed, the 
exchange between the counsellor and counselee falters as Mr Richter 
answers the counsellor’s question not quite in the way he wants him 
to. The answers are now too elaborate, with Mr Richter giving not only 
medical details but also information about the life circumstances of the 
person in question as he tries to convey small details of his relatives’ life 
narratives. The counsellor does not interrupt Mr Richter, but nevertheless 
makes it clear that this is not exactly what he wants to know. He stops 
writing and waits with an indifferent facial expression, he looks silently 
at his first drawings, comments with a short uninterested ‘aha’, repeats 
his medically focused question or comments that such issues will be 
discussed later in the session. An uneasy atmosphere immediately arises 
and Mr Richter seems puzzled and nervous. Whenever he gives the “right” 
kind of information, however, the counsellor becomes more active, giving 
encouraging nods and reassuring “aha’s” and writes things down. Mr 
Richter soon learns to get to the expected point quickly and the question–
answer game continues as a smooth exchange of short questions and 
short answers. While the matter-of-fact statements of “nothing special”, 
“still alive” and “already dead” may seem strange and even macabre to an 
outsider, Mr Richter once again partakes in the exchange eagerly. 
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This rhythm is interrupted when Mr Richter mentions that his father, 
who died from lung cancer, might also have suffered from breast cancer. 
The counsellor switches out of the mode of routine asking, adjusts his 
position in his chair, straightens up and displays a keenly alert facial 
expression. In reaction Mr Richter also straightens up and becomes more 
alert. As they collaborate in searching for and compiling medical facts, 
both counsellor and counselee engage in a more explorative questioning-
answering in which Mr Richter also asks questions. Although Mr Richter 
is unable to give many details about his father’s medical history, the 
communicative atmosphere is attentive and focused and the flow continues 
without awkward ruptures.1 They agree that Mr Richter will try to gather 
more information about his father by the next counselling meeting, and 
they then switch back to the previous rhythm as they continue charting 
the genetic family disease map. Later, when we talk with Mr Richter about 
the consultation, he wonders why the counsellor had been so interested 
in his father’s possible breast cancer, rather than the lung cancer; and, in 
general, he praises the counsellor’s professionalism, interest and clarity in 
his statements and questions.
What the counsellor makes clear when he expresses his “strategic 
affectivities” of professional indifference, pedagogic patience and cautious 
disapproval on the one hand and of encouraging nods, interested “aha’s” 
etc. on the other, is that this is a medical setting and that medical matters are 
of prime concern. Notwithstanding the manifold uncertainties involved in 
establishing medical facts, he also underlines the rational and intellectual 
nature of the encounter, without, however, abandoning a compassionate 
attitude towards the counselee and his accounts of his life. In turn, by 
acting on the affordances that the counsellor opens up the counselee tries 
to follow his lead and play along with the game. Nevertheless, because 
of the novelty of the situation he at first fails to give “correct” answers 
and —guided by the affordances of the counsellor— only hits the right 
tone and level of discussion after some trial and error. He too expresses 
his affectivities “strategically” (in the sense of being co-dependent 
on the actions of his social counterpart) —smiling at the counsellor’s 
jokes, confidently leaning back in his chair, displaying facial expressions 
1 As also found in other studies (Hartog 1996), it is worth noting here that female 
counselees could usually provide much more elaborate and precise information on such 
“family knowledge” than male counselees. 
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of uncertainty and puzzlement, eagerly partaking in the matter-of-
fact exchange of questions and answers. These affectivities guide the 
counsellor’s affective responses as they afford the conveying of the extent 
to which the counselee follows the counsellor’s lead. Eventually, when in 
this dynamic exchange of affective expressions the encounter turns into 
a smooth intellectual exchange of case-related medical facts, in which 
the counselee settles into the role as a provider of medical information 
about his family and the counsellor confirms his role as medical expert 
and genetic diagnostician, the affective coordination comes to what 
Dumouchel (2015: 9) refers to as temporary “coordination equilibrium”, 
situations in which each participant has found his role and is clear about 
the other participant’s reciprocal role. As affective coordination converging 
towards equilibrium is a process that takes certain turns but misses others 
—that is, it is selective— it maintains and guides our (bodily) attention 
towards certain trajectories (cf. also Reckwitz 2016). In the above 
counselling encounter affective coordination helps to organise genetic 
counselling as social practice and carry out certain diagnostic procedures, 
but at the same time it also emphasises the overall biomedical framing of 
the situation.
What is at stake in genetic counselling
In genetic counselling, the counsellor’s affectivities are most powerful 
(or have the most “affective value”, cf. Ahmed 2004) because they guide 
through the counselling session, whereas Mr Richter’s affectivities signpost 
his wholehearted participation and his current position as he tries to 
follow the counsellor’s lead. Mr Richter does so not only because this is 
what the patient role requires, but also because he has a particular interest 
in finding out if “it is genetic” and learning more about the associated 
consequences.
When we meet Mr Richter for the first time right before the counselling 
session starts, he explains how “all this” came about: he was working “full 
power” and had never really been sick; the diagnosis of the tumour in his 
bowels therefore was “a shock”; but the subsequent surgery went very well 
and as “they got it early”, he thought that was the end of it. However, when 
the call came from the hospital that there was a reasonable suspicion that 
it “is genetic”, once again it was “a shock”. The doctors told him that he 
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could get “it” (the cancer) again, and now it also concerns his family; they 
also told him that it is not inevitable that he will get cancer again, even in 
the event that he “has the gene”. This gives him a great deal of hope, and 
now he is here to find out more, which is what is now most important 
for him. Not knowing what to expect Mr Richter is tense, impatient and 
nervous as we wait for the counselling to start. 
After the initial phases of Mr Richter’s Erstberatung (the opening of the 
session, the counsellor’s opening question, the counselee’s initial account) 
the counsellor explains how he sees the case, based on the available 
information. The atmosphere of the encounter is openly friendly, but also 
tense and observant on the part of Mr Richter. As the counsellor explains 
the particular diagnostic technique that had been used to investigate the 
cancerous tissue after Mr Richter’s surgery he also mentions the possibility 
of carrying out a genetic test as the next diagnostic step. After a second he 
adds: “If you want to do this”. Mr Richter nods with an approving facial 
expression, but probes by saying that he had not prepared for genetic 
counselling and does not really understand the “heredity component” and 
what it would mean if he “has the gene”. The counsellor replies that the 
genetic test would be interesting, because in the event of a positive result it 
would allow them to start taking preventive measures, in particular regular 
colonoscopies; nothing can be done about the “heredity component” in 
therapeutic terms, but regular check-ups would identify a tumour early. 
Mr Richter asks warily at what age check-ups should start. The counsellor 
answers: usually around the age of 30. Mr Richter again: “No sooner?” As 
the counsellor confirms his previous answer, Mr Richter exhales, relaxes 
the tension in his muscles and swings his upper body back in his chair. 
When we later talk to Mr Richter, he emphasises again and again the relief 
he felt at this point, as in the following: 
What obviously reassures me tremendously is the statement that check-ups 
need not start earlier than at the age of 30, or, if you are being cautious, at 25. 
Because, I am really worried for my son especially, but of course also for my 
nieces and nephews. Do we have to do anything now, at the age of 7? And 
obviously you get plain scared when one has to say: well, the small one could 
already have it too, right? When you are 30, well, then you can handle it, or 
handle it more easily. But explaining something like this to a boy or a girl at 




The counsellor waits until Mr Richter regains his attentive body 
posture and moves on to lecturing about the basics of genetics. After this 
incident, the atmosphere has changed, and Mr Richter is much calmer and 
more composed.
A similar but less tense situation arises later when the counsellor 
asks if Mr Richter has any other questions. When Mr Richter enquires 
about the likelihood of “getting cancer again, if you have the gene”, the 
counsellor shakes his head evasively and says that he currently has no 
precise statistics and that it would be best to discuss this matter at the 
next consultation when they have the results of the gene test. He does 
confirm, however, that somebody will not necessarily develop cancer, 
even when he has inherited the genetic mutation that predisposes him to 
it. Mr Richter reacts in a slightly disappointed way, but is also relieved and 
reassured. During our later conversation he says that he would have liked 
more concrete information on the issue, but is basically very content and 
reassured even though he is curious about the result of the genetic test; all 
in all, he has considerable hope. Later during the day, the counsellor tells 
us that he put off discussing the issue because on the one hand he did not 
want to trouble Mr Richter unnecessarily, but also because he did not have 
concrete risk assessment figures to hand; he will have to look them up for 
the next consultation.
What is most at stake for Mr Richter is his affectedness. He attends the 
genetic counselling because he wants to clarify whether “it is genetic” and 
learn more about the possible threat to his and his family’s future wellbeing. 
His motivation to know (even if only partially and tentatively) makes him 
(as well as the counsellor) come to and stay in the consultation room, 
because this is what genetic counselling (at least in this particular form 
or “logic”) is about: generating knowledge about a threat and exploring its 
meaning for particular lives. Because Mr Richter’s desire for knowledge 
initiates the genetic counselling and drives it onwards, it is not merely 
his private motivation, but instead an integral part of genetic counselling 
as social practice. This is what Reckwitz (2016: 172) argues from a 
praxeological perspective for social practices generally. For Reckwitz 
any social practice needs to include an affective appeal that interpellates 
subjects to participate in the practice. Such an appeal can take the form 
either of an offensive pleasure appeal (offensiver Lustreiz) or a defensive 
unpleasure-avoidance appeal (defensiver Unlustvermeidungsreiz). Genetic 
counselling has both: the knowledge to be gained promises relief from 
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uncertainty in the present (Is it genetic or not? How does it affect my son 
right now? Is it certain that I will get cancer again?) and hope for possible 
positive futures (finding out that it is not genetic, my son can handle cancer 
when he is 30, not developing cancer, merely having to have regular check-
ups); avoiding knowing potentially implies more suffering (when cancer 
strikes again unnoticed, when the defective gene is passed on to offspring, 
and when ill children, nieces and nephews make accusations of not having 
been informed about the threat). However, the two kinds of appeal are 
reciprocally connected. As they closely link diagnostic knowledge in the 
present with divined health states in the future, they create expectations 
about the future that in turn organise feelings and actions in the present.
Concluding remarks
In this chapter I have tried to demonstrate how a focus on affect as a 
generative force for sociality can foster our understanding of diagnostic 
practices, in particular genetic counselling. I argued that by way of 
reciprocal affective coordination counsellor and counselee perform 
certain diagnostic procedures. The strategic affordances that are 
manifested privilege the counsellor in that he guides the counselling while 
the counselee follows. The affective style cultivated in the counselling 
session is one that favours rationality, fact-based decision-making, client-
centredness and the professional compassion of the counsellor, and helps 
confirm genetic counselling as a basically biomedical setting. In addition, 
affectivities revolving around the desire for knowledge about individual 
affectedness bring about and sustain the counselee’s engagement in 
genetic counselling and drive it forward as diagnostic certainty is pursued 
and possible futures are explored. Rather than being private emotional 
states, the related feelings of hope and fear, strain and relief are “built into” 
genetic counselling as social practice and hold together its doings and 
sayings. Thus, affectivities give genetic counselling order and direction as 
well as relevance and temporal depth.
In this connection I want to raise two points for further exploration. 
One important conclusion to be drawn is that the categorical differentiation 
between rationality on the one hand and emotionality on the other is 
misleading as it produces false dichotomies. It is certainly the case that 
affects —flows of various modes of (bodily) agitation— may (temporally) 
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“end” in emotions as we usually conceptualise them: culturally elaborated 
states of feeling. But, as I have tried to show, the same is the case for what 
we refer to as “rational”; the “rational” may follow the same generative path 
and also constitute a (preliminary) end point of joint action. When looked 
at from the perspective of affective flows both rationality and emotionality 
emerge as culturally specific solutions to coordination problems. In my 
view, this has so far been largely overlooked in most studies of affect and 
emotion and definitely deserves closer attention, particularly when we 
want to get a better understanding of how subject positions (of doctors 
and patients) and authoritative knowledge (by means of which the 
situation is defined and power exerted) become manifest and embodied 
in biomedical practices.
My second point concerns the ways in which we think about diagnosis 
and prognosis. In the case of genetic counselling for pre-symptomatic 
diseases, what perhaps becomes more visible than in other diagnostic 
procedures is that the focus on merely diagnosing cannot fully account 
for the meanings that are implied for those who are affected. Since these 
meanings are heavily dependent on which futures are imagined, the 
prognostic techniques that help create such expectations are crucial for 
the meanings that patients give to a diagnosis (or a preliminary diagnostic 
endpoint such as a genetic test result in genetic counselling). Genetic risk 
lays out possible futures for wellbeing in probabilistic terms, as has often 
been noted in the literature. Genetic risk also frames possible futures in 
biological terms, as has been less often noted. Both dimensions envision 
possible futures “beyond the reach” of the individual: one, because 
statistics cannot account for the individual case; the other, because our 
genetic make-up is (until further notice) beyond the scope of human 
intervention. Framing individual futures in terms of genetic risk, then, 
structures expectations about the future in particular ways (it selects some 
futures as possible and disregards others). But at the same time genetic 
risk leaves space for individual appropriations in terms of hope and fear 
for the very reason that it lies beyond individual reach. For those who are 
affected, genetic risk is not merely the informational result of a technical 
calculation of statistical data, a technologisation of the threat of future loss 
(cf. Collier, Lakoff and Rabinow 2004). Rather, it is felt. As analogous 
mechanisms can be expected to play a role in other diagnostic settings, a 
more inclusive view that integrates diagnostic and prognostic practices is 
advisable when looking at processes of diagnostic meaning-making.
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“I’M HERE TO HELP WITH PAIN”: DIAGNOSING AND 




Abstract: Palliative care was initially developed to address the multi-
faceted symptoms unique to end of life, and gave rise to the diagnosis 
of “total pain”. This chapter considers the origins of total pain within the 
genesis of palliative care as a medical specialty and then explores how total 
pain is diagnosed, and treated, in contemporary hospitalized palliative care 
in Canada. Through the story of one patient, I suggest how the diagnosis 
of total pain may best be understood as both enabling and constraining 
particular forms of conduct as end of life nears. 
Keywords: Total pain, total care, palliative care, hospital, end of life, 
affective labour
“Estoy aquí para ayudar con el dolor”: Diagnosticar y combatir el dolor total 
en paliativos
Resumen: Inicialmente los cuidados paliativos se desarrollaron para 
afrontar los síntomas multifacéticos propios del final de la vida y desenca-
denaron el diagnóstico del “dolor total”. Este capítulo trata de los orígenes 
del dolor total en el marco de la génesis de los cuidados paliativos como 
especialidad médica y explora cómo se diagnostica y se trata el dolor total 
en paliativos hoy en día en Canadá. A través del caso de un paciente expli-
co que el diagnóstico del dolor total puede entenderse mejor si pensamos 
en cómo permite y limita determinados comportamientos mientras se 
acerca el final de la vida.
Palabras clave: dolor total, cuidado total, cuidados paliativos, hospital, fi-
nal de la vida, trabajo afectivo
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A cry to be rid of pain is not worthy of man…Man by his very nature finds 
that he has to question the pain he endures and seek meaning in it 
(Saunders, quoted in Clark, 1999: 733).
The official origin story of palliative care begins in 1976, with the opening 
of the first specialized hospital units in Canada. Given this geographic 
lineage, it is also a fitting location to examine perhaps the most enduring, 
if ambivalent, component of palliative care–total pain. My interest in total 
pain emerged as a result of studying how the dying process is negotiated 
in Canadian hospitals. At its inception, palliative care was based on the 
free-standing hospice model emerging in England and shared the same 
mandate: focus on quality of life for those in the terminal stages of illness, 
open communication about diagnosis and prognosis, comfort rather than 
curative efforts, relief of physical and emotional suffering, championing 
patient autonomy, and help with bereavement, all achieved through a 
multi-disciplinary approach (Mount, 1976; Saunders, 1978). In order to 
meet these objectives, palliative care practitioners were required to identify 
and engage with a patient’s “total pain”—the sum total of their physical, 
mental, social, and spiritual pain. However, while the requirement to 
address total pain continues to be referenced as a foundational aspect 
of palliative care 40 years after its inception, there has been virtually no 
scholarship examining it as a diagnosis. 
I have a three-fold interest in examining total pain as a diagnosis. 
First, I am interested in the history of its production, and so I begin by 
exploring the rise of palliative care as a medical specialty which required 
naming, claiming, and legitimizing certain symptoms of distress as 
uniquely associated with end of life. Second, I am interested in how the 
diagnosis is currently “used” by hospital palliative clinicians, including 
what care practices and outcomes emerge from the act of diagnosis. 
Through reconstructing the story of a patient named Ruby,1 I explore how 
the diagnosis of total pain attempts to order her emotions and conduct in 
ways that both enable and mandate a good —or “good enough”— death. 
Ruby’s story also highlights how this work is an ambivalent practice, and 
exemplifies the ways in which everyone involved are required to negotiate 
the end of life within environments never entirely of their own making. 
This leads to my final interest; how contemporary practice tensions 
1 All names have been changed.
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in hospital palliative care both shape and reflect clinicians’ capacity to 
diagnose, and attend to, patients’ total pain. 
My thoughts are informed by spending a year (2008-2009) following 
clinicians who specialize in palliative care, both within dedicated 
palliative units and as consultants, in two large hospitals in Western 
Canada. I spent more than 1,000 hours observing a range of daily clinical 
activities including medical rounds, individual bedside consultations, 
medical, administrative, and family meetings, and innumerable hallway 
conversations. I also followed 36 consenting patients and their family 
members to the point of discharge or —more commonly— death; 
sometimes this occurred within days, other times weeks and even months 
passed. To compliment my observations, I undertook comprehensive 
chart reviews of the patients I followed and conducted 43 interviews 
with palliative and non-palliative clinicians, as well as several hospital 
administrators. During this time I observed how a diversity of patients, 
their family members, and palliative clinicians collectively negotiated the 
dying process.2 At times these negotiations were relatively straightforward, 
and a good death was achieved for everyone involved. More commonly, 
I observed a range of ambiguous, shifting, and at times contested 
understandings of appropriate care practices as end of life approached, 
the outcome of which I came to term a “negotiated good enough” death. 
Here I focus on one particular patient in this latter category –Ruby– who, 
as she nears end of life, is diagnosed with total pain. Although her story is 
her own, Ruby’s dying process shares many features of the palliative care 
trajectories that I witnessed. To understand how clinicians comprehended 
and acted on Ruby’s pain, it is first necessary to locate the genealogy of 
their knowledge and actions within the rise of palliative care as a medical 
specialty. 
2 The dying process within hospitalized palliative care encompasses: (1) a medical 
understanding of a person’s unfolding physical state as one of terminal decline; (2) the 
organization of their care during this time; and (3) the social and emotional impacts of this 
work on everyone involved in the provision and uptake of care. In defining the dying process, 
I borrow from Strauss, Fagerhaugh, Suczek and Wiener’s (1982) encompassing term 
“trajectory” to “refer not only to the physiological unfolding of a patient’s disease but to the 
total organization of work done over that course of illness plus the impact on those involved 
with that work and its organization”(p. 257). 
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Origins of Total Pain
In the 1950s pain became an area of medical specialization as other aspects 
of illness and disease were organized, observed, and spoken about in new 
ways. Previously conceptualized from a purely positivist view (where pain 
was the result of physiological signals sent to the brain when a part of 
the body was injured), researchers now began to understand pain as a 
complex situation (rather than a discrete event) that could be read for 
knowledge about the individual as well as their pathology (Braude, 2012; 
Clark, 1999; Shute, 2013). Pain was no longer reducible to a purely 
physical experience, and addressing pain now required an awareness of 
the patient’s interpretation of the experience, including their personality, 
past experiences, and social relations. 
This change in perspective was both informed by, and reflected 
within, the emergence of hospice care. Although clinical interest in 
pain management became an increasingly “legitimate” concern in post-
WWII medicine, expertise in addressing late-stage cancer pain remained 
relatively underdeveloped. Seymour, Clark, and Winslow (2005: 3) 
trace how newly specialized knowledge about pain specific to end of life 
began to emerge from an interest in translating “clinical wisdom into 
clinical practice” in caring and sitting with those who were dying, the 
increasing importance of “evidence and scientific credibility,” and the 
burgeoning interest in “phenomenological and social understandings 
of the body”. Collectively, they identify these changes as emerging 
from accumulating clinical evidence and the influence of “conceptual 
revolutions” in pain research, including the nascent field of end of life 
care. However, what Seymour and colleagues (2005) do not discuss is 
how the lack of knowledge about end of life pain was in part generated 
by newly emerging knowledge about the needs of dying patients. The 
successful establishment of end of life care as a medical specialty required 
that practitioners not only identify a unique care population with unique 
needs, but also required that they establish unique medical practices to 
meet these care needs. The emergence of end of life care as a medical 
specialty both enabled and required end of life pain to be understood as 
separate from other forms of pain. 
Although now in common use, Cicely Saunders, the founder of the 
modern hospice movement, was responsible for coining “total pain” in the 
early 1960s. Clark (1999), a sociologist and historian of Saunders’ work, 
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recounts that as she evolved from nurse to social worker to physician, she 
developed certain ways of listening to, and talking with, dying patients 
that enabled them to be active subjects. Through this work, Saunders 
began to understand end of life pain as having an affective dimension that 
did not differentiate between the physical and spiritual concerns of dying; 
it was “indivisible from both the body and the wider personality” (Clark, 
1999: 733). She started using the term total pain to describe instances 
of patients’ lived experience where the combination of physical, mental, 
social, and spiritual components of pain coalesced into suffering, or in the 
words of one of her patients, where “all of me seems wrong” (Saunders, 
1964: viii). 
Saunders was not only interested in understanding a patient’s 
experiences of suffering, but also in transforming these experiences. This 
required clinicians “to analyse, to assess and to anticipate” through two 
forms of intervention (Saunders, quoted in Clark, 1999: 733). The first 
intervention was articulated through a conventional medical dimension, 
focused on the prevention rather than alleviation of pain, provided through 
regular doses of opioids that proactively anticipated, rather than merely 
responded to, pain. Specialist knowledge (and advocacy) of analgesics 
that worked best on specific types of terminal pain became necessary. Yet 
diagnosis of total pain required the ability to read the patient for signs and 
symptoms that included, but surpassed, the purely corporeal. This was a 
multifaceted pain that could not be relieved solely by pharmacological 
expertise; it also demanded that a particular presence and set of skills 
where “[l]istening has to develop into real hearing” (Clark, 1999: 731). 
The second intervention therefore linked clinicians’ ability to manage 
physical pain with their ability to elicit patients’ experiences of illness, 
including its impact on meaning-making and biography. As the subjective 
aspects of end of life became a legitimate site for clinical intervention, 
therapeutic relationships also became increasingly important for helping 
patients achieve catharsis. Saunders was clear that “[t]he last stages of life 
should be seen…as life’s fulfillment. It is not merely a time of negation, but 
rather an opportunity for positive achievement. One of the ways we can 
help our patients most is to learn to believe and expect this” (Saunders, 
2006: 79). This required what theorists variously term “affective labor” 
(Hardt, 1999) or “emotional labor” (Hochschild, 1979), which defines 
the work that caring professionals undertake in shaping the affective or 
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emotional states of those they care for3. For example, in palliative care, 
studies have examined how clinicians engage in “hope work” where, 
as death approaches, they actively work to replace hope for a cure with 
hope for physical comfort, emotional closure, and dignity (Benzein & 
Saveman, 2008; Fanos, Gelinas, Foster et alii 2008; Penson, 2000; 
Perakyla, 1991). Other affective labour techniques to transform suffering 
include talk therapy, family meetings, and legacy work (Cohen & Mount, 
2000; Foley, 2005; Mehta & Chan, 2008). Diagnosing and attending 
to total pain can then be understood as emerging from, and reflecting, a 
burgeoning medical specialty concerned with the totality of a patient’s end 
of life experiences.
Collectively, these two dimensions of intervention at end of life 
—pharmacological and affective — became the cornerstone of “total care”. 
They remain central to the contemporary identity of palliative care, and 
the majority of professional descriptors continue to use palliative care and 
total care as synonyms4, as well as to mark their specialty as clinically and 
ethically superior to conventional forms of medical care for the terminally 
ill. There are, however, no clinical parameters for the diagnostic process, 
nor for practices of care once diagnosed. Some may argue that, due to this 
lack of standardization, total pain is better understood as a concept rather 
than a diagnosis. To bolster that position, in my observations I found 
that the term was used only in conversations with other clinicians and/
or in chart notes as a back-room “cultural script” (Timmermans, 2005), 
never with patients or family members. How then does constructing 
it as a diagnosis help to understand how the dying process is currently 
negotiated in hospital palliative care?
Total pain as diagnosis
The space within which medical specialists invoke a diagnosis, whether 
public or private, does not alter its core function. Like conventional 
diagnoses, total pain operates as a nomenclature–a system of ordering 
3 In recognition that the definition of affect varies from author to author, I define an affect as 
an emergent physical state accompanied by certain modes of thinking that include emotions. 
4 For example, the World Health Organization (2014) defines palliative care as: 
“The active and total care of patients… [where] control of pain, of other symptoms, and of 
psychological, social and spiritual problems, is paramount” (para. 1).
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through naming and categorizing–that generates new knowledge about 
the patient’s symptoms and signs of embodied distress.5 Diagnosis also 
generates the need for clinical action. These characteristics are reflected 
within the sizable amount of clinical literature on how to identify and 
treat total pain, even as practitioners acknowledge that formal diagnostic 
processes remain elusive (LeMay & Wilson, 2008; Mehta & Chan, 2008; 
Schute, 2013). The “messiness” of this particular diagnostic process is 
not unique to palliative care, but rather is evidenced across a range of 
proliferating syndromes and symptoms in 21st century Western allopathic 
health systems, and is subject to ongoing interest (cf. Borgstrom, 
Barclay & Cohn, 2013; Jutel, 2009; Lock, 2013). 
Yet the problematic still remains that the process of diagnosing total 
pain does so without sharing the diagnosis with those who have been 
diagnosed. This suggests that, as a classification project, total pain functions 
on more than one register, operating simultaneously as what Clark (1999: 
727) refers to as a “nomenclature of facilitation” and a “nomenclature of 
inscription”. On the one hand, Clark argues, total pain requires clinicians 
to engage to explore, understand, and transform their patients’ experiences, 
and therefore addresses the “phenomenological connectedness between 
individual experiences of pain, distress and suffering” (Clark 1999: 734, 
see also Gunaratnam, 2012). Total pain foregrounds an awareness that 
pain is a multidimensional process fundamentally shaping our capacity to 
be in the world, and creates individual, social, and specialist meaning from 
a process previously seen as devoid of anything other than the autonomic 
physiological responses of a decaying and socially devalued body. The 
diagnosis of total pain provides both a clinical signifier and a social status 
for the patient’s experience as suffering, thereby legitimatizing forms of 
distress that previously have been ignored, pathologized, and/or seen as 
moral “weakness”. By requiring therapeutic practices utilizing affective 
labor to facilitate the production of meaning, clinicians can increase the 
capacity of the dying person and their social networks by “help[ing] the 
5 I define embodied distress as any expression where a person uses their body (including 
speech) to communicate a significant and unwelcome decrease in the capacity to strive. This 
can include, but is not limited to: physical expressions of anxiety (such as hyperventilation, 
increased heart rate, and trembling), crying, insomnia, turning away from the person 
speaking, refusal to talk, verbal “outbursts,” and compulsive and/or repetitive behaviours 
(such as picking at an object or self).
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patient to reconstruct his world and his relations with others” (Saunders, 
quoted in Seymour, Clark, & Winslow, 2005: 9). Consequently, suffering 
can be resolved and healing can occur even when there is no longer hope 
of a cure.
Total pain can also be read as an expansion of the medical gaze 
forming a new mode of surveillance and domination. Specialist end of life 
care now requires that patient narratives be read for deeper significance, 
where clinicians undertake affective labor in their penetrating search “for 
signs of trouble, in the social network, in the psyche, even in the soul itself ” 
(Clark, 1999: 725). This search constructs suffering at the end of life as 
an abnormal state and a “disease-like object” (Borgstrom, Barclay & 
Cohn, 2013). Resolution of total pain then also requires docile bodies 
willing to align their conduct with normative expectations of a good death. 
As the sociologist Carl May articulates, this requires the collaboration of 
all parties, where “the patient, after a series of [therapeutic] encounters 
that lead her to accept the inevitability of death, recognizes this inevitable 
outcome and thus renders herself unproblematic” (May, 1992: 596). In the 
hospital setting, if a patient become “problematic” by refusing to accept 
this inevitability and/or challenges the purpose of care in other ways, they 
are also blocking efficient transitions along the institutional care pathway. 
In these instances, a diagnosis of total pain then not only signifies patient 
suffering but also demarcates contested relations of power that have 
material consequences, thereby requiring further intervention(s). 
Diagnosis therefore designates patient distress and patient conduct 
as mutually constituted objects of work. Clinicians’ compassionate 
attempts to identify and resolve multifaceted suffering at end of life are 
the very same practices that further expansion of medical surveillance, 
require certain forms of normative conduct, and promote institutional 
efficiency. However, while this discussion provides analytic clarity as to 
how diagnosis of total pain operates on multiple registers, or what Clark 
(1999) termed nomenclatures of “facilitation” and “inscription”, it does 
not enable insight as to how total pain functions in situ of the uncertain, 
shifting, and ambivalent contexts that constitute contemporary hospital 
palliative care. 
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Ruby: Fall 2009, Acute Care Unit
An attending physician requests a palliative consult for a “goals of care” 
conversation with a younger female patient who has been relatively 
recently diagnosed with an aggressive relapse of cancer. The patient, Ruby, 
has interacted with palliative services on a previous admission, but the 
attending physician reminds the palliative consultant Kelly6 that both 
the patient and her husband are “very sensitive to the word ‘palliative’”. 
On entering the room Kelly, who has not met Ruby before, states that 
she is “here to help with pain” and identifies the purpose of her visit as 
“discussing a possible ‘tune up’ with the goal of going home”. Ruby states 
that her goal is to stabilize her symptoms and to be discharged home 
as quickly as possible in order to start a new course of experimental 
treatment. She and her husband then recount, in detail, other possible 
treatment pathways if the current one becomes unavailable due her disease 
progression. Kelly does not reference these possibilities, and instead 
focuses on Ruby’s current pain management needs. Once the meeting is 
over, both the attending physician and Kelly privately agree that, given 
the extent of the patient’s disease progression, associated symptoms, and 
“suffering”, Ruby “would be better served on the palliative unit”. A family 
meeting is convened several days later to discuss a possible transfer, but 
neither Ruby nor her husband expresses any willingness to be transferred 
as they believe they are getting the care she needs in her current location. 
Afterwards Kelly’s chart notes state that the patient and her husband felt 
“pressured” by the conversation. The note also states that the patient is 
“experiencing total pain”, and highlights that “this may cause potential 
challenges for clinicians in determining the appropriate care pathway”.
In my conversation with Ruby, she asks “Why me? I see all kinds of 
people on the street who are abusing their body by drinking and doing 
all kinds of things. I’ve never smoked or drank, and how come they’re 
not sick? I’m really angry. It still doesn’t make sense to me, but I’m doing 
it day by day”. After discussing how hard both she and her husband have 
worked, she recounts the trauma of her previous round of surgery and 
6 All the clinicians I include in this chapter occupy senior positions and have worked in the 
field for more than a decade. I have purposely left individual characteristics of both clinicians 
and patients vague as, given the relatively small community of specialists where I conducted 
my fieldwork, further details could easily serve to identify them and/or those they cared for. 
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chemotherapy and how it made her so ill she thought she was going to die. 
She says “I’m a worrier; people tell me not to worry. Well you try being 
in my shoes for a couple of hours knowing what [the doctors] have told 
me, and knowing what I know. I haven’t been sleeping much.” I ask what 
is worrying her and she talks about how her youngest son is “not doing 
so well” with her diagnosis. She says that the doctors are “now saying no 
[experimental treatments] because it will make me deathly ill” but that 
she’s focused on trying to find out more about her options. 
Over the next two weeks, the chart notes trace ongoing conversations 
with multiple clinicians (both palliative and non-palliative) that “a palliative 
transfer is in the best interest of the patient”. During this time Ruby’s physical 
symptoms fluctuate and remain poorly controlled. Finally, although she 
says she’s “very torn about the decision”, Ruby and her husband accept a 
transfer “for symptom management needs” as long as current treatments 
continue (a framing which is also echoed in the chart notes). 
While her clinicians initially agree that Ruby is suffering, she is 
not diagnosed with total pain until it becomes clear that she presents a 
blockage to efficient trajectory work, or, in the language of the chart notes, 
“potential challenges for determining the appropriate care pathway”. The 
designation therefore encapsulates not the patient’s physical pain, but 
also her (and her husband’s) resistance to accepting her poor prognosis, 
expressed through their repeated requests for experimental curative 
treatment and corresponding resistance to a transfer to the palliative 
unit. However, while identifying Ruby as suffering and as a site of 
contested practices of care, the diagnosis does not initially facilitate any 
new practices of care other than a continued focus on physical symptom 
management. In turn, the mutually agreed public framing of palliative 
involvement only to address physical symptoms legitimizes Ruby and her 
husband’s continued resistance to transferring location of care. Eventually, 
through negotiations of increasingly visible relations of unequal power 
where clinicians repeatedly “recommend” transfer, everyone conditionally 
agrees on the transfer, citing better access to specialists in the best interest 
of her “ongoing symptom management needs”.
On admission to the palliative unit, due to the instability of Ruby’s 
symptoms, several staff express uncertainty if they are providing symptom 
management for purposes of stabilization and discharge (as stated in 
the chart notes) or end of life care (based on their observation of her 
deterioration). Over the next several days, while palliative clinicians are 
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able to better control her physical pain, staff report how they frequently 
find her crying in her room. When asked what is upsetting her, she replies 
that she “doesn’t want to talk about it” and that “they wouldn’t understand”. 
Although the chart notes state that “the patient and her family are slowly 
coming to understand the role and benefits of palliative care”, during 
another meeting to explore Ruby’s suffering, she and her husband 
continue to aggressively advocate for the continuation of intensive testing 
in order to pursue further interventions. They cite her relatively young 
age, the fact that she is a mother, her “right” to all possible treatment given 
her previous remission, and that others have survived this disease. While 
the palliative unit clinician [Kirsten] frames Ruby’s current admission 
as focused on stabilizing her symptoms, after which they can “revisit” 
other possible treatments, she also tells Ruby that “I understand that you 
need to hope for the best, but you also need to prepare for the worst”. In 
weekly rounds the next day, Kirsten remarks on the “challenging nature 
of [Ruby’s] total pain”. The team agrees that they will make a concerted 
effort to spend more time with her, although as the next few days pass they 
express continuing frustration in their inability to do so due to task-based 
care with other high needs patients. Ruby’s physical decline is now visibly 
accelerating (increasing weight loss, fatigue, and shortness of breath) yet 
both she and the clinicians continue to make tentative preparations for 
an upcoming surgery for “symptom management”. At this point several 
team members begin to ask, “What is her quality of life?” and “Are we 
prolonging her life or are we prolonging her dying?” 
Ruby’s clinicians want to transcend the purely corporeal and address 
her suffering. Due to Ruby’s insistence that they focus only her physical 
symptoms and curative care pathway, however, all clinicians can do 
is invoke a framing rule of proper behavior regarding the appropriate 
corollary of hope (“prepare for the worst”). Without access to Ruby’s 
subjective experiences (as exemplified in her repeated refusals to discuss 
the source of her distress), clinicians remain blocked in their ability 
to engage in any other forms of affective labor. Yet in spite of Ruby’s 
resistance, her clinicians persevere and consciously attempt to increase 
their efforts, only to be frustrated by the instrumental requirements 
of task-based care with other patients. Overall, the inability of Ruby’s 
clinicians to resolve her suffering complicates efficient trajectory work, 
troubles the unit’s sentimental order of “niceness” (Li, 2004), renders 
visible relations of power, and challenges clinicians’ professional identity 
as both compassionate and efficient. 
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During an afternoon when she has “a bit of energy”, I ask Ruby 
how she’s getting along with Kirsten [her physician]. She says “I always 
like it when Kirsten comes in”. When I ask further questions about her 
experiences on the unit, she says she “feels cared for”, then re-directs the 
conversation, telling me about her love of Elvis and corresponding “life 
dream” to go see Graceland, and about her dogs who she misses (a picture 
of them is in a frame on the window ledge in the room, along with another 
older photo of her kids sitting on Santa’s knee). She recounts how one 
of her sisters died five months ago and that she and her family haven’t 
got over the loss. She turns the discussion to her elderly parents, how 
supportive they’ve been but also how she’s aware how much her illness has 
“taken” from them. She says that “some days I’m still ready to go, to fight–
other days I’m tired”. Ruby turns her head towards the opposite wall, and 
we are quiet for a moment before she adds, “I’m a bit tired now”. Within 
three days of this conversation Ruby is no longer able to get out of bed 
or feed herself. She begins to openly discuss with the team her sense of 
loss and sadness about the things “I wanted to do but now will never be 
able to”. Through these conversations Kirsten suggests she create a “legacy 
project” for her children, and her husband brings in pictures and other 
mementos of their life together to create a scrapbook. As she continues 
these conversations and activities over the course of a week, her husband 
acknowledges to Kirsten that his wife is approaching the end of her life. 
He requests that she be able to stay on the unit until her death as she “takes 
comfort” in the relationships she has developed with the staff. She loses 
consciousness several days later and dies with her husband and remaining 
sister by her side. 
Ruby acknowledges and begins to accept that she is dying only once 
her physical deterioration becomes irrefutable. The emotional expressions 
that accompany this awareness provide staff with a language to coauthor 
appropriate behaviors, including curating memories for her family, to 
acknowledge the end of her life. As this time visibly nears, everyone is 
then able to mutually collaborate in creating an affective environment that 
facilitates a negotiated “good enough”7 death. 
7 In using the term “good enough” death, I borrow from McNamara (2004) who coined the 
term to describe the increasing failure by end of life care providers in Australia to facilitate 
a good death due to increasing medicalization and bureaucratization, although they remain 
proactive in alleviating physical pain.
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Ruby’s experience enables us to understand how the diagnosis 
simultaneously operates as a nomenclature of facilitation and inscription. 
Here, the affective labour triggered by diagnosis (family meetings, talk 
therapy, hope work, and legacy project) are understood as compassionate 
work for transforming overwhelming and disordered distress into 
ordered emotional expressions of grief, sadness, and other aspects of 
suffering which can be addressed. This was done for the best interest of 
the individual patient and her social networks in concerns for personal 
catharsis. At the same time diagnosis and attendant practices of total care 
attempted to naturalize and extend the reach of the biomedical gaze into 
Ruby’s subjective experiences of dying, and shaped understandings of her 
conduct to fit within an appropriate “normalized” way of living, even at 
the very end of life. 
Negotiating total pain in hospitalized palliative care
While clinicians are the privileged cultural brokers of hospitalized palliative 
care and engage in affective labor to frame “appropriate” emotional 
orientations to the dying process (cf. Kaufman, 2005; Perakyla, 1991; 
Timmermans, 2005), these orientations are negotiated, validated, and/
or contested through the rights and obligations generated by everyone 
involved. As evidenced in Ruby’s story, clinicians work within institutional 
environments that, similar to their patients, are never entirely within their 
control. Palliative specialists’ capacity and interest in diagnosing total 
pain reflects heterogeneous tensions in contemporary practice: evolving 
understandings of the primary purpose of care, the use of earlier and more 
complex interventions, prioritizing acute physical symptom management, 
increasing patient and family member claims to authority in directing 
care, and the rise of business modeling within hospitals.
Framing the purpose of care primarily for acute physical symptom 
management needs is contiguous with the expansion of palliative expertise. 
The shift away from the centrality of total pain and attendant practices of 
total care is evidenced in the changing definitions of palliative care. In 
1990, the World Health Organization defined palliative care as “the 
active total care of patients whose disease is not responsive to curative 
treatment. Control of pain, of other symptoms, and of psychological, 
social and spiritual problems, is paramount” (Who, 1990: 11). While 
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the current definition still addresses the need for “relief of suffering” 
caused by physical, psychosocial and spiritual issues, practices are now 
centered on “early identification and impeccable assessment…applicable 
early in the course of illness, in conjunction with other therapies that are 
intended to prolong life…and includes those investigations needed to 
better understand and manage distressing clinical complications” (Who, 
2014: 1). Some practitioners are even more assertive in merging palliative 
care with conventional biomedical priorities, stating that their specialty 
is an appropriate form of care for those still pursuing curative treatments 
(Byock, 1998; Meghani, 2004; Meyers & Linder, 2003). 
The integration into new and earlier phases of disease trajectories 
and/or with curative care requires that palliative clinicians work with 
patient populations that have increased prognostic uncertainty and 
complex symptom management needs. As palliative care extends its reach 
beyond the body with terminal cancer, patients with organ failure, cardiac 
problems, dementia, ALS, Parkinson’s, and other chronic or life-limiting 
diseases are all now constructed as benefiting from palliative expertise. 
Yet many of these patients have not had a physician tell them in clear 
language that their disease is considered terminal, or if they have, may 
live with their symptoms for many years, experience several near-death 
episodes but, with aggressive medical intervention, once again stabilize 
for significant periods of time. Based on these past experiences, patients 
may then expect this cycle to continue indefinitely, as even some forms of 
cancer are now characterized as a “chronic illness” (Brickner, Scannell, 
Marquet et alii, 2004; Edmonds & Rogers, 2003; Mack & Smith, 2012). 
Consequently, many patients and family members assert an autonomous 
“right” to continue pursuing curative, experimental, and/or investigative 
treatments. Even when curative therapies are no longer available, the 
embedded moral position is that patients and family members are justified 
in continuing any treatment to extend life. In these instances many palliative 
clinicians are challenged to do anything other than default to continuing 
aggressive interventions, even once the patient has been transferred to 
the palliative unit. In turn, the continuation of these treatments even as 
the patient nears end of life necessarily increases the probability they will 
have heighted symptom management needs requiring further medical 
interventions that once again prioritizes physical symptoms over affective 
concerns. In the most extreme of these cases, these practices create “zones 
of indistinction” (Kaufman, 2005) where patients are neither actively 
dying nor can they be discharged from the hospital. 
163
“I’m here to help with pain”: diagnosing and resolving total pain in hospital palliative care
This evolution of care has led to two sets of–at times contradictory–
discourses that define contemporary palliative care. The first discourse 
constructs it as a specialty designed to meet the unique needs of those at 
the end of life while at the same time appropriate for those who are not at 
the end of life. The second discourse champions empathic claims to patient 
and family member autonomy and clinicians’ authority to define direction 
and outcome of care. This discordance both reflects, and can further create, 
irreducible tensions in framing the purposes of hospitalized palliative 
care.8 One senior physician ruminated about how these complexities 
emerge from her specialty’s integration within mainstream hospital care:
June: It’s interesting; I know everybody wants maximal medical care. 
Everybody wants everything done, of course they do. Why wouldn’t they want 
it, unless they’re really, really suffering? Of course they will. What we have to 
do is be very careful as clinicians not to offer things that are not appropriate…
So a lot of it [providing palliative care] is being very aware what is appropriate 
for that patient at that time. And I think what is frustrating a little bit is people 
are aware much more of what they can have and are requesting things and 
we’re kind of going along with it. Like the chemotherapy; why are we giving 
all these [treatments], so many of these people chemo that we didn’t give years 
ago? A lot of it is that the oncologists say, “Why not? It’s not really harming 
them.” Well, it’s taking away from the real work patients should be doing… 
We shouldn’t be making these poor patients and families make the decision 
when they don’t have all the background. So, instead of saying to patients 
and family members, “Do you want to be tube fed?” We should be saying, 
“Tube feeding is not indicated in this situation,” rather than offering it in an 
inappropriate manner just because we can. And that’s what’s happening more 
and more.
Yet not all patients or family members express a desire to undertake 
what June calls the “real work” as end of life nears. Ruby and her husband 
evidence how patients and family members may express reluctance, and 
even sustained resistance, to clinicians’ attempts to access and transform 
their subjective experiences and instead choose to frame the purpose 
of all care —including palliative— within the conventional biomedical 
paradigm. 
8 In hospice contexts, these tensions are structured as “institutionalization” and 
“medicalization” of care (c.f. Abel, 1986; Clark, 2002; Georges, Grypdok, & Dierckx de 
Casterle, 2002; James & Field, 1992; and McNamara, Waddell & Colvin, 1994). 
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This perspective is further informed by the business framing rules 
and organizational mandates of hospitals which construct the good 
death as either occurring in the community or as institutionally “quick, 
cost-efficient, [and] no risk” (Mor, Greer, & Kastenbaum, 1988: 3). 
Although concerned with ethical patient care at the end of life, hospital 
administrators also champion palliative care with the expectation of cost 
savings accrued by decreasing length of stay or reducing resource use 
associated with terminal hospitalizations (Davis, Walsh, & Nelson, 
2002; Rodriguez, Barnato & Arnold, 2007). Many of the clinicians 
I worked with spent a great deal of time detailing how their daily care 
practices are influenced by institutional imperatives reflected within 
continual meetings regarding bed counts and length of stay, internal 
health authority guidelines meant to streamline care processes for 
purposes of efficiency, and administrators concerned about the statistical 
averages of their departments in relation to lowering costs. In focusing on 
acute physical symptom management, stabilization, and rapid discharge, 
the impetus for care prioritizes organizational efficiency regarding the 
biological processes of dying. This valorizes a “bureaucratic model” of 
task-based care over therapeutic relationship building, where palliative 
clinicians are institutionally rewarded for adopting system characteristics 
as the determining factor rather than patient or even clinician preferences 
in end of life care (Bruce & Boston, 2008; Drought & Koening, 2002; 
Georges et alii, 2002). 
The capacity to diagnose total pain, or attend to it through 
comprehensive total care, is fundamentally problematized when clinicians 
are confined to, or choose, narratives that primarily reference life-
extending therapies and physical symptom management, as evidenced in 
the following quote. 
Penny: I was talking [with a patient] this morning and she was saying 
that she’s so lonely and afraid, and I don’t know what to do for her, the 
psychosocial. What do we do? It’s total pain, what can we do because the pills 
aren’t working, what else can we do? We don’t know how to deal with her 
suffering so we give her another pill. It’s so ridiculous. Why can’t [clinicians] 
cope with [witnessing] anxiety? Because we can deal with the physical pain. I 
want to fix it [patient’s anxiety], so if I can sedate then at least she’ll be calm. 
I don’t know how to fix it, and I’m not there to fix it…the psychosocial is not 
dealt with …I know that if it was physical pain we’d be all over it, but because 
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it’s pysch-social [sic]…we recognize it but we don’t know what to do with it…
We just medicate people with anxiety.
Penny, in speaking from her position as a palliative clinician, locates 
total pain as outside both her specialist affective labor skill set (“I don’t 
know how to fix it”) and her professional mandate (“I’m not there to fix 
it”), even as she continues to invoke the diagnosis (“it’s total pain”) that 
defines her expertise. This articulation of her and her colleagues’ inability 
to “sit” with, resolve, or ignore suffering evidences how contemporary 
practice tensions foster ambivalence in trying to live Saunders’ dictate 
that, when resolution of total pain fails, the role of clinicians is “not…
to take away or explain, or even to understand, but simply to ‘watch with 
me’” (2006: 219). 
Concluding remarks
Not all hospital patients who are at end of life express distress or challenge 
the purpose of care to the degree that they are diagnosed with total pain. 
Conversely, not all patients who express significant distress or resist 
palliative care as they near death are diagnosed with total pain. The 
reasons for this differential diagnosis remains for future researchers to 
explore more fully. For the patients that I observed who were so diagnosed, 
it functioned on multiple registers of knowledge and action to organize 
the dying process in ways that facilitated a good (or “good enough”) 
death. In naming and claiming certain pain as unique to end of life, the 
corresponding affective practices for resolving this pain–active listening, 
talk therapy, hope work and legacy work–compassionately help patients 
and family members achieve individual meaning and emotional closure 
while simultaneously ensuring their appropriate conduct as end of life 
approaches. In turn, this work is both grounded in, and justifies, the reach 
of palliative care as a medical specialty ever further into the processes of 
dying for the population as a whole, even as its success generates tensions 
in practitioners’ capacity to diagnose and treat total pain. Yet rather than 
attempting to reconcile these tensions, my goal has been to construct total 
pain as a reflection of contemporary palliative care as a whole, defined as 




Abel, E. (1986). “The hospice movement: Institutionalising innovation”. 
International Journal of Health Services, 16(1), 71–85. 
Benzein, E., & Saveman, B. (2008). “Health-promoting conversations 
about hope and suffering with couples in palliative care”. International 
Journal of Palliative Nursing, 14(9), 439-45. 
Borgstrom, E., Barclay, S., & Cohn, S. (2013). “Constructing denial as a 
disease object: accounts by medical students meeting dying patients”. 
Sociology of Health & Illness, 35(3), 391-404. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9566.2012.01487.x
Braude, H. D. (2012). “Affecting the body and transforming desire: The 
treatment of suffering as the end of medicine”. Philosophy, Psychiatry, 
& Psychology, 19(4), 265-278.
Brickner, L., Scannell, K., Marquet, S., & Ackerson, L. (2004). 
“Barriers to hospice care and referrals: Survey of physicians’ 
knowledge, attitudes, and perceptions in a health maintenance 
organization”. Journal of Palliative Medicine, 7(3), 411-418. doi: 
10.1089/1096621041349518.
Bruce, A., & Boston, P. (2008). “The changing landscape of palliative 
care: Emotional challenges for hospice palliative care professionals”. 
Journal of Hospice & Palliative Nursing, 10(1), 49-55. doi: 10.1097/01.
NJH.0000306713.42916.13
Byock, I. (1998). “Hospice and palliative care: A Parting of the ways or a 
path to the future?” Journal of Palliative Medicine, 1(2), 165-176. 
Cohen, S. R., & Mount, B. M. (2000). “Living with cancer: “Good” days 
and “bad” days—What produces them?”. Cancer, 89(8), 1854-1865. 
doi: 10.1002/1097-0142(20001015)89:8<1854
Clark, D. (1999). “«Total pain», disciplinary power and the body in the 
work of Cicely Saunders, 1958–1967”. Social Science & Medicine, 
49(6), 727-736. doi:10.1016/S0277-9536(99)00098-2
Clark, D. (2002). “Between hope and acceptance: The medicalisation of 
dying”. British Medical Journal. 324(905), 905-907. 
Davis, M., Walsh, D., Nelson, K., Konrad, D., & and LeGrand, S. 
(2001). “The business of palliative medicine: Management metrics for 
an acute-care inpatient unit”. American Journal of Hospice Palliative 
Care, 18(1), 26-29. doi: 10.1177/104990910101800108
167
“I’m here to help with pain”: diagnosing and resolving total pain in hospital palliative care
Drought, T., & Koening, B. (2002). “«Choice» in end-of-life decision 
making: Researching fact or fiction?” The Gerontologist, 42(s3), 114-
128. doi: 10.1093/geront/42.suppl_3.114
Edmonds, P., & Rogers, A. (2003). “«If only someone had told me…»: 
A review of the care of patients dying in hospital”. Clinical Medicine, 
3(2), 149-152. doi: 10.7861/clinmedicine.3-2-149
Fanos, J., Gelinas, D., Foster, R., Postone, N. & Miller, R. (2008). 
“Hope in palliative care: From narcissism to self-transcendence in 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis”. Journal of Palliative Medicine, 11(3): 
470-475. doi:10.1089/jpm.2007.0098.
Foley, K. M. (2005). “The past and future of palliative care”. Hastings 
Center Report, 35(7), s42-s46.
Georges, J., Grypdock, M., & Dierckx De Casterle, B. (2002). “Being 
a palliative care nurse in an academic hospital: A qualitative study 
about nurses’ perceptions of palliative care nursing”. Journal of Clinical 
Nursing, 11(6), 785-593. 
Gunaratnam, Y. (2012). “Learning to be affected: social suffering and 
total pain at life’s borders”. The Sociological Review, 60(S1), 108-123.
Hardt, M. (1999). “Affective labor”. boundary 2, 26(2), 89-100.
Hochschild, A. (1979). “Emotion work, feelings rules, and social 
structure”. The American Journal of Sociology, 85(3), 551-575. 
James, N., & Fields, D. (1992). “The routinization of hospice: Charisma 
and bureaucratization”. Social Science & Medicine, 34(12), 1363-l375. 
Retrieved from 
Jutel, A. (2009). “Sociology of diagnosis: a preliminary review”. 
Sociology of Health & Illness, 31(2), 278-299. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9566.2008.01152.x
Kaufman, S. (2005). And a time to die: How American hospitals shape the 
end of life. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Kearney, M. (1992). “Palliative medicine—just another specialty?” 
Palliative Medicine, 6(1), 39-46. doi:10.1177/026921639200600107
LeMay, K. & Wilson, G. (2008). “Treatment of existential distress in life 
threatening illness: a review of manualized interventions”. Clinical 
psychology review, 28(3), 472-493.
Li, S. (2004). “‘Symbiotic niceness’: constructing a therapeutic relationship 




Lock, M. (2013). The Alzheimer conundrum: Entanglements of dementia 
and aging. Princeton University Press.
Mack, J. W., & Smith, T. J. (2012). “Reasons why physicians do not have 
discussions about poor prognosis, why it matters, and what can be 
improved”. Journal of Clinical Oncology, 30(22), 2715-2717. doi: 
10.1200/JCO.2012.42.4564
May, C. (1992). “Individual care? power and subjectivity in 
therapeutic relationships”. Sociology, 26, 589-602. doi: 
10.1177/0038038592026004003
McNamara, B. (2004). “Good enough death: Autonomy and choice in 
Australian palliative care”. Social Science & Medicine, 58(5), 929-938. 
2004. 
McNamara, B., Waddell, C., & Colvin, M. (1994). “The 
institutionalization of the good death”. Social Science & Medicine, 
39(11), 1501-1508. doi:10.1016/0277-9536(94)90002-7
Meghani, S. H. (2004). “A concept analysis of palliative care in the 
United States”. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 46(2), 152-161. doi: 
10.1111/j.1365-2648.2003.02975.x
Mehta, A., & Chan, L. (2008). “Understanding of the concept of “total 
pain”: A prerequisite for pain control”. Journal of Hospice & Palliative 
Nursing, 10(1), 26-32. doi: 10.1097/01.NJH.0000306714.50539.1a
Meyers, F. J., & Linder, J. (2003). “Simultaneous care: Disease treatment 
and palliative care throughout illness”. Journal of Clinical Oncology, 
21(7), 1412-1415. doi: 10.1200/JCO.2003.01.104
Mor, V., Greer; D. S., & Kastenbaum, R. (1988). The hospice experiment. 
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Mount, B. (1976). “The problem of caring for the dying in a general 
hospital: The palliative care unit as a possible solution”. Canadian 
Medical Association Journal, 17(115), 2, 119–121. 
Penson, J. (2000). “A hope is not a promise: fostering hope within 
palliative care”. International Journal of Palliative Nursing, 6(2), 94-98. 
doi: 10.12968/ijpn.2000.6.2.8950
Perakyla, A. (1991). “Hope work in the care of seriously ill 
patients”. Qualitative Health Research, 1(4), 407-433. doi: 
10.1177/104973239100100402 
Rodriguez, K.; Barnato, A., & Arnold, R. (2007). “Perceptions and 
utilization of palliative care services in acute care hospitals”. Journal of 
Palliative Medicine, 10(1), 99-110. doi: 10.1089/jpm.2006.0155
169
“I’m here to help with pain”: diagnosing and resolving total pain in hospital palliative care
Saunders, C. (1964) “Care of patients suffering from terminal illness at 
St Joseph’s Hospice, Hackney, London”. Nursing Mirror, 14(February), 
vii-x. 
Saunders, C. (1978). “Hospice care”. American Journal of Medicine, 65(5), 
726-8.  
Seymour, J., Clark, D., & Winslow, M. (2005). “Pain and palliative 
care: The emergence of new specialties”. Journal of Pain and Symptom 
Management, 29(1), 2-13. doi: 10.1016/j.jpainsymman.2004.08.008
Shute, C. (2013). “The challenges of cancer pain assessment and 
management”. The Ulster Medical Journal, 82(1), 40. 
Timmermans, S. (2005). “Death brokering: Constructing culturally 
appropriate deaths”. Sociology of Health & Illness, 27(7), 993-1013. 
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9566.2005.00467.x
World Health Organization (1990). “Cancer pain relief and 
palliative care”. Retrieved from: <http://apps.who.int/iris/
bitstream/10665/39524/1/WHO_TRS_804.pdf>.




Marian Krawczyk is a Lord Kelvin Adam Smith Fellow with the End of 
Life Studies Group, School of Interdisciplinary Studies, at the University 
of Glasgow. She is a medical anthropologist with a particular interest 
in hospital ethnography. Her current research traces the history of 
ethnographic research in hospital end of life care. She also researches how 
ideas of appropriate end of life care travel between local hospital settings 
and global health infrastructures. 

Nissen, Nina & Risør, Mette Bech (eds.), Diagnostic fluidity: working with uncertainty and 
mutability, Publicacions Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Tarragona, 2018, p. 171–194. ISBN: 978-
84-8424-663-3. DOI: 10.17345/9788484246633
THE ROLE OF PATHOLOGY IN DIAGNOSTIC WORK
Torsten Risør
UiT The Arctic University of Norway and Norwegian Centre for E-health Research
torsten.risor@uit.no
Abstract: Pathology is the keystone of medical diagnoses. However, 
a case story of a young woman with potentially fatal head injury and 
suspected abdominal trauma demonstrates how the logics of organization 
may trump pathology as the driving style of reasoning in diagnosis. The 
relation between pathology and organization in clinical practice is made 
an object of inquiry and the impact on diagnostic decision-making and on 
professional socialization of doctors is found to be significant, but is rarely 
presented openly in medical communication.
Keywords: diagnosis, clinical reasoning, pathology, professional 
socialization, Denmark
El rol de la patología en el proceso de diagnóstico
Resumen: La patología es el elemento clave del diagnóstico médico. Sin 
embargo, el caso de una mujer joven con una herida en la cabeza poten-
cialmente letal y un presunto traumatismo abdominal demuestra cómo la 
lógica de la organización puede acabar determinando más la manera de 
pensar a la hora de realizar un diagnóstico que la patología. La relación 
entre la patología y la organización en la práctica clínica es objeto de estu-
dio y el impacto en la toma de decisiones diagnósticas y en la socialización 
profesional de los médicos ha resultado ser significativo, pero rara vez se 
habla abiertamente de ello en la comunicación médica.




Advocates of evidence-based medicine and decision analysis methods can tell 
us much about what should influence management decisions… but can tell 
us little about how practitioners actually weigh up the many factors, medical, 
social and psychological to arrive at a particular course of action (Norman, 
2005: 425).
This quote is from Geoffrey R. Norman’s review of research of clinical 
reasoning from 2005. His wondering about this core activity in clinical 
work for doctors became my own wondering and a driver in my fieldwork 
in 2007-2008 in which I followed a group of young doctors in Denmark 
to find out how they learned to make decisions as an integrated part of 
their daily work. This is a return to and development of one of the themes 
from the thesis that resulted from the fieldwork (Risør, 2010) —the role 
of pathology— as a field of scientific knowledge and as a style of reasoning 
—in the thoughts and actions driving towards a diagnosis for a patient. 
Always present in the reasoning and writing about patients’ problems, but 
as only one of many voices in clinical practice, pathology became more 
elusive as fieldwork progressed. I did not manage to successfully present, 
far less resolve, this ambiguity in my thesis, but it felt important.
In this chapter, I wish to examine what the diagnostic reasoning 
inherent in pathology looks like in a clinical case with a patient in need 
of emergency care. I will examine this from the perspective of a young 
doctor learning to manage herself in clinical work, and I use the term 
diagnostic work to describe the activities she engages in to synthesize the 
different kinds of information into diagnoses consistent with the logics of 
pathology. How does diagnosis emerge from this process and what is the 
role of pathology in diagnostic work?
Before diving into the case, however, we must briefly consider the 
research that will allow analysis of the case. Not just medical scientists, but 
also social scientists have found diagnoses and clinical reasoning a rich 
empirical field. Spread over several decades, researchers in anthropology 
and sociology have explored diagnosis as both process of and result of 
construction and classification, creating a landscape of perspectives and 
actors —human and non-human— that impact the human practice 
of diagnosis (Garro, 1998a, 1998b; Hahn, 1995; Kleinman, 1980; 
Mattingly, 1998; Smith-Morris, 2016). This research landscape allows 
us to explore the construction of illness and disease, but it also allows us 
important insights into the social processes and structures, which drive 
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the constructions. Recent books (Jutel, 2011; Jutel & Dew, 2014) and 
research journals with entire issues on diagnosis (Jutel & Nettleton, 
2011; Nielsen, Petersen, Risør et alii, 2016) illustrate this. But there 
is a gap in the literature. There is a part of medical practice not given to 
scrutiny by the social sciences. It is the part where the research discipline 
pathology has the strongest claim as a foundation for reasoning. 
I illustrate this from a starting point in medical research literature 
on clinical reasoning and diagnosis. Diagnosis is a labelling or framing 
of clinical problems. In clinical practice, it is a way to reduce and focus 
the relevant actions and therapies to something manageable and relevant 
for a particular clinical problem. In medical research literature it is 
described as the result of “clinical reasoning”, a cognitive process in which 
the doctor examines all the available information from the patient’s story 
and the findings from the clinical examination of the patient, and draws 
a conclusion about how the individual pieces of information may be 
connected (Eva, 2004). The term “differential diagnosis” is used to describe 
how several diagnoses are often possible from the same collection of data, 
but also to describe the process and actions through which the doctor 
assesses the likelihood of each of these possible diagnoses. 
In medical anthropology, information about patients is understood as 
constructed in a contextual and inter-relational process rather than seen as 
the only true representation of the patient’s condition. In contrast, medical 
students and doctors —including this author— learn to aim for a specific 
kind of precision in the description of the patient’s complaints, the clinical 
findings from the examination of the patient’s body, and the various 
tests including blood work and clinical imagery. The language for this 
description is the language of pathology; the categories, the processes, the 
terminology, the legitimate ways to reason. This apparent divide between 
a perspective on sickness and illness as socio-cultural constructions and 
disease and diagnoses as biological entities is often difficult to bridge for 
physicians; even those with experience with medical anthropology and 
ethnography1. 
1 There are exceptional scholars who manage to bridge the divide —like Arthur Kleinman 
and Paul Farmer— but my experience from dialogues and conferences in medical 
anthropology is that physician-anthropologists often find themselves in a continuous 
negotiation of professional identity to the extent of feeling betwixt and between.
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The literature on clinical decision-making (CDM) describes the activity 
as core to finding the right diagnosis in medical practice, yet difficult to 
understand despite a large number of studies of CDM (Norman, 2005). 
The paradigmatic case used to illustrate CDM is when the doctor sees a 
new patient with an acute medical problem and needs to reach a diagnosis 
that will suggest therapy, most often located in a university hospital (Eva, 
2004; Norman, 2005). Prevailing models on how to manage these kinds 
of situations draw from cognitive psychology and statistics and describe 
how doctors use hypothetico-deductive reasoning (Elstein, Shulman, & 
Sprafka, 1978), pattern recognition (Schmidt, Norman, & Boshuizen, 
1990), scheme-induction (Coderre, Mandin, Harasym et alii, 2003) or 
a number of other ways to go from symptoms and signs to diagnosis. 
Studies in social sciences extend the medical models for reasoning 
into the social context, for example by demonstrating how clinicians build 
up schemata for thinking and behaving in response to certain patterns 
of information and how these schemata are modifiable over time and 
from social interaction with peers (Davenport, 2011; Gabbay & May, 
2004; Rees, 2011) and are often adapted from existing local patterns of 
diagnostic work (Risør, 2016). However, if we look at the diagnoses and 
the contexts most often studied in this field in social science, we find 
that quite often it is the chronic diseases rather than the acute ones that 
are in focus (Barker, 2011; Brown, Lyson, & Jenkins, 2011; Ebeling, 
2011; Olafsdottir & Pescosolido, 2011; Salter, Howe, McDaid 
et alii, 2011; Singh, 2011; Trundle, 2011). These conditions are mostly 
studied in the very young and the very old (Prior, Evans, & Prout, 
2011; Salter et alii, 2011; Singh, 2011; Trundle, 2011), and rather than 
internal medicine and surgery, the context of the studies is predominantly 
gynaecology, psychiatry and primary care (Armstrong, 2011; Barker, 
2011; Berger & Johansen, 2016; Brown et alii, 2011; Dahl, 2016; 
Ebeling, 2011; Møller, 2016; Olafsdottir & Pescosolido, 2011; 
Ringø, 2016; Singh, 2011; Trundle, 2011; Ulrich, 2016). There are 
important studies on how powers and drivers from outside the clinical 
context —notably pharmaceutical industry, new technology and national 
politics— may impact the classification system of diagnoses (Barker, 
2011; Bourret, Keating, & Cambrosio, 2011; Danholt, Bossen, & 
Klausen, 2016; Ebeling, 2011; Schubert, 2011), but these are described 
as outside influences on classification rather than part of diagnostic work 
itself. There are exceptions to this sketchy representations of the literature: 
studies on acute disease, but mostly on less serious cases (Prior et alii, 
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2011); studies from internal medicine, such as cardiology and neurology, 
but these focus mostly on mental aspects or risk rather than the biomedical 
diagnosis (Gardner, Dew, Stubbe et alii, 2011; Halpin, 2011). An 
interesting field of study focus on cancer diagnoses, but most examples I 
find bring forward the significant consequences for the patient’s life and 
for the lives of those in the family (Olson, 2011; Schaepe, 2011; Willig, 
2011) and do not question the diagnosis or the diagnostic work itself.
This leaves the domain of acute medical and surgical diseases in the 
highly specialized hospital context almost untouched by social analysis. 
Why is this important here? It is important because the diseases in that 
domain are the most high status conditions in the medical community and 
the specialties working with these conditions receive the highest acclaim 
with doctors from all specialties. This status-hierarchy is learned by 
students and maintained throughout professional life and it is found to be 
stable over decades (Album, 1991; Album, Johannesen, & Rasmussen, 
2017; Album & Westin, 2007). Album notes that the diseases with the 
highest status are those that arise suddenly, affect an organ in the upper 
half of the body, preferably in a young adult male, and where the patient 
is unconscious at arrival and —after the heroic use of highly technical 
interventions— leaves the hospital healthy and thankful. The subjects 
studied by social science have few of these characteristics, and therefore, 
in effect, we have a domain of high status diseases where pathology is the 
dominant scientific perspective and where social sciences rarely venture. 
To study the clinical reasoning inherent in pathology as I set out to 
do in this paper, the high status domain of acute disease in a university 
hospital should provide the ideal ground on which to explore the ambiguity 
I sensed but could not grasp in the fieldwork; the high status but almost 
invisible presence of pathology as a framework for understanding and 
managing disease.
The case below fulfils many though not all of the criteria for high status 
found by Album. It affects a young adult; it is the result of a sudden event, 
which left the patient briefly unconscious; it involves the brain and (later 
on) the upper abdomen. We also see the use of several kinds of diagnostic 
imagery employed. However, as it will turn out below, the emergence of a 
diagnosis over time and in this specialized setting presents some challenges 
to established medical theory about clinical decision-making despite 
having all the characteristics of an archetypical medical case in a context 
where state-of-the-art technology and competence are present. 
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Before turning to the fieldwork, we need just one more detour to 
present an image of what pathology is as a field of knowledge. Descriptions 
of clinical reasoning always to some extent include the bi-directional 
process of both searching for the objective truth within the patients 
body and —at the same time— the reflective inner stance of the clinician 
weighing for and against, sensitive to context. This ambiguity does not 
feature in formal descriptions of pathology, however. Here, there is a clear 
and coherent rationality about the nature of disease:
Pathology is the study of disease by scientific methods. Disease may, in turn, 
be defined as an abnormal variation in the structure or function of any part 
of the body. There must be an explanation of such variations from the normal 
—in other words, diseases have causes— and pathology includes not only 
observation of the structural and functional changes throughout the course 
of a disease, but also elucidation of the factors which cause it. It is only by 
establishing the cause (aetiology) of a disease that logical methods can be 
sought and developed for its prevention or cure (Macsween, 1992: xiii).
This short extract indicates, that pathology —as a science and as 
a prescription for practice— has what Hacking termed “a style of 
reasoning”: a historically grounded way of connecting facts and producing 
valid statements in a scientific context (Hacking, 1982). I find the concept 
useful here because Hacking finds that styles of reasoning are situated 
in time and space, and that historically different styles of reasoning have 
waxed and waned in various fields of science. This also indicates that 
pathology is not static and that other styles of reasoning may become 
more powerful. As a style of reasoning, pathology is thus not just a body 
of knowledge, but a way to interpret and connect information about the 
patient’s condition; it is a way to create meaning from uncertainty, but a 
way that may also be challenged by other styles of reasoning, and which 
is itself subject to change. Hacking coined the term with the intent to 
describe scientific practice. In this case, the scene and the practice is, 
however, practical and clinical, and although pathology can be seen as a 
style of reasoning, it does not follow that it is a style of reasoning in clinical 
practice as well. Clinical practice have been seen as a ‘practical synthesis’; 
a joining together of apparently unconnected fields of knowledge with 
a difference in epistemological grounding that —from a philosophical 
viewpoint— makes them incompatible. But in medical practice these 
unconnected fields are connected through their application to a problem 
to establish a practical synthesis (Hovdenak & Risør, 2015). My curiosity 
here concerns the role of pathology in that synthesis. 
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Fieldwork 2007-2008
I experienced the happenings of the case below as part of a fieldwork I 
did in 2007-2008 and which provided the empirical material for my PhD 
thesis in 2010. The purpose of the fieldwork was to study how young 
doctors learn to make clinical decisions. I recruited nine interns fresh out 
of medical school who allowed me to follow them at all hours in their 
daily clinical work and interview them about decisions made in that work. 
Over a period of eighteen months, they had three 6-months placements 
—in surgery, internal medicine and family medicine— that together 
made up internship: the transition period between medical school and 
specialty training, mandatory for all doctors. From the hundreds of hours 
of observation and almost fifty hours of interview, I had to conclude that 
doctors do not learn to make decisions as much as they learn to participate 
in decision-making (Risør, 2010). 
In the case below, I am with the intern Karen. She was an excellent 
informant in the sense that she was able to reflect about what she was 
doing and why, while she was doing it, and thus providing me with much 
information about her perspective and her weighing of many factors and 
information as the action unfolded.
The case of Karen and Alice
It is fall, and Karen is on evening duty in the orthopaedic emergency 
ward. Patients are coming and going. Karen moves from one patient to the 
next, talking to nurses, instructing medical students, conferring with her 
colleagues as she does so. She is relatively new to this setting, but already 
she seems to be adjusting well, even enjoying her work.
About 4.45 PM Alice, an 18-year-old woman is brought in on a stretcher. 
She has had a bike accident. She is awake but confused and does not recall 
what happened. The papers from the paramedics in the ambulance give some 
information: She fell on her bike going down a specific street (which I know 
to be quite steep). Apparently, there was no one else involved in the accident. 
She has been unconscious, how long is uncertain. She has pain in neck and 
head. She has bruises in her head and on her left hand.
Karen goes to the next room, checks on the stitches of a medical student, 
goes back to Alice and examines her leg, then her left hand. She notes to 
herself that ‘we need an x-ray of the hand, especially fifth finger’. The nurse, 
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Lone, enters the room and asks Karen how many rooms she is working in. 
‘Only this one now’ says Karen, focusing on Alice. The nurse gives her Alice’s 
values: BP2 131/84, p3 74, sat4 89 %. Karen shines a light into Alice’s eyes, 
examines the bruise in her forehead. Karen goes out to get help to turn Alice 
over. She meets her second-call5 in the hallway and asks him about the relevant 
regime for Alice. He asks a few supplementary questions. Then Karen, he and 
I go back to the patient and turn her over. Karen finds no tenderness of the 
back. She examines her neck, where there is some diffuse tenderness. Alice 
complains about her headache again. Karen decides to get an x-ray of Alice’s 
neck and writes the requisition for x-ray of neck and left hand. A porter 
comes to take Alice to x-ray, still on the stretcher.
The nurse comes in and asks Karen: ‘Shouldn’t you examine the neck 
before the back?’ She asks about the use of the “spine board” on which the 
patient was placed, and suggest that Karen and her colleague did not make 
correct use of it. ‘It’s not to sound grumpy’ the nurse says, ‘it’s just that…’. 
Karen explains that she was only given a cursory glance of the board when 
she started in the ward and was not aware of some of the specifics. The nurse 
shrugs. Karen makes the entry in Alice’s journal.
Karen goes to see a 42-year-old woman who has had an accident in her 
car. When she returns to the small office with me, Lone, the nurse, asks Karen: 
‘Can Alice go home?’
Karen: ‘The last time I had one like her, who had had a head trauma, I 
almost sent him home with a hole in his eardrum. Then he became nauseous, 
was admitted and two hours later his blood pressure suddenly fell, so…’
Karen looks at an x-ray on another patient who hit her hand. Then she 
sees another patient with a distorted ankle. The porter returns with Alice 
from x-ray: ‘She vomited again’, he says. Karen asks her colleague how reliable 
an x-ray of the neck really is. In other places it is not standard, but at this ward 
it is. Why not just do CT scan if you get a clinical suspicion of serious injury 
to the head or neck? He says that he does not know. ‘I’m going to admit her’, 
says Karen and informs Lone, who says that ‘she is still a little dizzy, confused. 
Her family has just arrived’.
 We enter the room, where Alice lies, and Lone tells Karen that Alice has 
recently had mononucleosis and according to her mother, she has an enlarged 
spleen as a result of this. Alice then throws up again. Lone helps Alice, Karen 
leaves, goes to the office and asks her second-call, who only has three more 
months of experience at the department, what to do: 
2 BP: Blood pressure
3 p: pulse
4 sat: saturation; the level of oxygen in the blood. Normal range is 94-98 %.
5 A more experienced colleague from the same department; the one she should consult 
with first in case she needs advice or help. 
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Karen: Shouldn’t we do the CT6 now? She has pains in her stomach as 
well?
Second-call: Ask at [department of abdominal surgery]. CT is relevant. 
You may order it.
Karen calls the first-call at the department of abdominal surgery. She 
says she will come and take a look at Alice.
Alice is a good example of how the logics of pathology can help 
diagnose a patient so that the search for a relevant therapy can begin. She is 
a healthy young woman who has been exposed to a powerful and specific 
factor —the high-speed downhill bike accident— which has resulted 
in specific clinical symptoms —unconsciousness, headache, dizziness, 
followed shortly after by nausea and vomiting. All these symptoms are 
compatible with cerebral concussion and with possible intracranial 
bleeding. In addition, the enlarged spleen is a known complication to 
mononucleosis, the accident combined with the pathology of the spleen 
being sufficient aetiology for an abdominal bleeding that manifests 
itself in abdominal pain and possibly contributes to the reduced state of 
consciousness in which Alice finds herself. 
The Cynefin Framework by Snowden and Boone (2007) can help 
us understand the situation further. Snowden & Boone describe four 
different kinds of problems that leaders face and the relevant ways to 
analyse problems in context and respond to them (Snowden & Boone, 
2007). I use it here, because all four kinds of problems can be identified at 
various times in the case. To be able to understand the role of pathology in 
problem-solving, I found this a useful manoeuvre, but this is not to imply 
that the Cynefin Framework necessarily is a useful way to analyse clinical 
practice. It is merely a help to fertilize reflections below. In this part of the 
case, we can observe the first two kinds of problems. First there are simple 
contexts, characterized by clear cause-and-effect relationships. Here, the 
decision-maker must first sense, then categorize and finally respond. The 
diagnosis cerebral concussion is such a problem and this is where “best 
practice” is relevant: standardized solutions to known problems. Second, 
there are complicated contexts. Now, cause-and-effect involves more 
factors that may even affect each other. The decision-maker now needs 
6 Of the head because of the trauma to the head and of the abdomen because an enlarged 
spleen due to mononucleosis easier starts to bleed and the trauma and the abdominal pains 
suggest that this is the case now. 
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to analyse, before categorization and response is possible. The risk of 
intracranial bleeding and the added factors of mononucleosis and enlarged 
spleen take the problem from the simple to the complicated domain. 
This is the domain for experts and we see how Karen starts to involve 
more experienced colleagues in problem-solving. The logics of pathology 
provide the doctor with ways to analyse the complicated and suggest the 
proper response: to search for intracranial and abdominal bleeding and 
do so right away, so that the relevant treatment can be given. In actual 
practice, however, the logics of pathology ran into difficulties.
Karen & Alice, part II
Karen is in doubt about what she is expected to do. Is the radiologist waiting 
for her answer on the x-ray of Alice’s neck? There are two different radiological 
departments in the hospital. Which one should she call to ask for a CT scan? 
Or should she wait for the intern from abdominal surgery? Karen says to me: 
‘We usually wait for an answer from x-ray before we move on to order CT of 
cerebrum’. The intern from abdominal surgery, Agneta, arrives. Karen knows 
her. Karen tells the story.
Agneta: But she is going to get a trauma-scan then.
Karen: No. Not automatically.
Agneta: I’ll just have a talk with them then. 
 Agneta calls the radiologist who is just going to see the images of Alice’s 
neck. Agneta and Karen go to see Alice again. Then the radiologist calls 
Karen: There is no fracture and no indication for CT of the spinal column. 
Agneta has examined Alice and finds that “abdomen is soft and not tender to 
palpation”7. Agneta calls her second-call and tells about Alice: bike accident, 
abdomen not tender, enlarged spleen. “Is there reason for CT abdomen?” 
Apparently, she gets no certain answer and keeps retelling the story and 
asking what to do. Karen fills out the requisition for CT cerebrum and CT 
abdomen while Agneta talks. At last, Agneta gets the advice from her second 
call that the scan should be made as a trauma-scan, including the head, the 
thorax and the abdomen in the CT scan. 
7 The Danish term is abdomen blødt og uømt. Directly translated, this means that the 
stomach is soft and without tenderness when examined. This indicates to the reader of the 
patient record that the entire abdominal region (not just the “stomach”) has been thoroughly 
examined —inspection, palpation, percussion— and that no evidence of pathology has been 
found, thus making it unlikely that the patient is in need of immediate medical or surgical 
intervention. 
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Karen calls the radiological department to get the scan done, but they 
tell her they can only do the head scan. Then she calls the other department 
of radiology, where she is told that they can only do the abdominal scan. It 
turns out that only a patient who enters the emergency ward categorized as 
a “trauma patient” can get the CT scan of both head and abdomen at the 
same department. It is possible to change the status of the patient to be a 
“trauma patient”, but that will usually imply that her condition is very serious, 
potentially fatal, and the call put out on such a patient will bring a number 
of surgeons, anaesthesiologists and nurses running to the emergency ward, 
leaving whatever they do at the time. Karen finds this to be a bit drastic. 
Agneta calls her senior colleague again, explaining the situation. The senior 
surgeon then changes his opinion and says that the CT abdomen can wait 
but should be done if she develops abdominal pain. Agneta is clearly tired of 
all the bureaucratic problems, but tells her second-call’s decision to Karen, 
adding “I don’t believe this is happening”.
Karen goes to tell Alice and her parents that Alice will be admitted and 
that her head should be scanned. It is now 6.35 PM and Alice has been at 
the ward for almost two hours. Karen goes back to the office, waiting to 
accompany Alice to CT cerebrum. The nurse goes to find the ‘emergency bag’ 
containing medications for transporting patients, so that Karen can give her 
immediate treatment if Alice’s condition should deteriorate on the way to the 
scanner. Karen notes to me that the medication in the bag is for intravenous 
administration, but that there are no utensils for this in the bag. As she does 
not have the tools to inject the medication, the bag is, in point of fact, useless.
 Karen sees a boy with a minor injury. Then two porters come to bring 
Alice to the scanner. Karen tells a nurse what should happen to the boy, and 
runs to catch up with Alice’s bed. We all go through the basement  —the two 
porters driving the bed with Alice in it, Alice’s parents and her boyfriend, 
Karen, a medical student and me. We take the elevator to the right floor. Go 
to the scanner. The young male radiologist receives us. Alice is taken into the 
scanner and the scan is done. “IA”8 says the radiologist to Karen. We go back 
the way we came and Alice’s bed is taken to the same room in the emergency 
ward. Karen tries to find her second-call to discuss if a CT abdomen should be 
done after all, as Karen is uncomfortable with the knowledge of the enlarged 
spleen, the trauma and that Alice earlier complained about abdominal pains. 
It is 7.30 PM and Alice has been at the ward for almost three hours.
 I leave to get something to eat and some fresh air. Karen continues 
the work in the ward. When I return Karen has finally gone to the other 
department of radiology with Alice to get the scan of her abdomen. She 
8 IA: Intet Abnormt (Danish). It means “nothing abnormal”.
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returns about 8.15 PM and tells me that, fortunately, there was no sign of 
bleeding in the abdomen either.
 Karen: “Okay, now I can finally admit her to the department.” She 
dictates, but finds it difficult to find out what to say: “I think now it is me 
who can’t remember”. The nurse says: “It’s because you haven’t had anything 
to eat yet.” Karen tries to go on, but then there is a technical problem with the 
Dictaphone. “Oh no — It seems to be going in circles. I’d better count to ten.” 
Karen goes to find a secretary who can help her with the technicalities. The 
secretary comes back with Karen to the office and they try to fix the problem. 
They can’t. Karen: “Damn! Damn! Damn!” Secretary: “Not a day goes by 
where there aren’t any problems with this system.” Karen goes to another 
room to repeat the dictate that failed, hoping that the voice recorder is better 
there. It is. Alice gets admitted and leaves the emergency ward.
Organizational logic
It took three and a half hours from the time Alice enters the ward until 
the CT scan of the head and the abdomen are done: plenty of time for a 
patient to die from a possible internal bleeding. All kinds of bureaucratic 
barriers prevented Karen from doing what the logics of pathology told 
her to do: the division of the department of radiology into two sections, 
the need to contact the department of abdominal surgery, the need for 
the patient to have a certain status or category to get a certain kind of 
scan. The busyness and the breakdown of technical aids are additional 
nuisances. Karen finds it very hard to perform her basic duties as a doctor. 
Moreover, there is no way she can change this. Even the more experienced 
doctor from abdominal surgery gives up: he decides to change his decision 
about a CT of the abdomen when it turns out that there are organizational 
obstacles. The organizational logic overrules the logics of pathology.
In the Cynefin Framework referenced above, I mentioned the simple 
domain and the complicated domain and the proper response to them. 
The framework has two more domains that may help us understand the 
practice observed: The complex and the chaotic domain. The complex 
domain is the realm of “unknown unknowns”. There are few right answers 
and understanding may be more difficult to find. What the problem is 
emerges gradually rather than being present and analysable from the 
outset. It is often tempting to treat a problem as complicated rather than 
complex (Snowden & Boone, 2007). 
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In this case, Karen seems open to the possibility of complexity as 
does Agneta from abdominal surgery, but the spatial lay-out itself makes 
it difficult. The patient is in the reception ward and the CT scanners are 
placed elsewhere in two secluded areas where specialists in radiology 
adhere to the regulations about who should —and who should not— have 
access to the scanner. If Alice had become unconscious or if her heart 
stopped, this would have taken the situation into chaos. Here, Snowden 
& Boone claim, the right approach is to ‘stanch the bleeding’. It is no 
longer a first priority to find cause-and-effect relationships, to analyse the 
situation. You need to act first and, secondly, monitor results and adjust 
response. If Alice was categorized as a “trauma patient” there would be 
routines and organizational roles in place to manage the situation. So the 
problem is when the patient is in the complex domain and organization is 
set up to manage either simple or chaotic problems.
In this case, the patient’s conditions lay within the spectrum of 
problems that are considered common in this particular context. Most 
clinical settings have such a ‘spectrum of normality’ (Risør, 2016). It is 
common to have patients exposed to trauma to the body entering the 
ward, and the nurses, the porters and the doctors move between each other 
in patterns directed at managing these kinds of patients and problems. 
This spatiality, this organization of rooms and patterns of movement, is 
coordinated with a local temporality: unspoken agreements about the 
order in which things should be done, and when to involve additional 
actors and in which order. The intern is aware of this and directs her 
attention —her sensing and perception— to the visible signs of trauma. 
There is a clear logic of pathology that can be followed in the management 
of those signs. 
But as the level of complexity of the case is found to increase —from 
simple to complicated to complex— the barriers for action rise for Karen. 
Her ideas about management —with the desire to do a more extensive 
CT scan as the case in point— challenge established spatiality (because 
radiology is split into two) and temporality (because the patient must be a 
“trauma patient” first to allow this). She tries to probe the problem (as the 
Cynefin Framework suggests as relevant for complex issues) by involving 
different actors, but she must give in at the end. Although she does go 
through with the abdominal scan although an abdominal surgeon had 
decided that it was not necessary. She feels guilty about it, but actually she 
is the one who stays with the reasoning of pathology, one that indicates a 
risk of internal bleeding.
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Could Karen do anything to change the limits of the organization 
and the way this logic forces clinical practice away from the line of action 
suggested by clinical reasoning? When I met her again, a couple of weeks 
later, I suggested to her that she could write a letter to her superior, 
explaining the incident and the potential danger that these structures 
pose to patients. I offered to help with the letter, using my fieldnotes to 
document what happened and when. Karen was not too keen on this, 
however. She said: 
I found out that a letter had been sent out a few months ago, explaining the 
procedures of the two radiological sections and that there was a specific 
number I should call, or rather have my second-call call if a situation arose 
where a patient’s status in the emergency ward should be changed to “trauma” 
to make a “trauma scan” possible. If I had known that, I would have known 
what to do. So, it is not really a fault on the part of the department of radiology.
This seemed to be the end of it. Karen felt that she was to blame in 
this case. The fact that she had not received the letter in question and 
that no one else in the case seemed to know about it, did not do anything 
to ease this self-blame. This story is an example of a process I observed 
many times during fieldwork, which clearly impacted how doctors felt 
about their work and themselves as professionals. The young doctors try 
to do their best for their patients, but they are continuously dispirited by 
organizational restrictions. Restrictions meant to ensure efficient use of 
resources apparently has the effect of teaching the interns that they should 
not show too much initiative in diagnostics and treatment, but instead 
accept the department’s procedure and bureaucracy.
Reflections on pathology
Let us return to pathology. If the construction of clinical information is 
not founded on pathology (as the case suggest) and if the very definition of 
pathology says that all diseases are based on pathology, what is the logical 
conclusion? That the phenomena I have described have not to do with 
disease (thus not having a pathological foundation)? Or that the definition 
of pathology is wrong?
The Muir textbook cited above is a wonderfully clear (and extensive) 
presentation of a very diverse and difficult subject. The problem therefore 
does not lie in its contents. It lies in its non-contents. The definition of 
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disease cited leaves out a wide range of phenomena that are very much 
part of the spectrum of human suffering that a health care system needs to 
be able to handle. How often is there a specific aetiology? How often is it 
possible to locate an “abnormal variation in the structure or function” in 
the body? Even in departments as specialized as the ones in a university 
hospital where the case of Karen and Alice takes place, the spectrum of 
suffering is much wider than the spectrum of disease for which the “logical 
methods” of pathology applies. The style of reasoning of pathology includes 
a complex and detailed language for describing states of the body from the 
cellular to the systemic level. But it includes no language for describing the 
temporality, the spatiality, or the emotionality that frame and impact the 
body and drive the decision-making in real-world, real-time interactions 
between positioned actors. This limits pathology to influence decision-
making to situations where clearly defined symptoms or signs, verified 
through the use of diagnostic technology, are present. The same limitation 
is true for the patient record, thus making the most significant part of 
clinical action and decision-making invisible and non-verbalized. 
The definition of pathology is not wrong. But the idea of pathology 
as the epistemological foundation of medical practice apparently is. It 
may be an effective style of reasoning for research on a number of clinical 
problems. But it does not provide the knowledge that may help the intern 
determine when it is relevant to employ the tools of pathology. That 
knowledge would be of a different order. Medical students and the interns, 
however, still learn to live with the ideal of pathology as an integrated 
part of daily practice and they —as Karen in this case— learn to blame 
themselves when they are unable to live up to the ideal.
In the above case, the first-call surgeon, Agneta, voiced her 
frustration when the logics of pathology were overruled: “I don’t believe 
this is happening.” The young doctors try to resist the factors that had 
a negative influence on their practice, and instead they try to work out 
beneficial solutions for their patient. Karen actually made sure that Alice 
—eventually— had a CT scan of the abdomen. In doing so, she exercised a 
kind of disobedience to a superior and to the system. This was a recurring 
theme for the doctors I worked with during fieldwork and often led to 
beneficial outcomes that would not have been reached otherwise. The 
doctors themselves, however, experienced shame and self-doubt in these 




In most cases, the interns have to learn to accept the organizational 
restrictions. One of the factors that strengthen this learning process is 
language, specifically the language of medicine. This is the language of 
textbooks and scientific journals, but it is also a spoken language with a 
wide range of phrases and slang words that are learned in the practice of 
a local setting and used in that setting or others like it. It often sounds 
like Danish, but the language spoken carries underlying connotations and 
implications known only to the doctors like, for instance, the IA said by 
the radiologist in the case of Karen & Alice. A number of standard verbal 
expressions are employed in taking the patient’s story and in narrating it 
in the journal and at conferences.
Mary Delvecchio Good and Byron Good did fieldwork at the 
medical school at Harvard in the nineties, and found the issue of language 
to be very important. They found that learning the language of anatomy 
and learning the narrative and linguistic techniques of presenting the case 
were important steps in the process of creating the students’ professional 
identity. Mastery of the language made communication with colleagues 
possible and signalled that they had reached an understanding of 
medicine and their professional role in the field (Good & Good, 1994). 
Learning the language was also important for structuring the students’ 
thoughts, thinking and reasoning (Good & Good, 1993). Bo Jacobsen 
(1981) concluded the same thing in his study of university students in 
the humanities compared to medical students. He noted how the medical 
students learned to think of knowledge in terms of blocks of information 
that ideally were transferred unchanged from teacher to student, while 
the students of language, for instance, learned to think of knowledge as 
relational, depending on positions and actors, modifiable according to the 
situation (Jacobsen, 1981). This produces a specific focus on the world, 
which makes doctors effective at some things, but blind to others; blind to 
certain possible decisions and to certain kinds of information that cannot 
be expressed in a medical terminology. 
The interns were therefore strongly conditioned towards a specific 
linguistic style which guided their identity and thinking, and from which 
it was difficult to divert. This style was extensive in the description of 
symptoms, diseases and pathology with regard to simple problems, but 
less developed as a means of speaking of relations and knowledge that 
did not fit the blocks-of-information pattern and for which “best practice” 
did not exist, because it was, in effect, a complex problem. In situations 
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where relational knowledge was needed they therefore had to fall back 
on their personal experience from before and outside medical school; an 
experience that some were aware of and were able to use actively. But to 
all of them it took an effort to step out of the spectrum of phenomena 
that could be described in the professional tongue, the language of clinical 
pathology, and instead trust personal experience. 
The logics of pathology may not be sufficient to determine action 
in the clinic, but it is still the logic we adhere to, when we create our 
representations of the patient in our communication with our medical 
colleagues in conferences or in the patient’s journal. This is the appliance 
of the exquisite and precise language the interns learned in medical school 
and the language they are expected to use when representing the patient’s 
story and their findings in the patient record. Pathology and diagnosis 
come to the fore in the text in the patient record, but at the expense of 
temporality, spatiality and emotionality. This is perhaps understandable if 
the only aim of the patient record was to provide a short-hand version of 
the patient’s experience and the objective clinical findings. But the journal 
is increasingly being used as the documentation not only of the patient’s 
condition, but also of the quality of care provided. Not a word is found in 
Alice’s record about how the temporal and spatial organization of work 
and decision-making impacted management and extended her stay in the 
ward to 3.5 hours before initial assessment was concluded. Not a word to 
express the frustration of doctors and nurses about management. 
Conclusion
It should be uncontroversial to state that the diagnoses a doctor writes in 
the patient’s journal are not simple results of collected data compared with 
knowledge about pathology. The case of Karen and Alice could perhaps 
be argued to be a special case, but when I have presented it, several times 
over the last few years and to medical doctors of many different specialties, 
the response is primarily one of recognition; recognition of organizational 
challenges of the nature described in the case. Doctors will then voluntarily 
share their own experiences and their own emotional striving, their own 




Diagnosis as category is strangely absent in much of the case. One or 
more diagnoses are expressed in the different written communications: 
In the requisition for x-ray or CT-scan, in the entry in Alice’s journal. It 
could be mentioned in retrospect, as mononucleosis was in the case. But 
in the communication between doctors, and between doctors and nurses, 
diagnoses are only alluded to indirectly or in a very general way. Given 
the importance allocated the diagnosis this is quite interesting. But others 
have found the same almost-absence of diagnoses when observing clinical 
practice in real-time (Donner-Banzhoff et alii, 2017). It appears that 
diagnosis share the characteristics of pathology in the decision-making: It 
is an ideal or goal for the doctor, but is only expressed clearly in retrospect. 
Diagnostic work, however, is very much present and the young 
doctor’s knowledge about pathology is a sounding board for reflection and 
a provider of hypotheses all through the case. One could take the view that 
organizational logic impedes or influences diagnostic work, but a fairer and 
more constructive perspective would be to accept organizational logic as 
ever-present; a part of diagnostic work as much as the patient is. Schön 
described a case of how architects work, where ideal forms and structures in 
the training of the architect must be connected with the physical conditions 
of the site for a new building. It is in this interaction that the possibility for 
a creative construction happens (Schön, 1983). This idea resonates with 
the case of Karen and Alice, but here, contrary to the architect, the young 
doctor feels limited and shameful about the process.
The interns in all the departments where I did fieldwork learn to adapt 
to local conditions for clinical practice, and they learn to identify and work 
with the kinds of decisions and styles of reasoning that are considered 
valid in the local context. In their many encounters with the patients, 
they get to experience a number of clinical cases that they can compare 
with their knowledge on symptoms, diseases and possible treatments, 
adjusting and supplementing their mental schemata as they do so. In this 
process they learn to focus their attention and their senses in a way that 
makes them efficient in the local setting, but they may also learn to neglect 
certain pieces of possible information, which may have an effect on patient 
outcome. There may be patterns of local organization, which help direct 
their attention to certain problems and certain ways of management. But 
it also teaches them to downgrade the importance of what the patient 
tells them and the reflections this generates. There are situations where 
they need to accept bureaucracy and traditions to an extent that they have 
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to modify and dilute sound medical reasoning to adapt. It is worrying 
to find that the interns tend to turn these problems inward and blame 
themselves for conditions, which are largely organizational. The process 
of making diagnoses and making decisions is also a process of making 
doctors; of creating emotional restraints in the doctor that encourage the 
doctor to look for certain kinds of problem —especially simple or chaotic 
problems— and avoid complexity.
The role of pathology in this learning and in the diagnostic process is 
to provide a framework for reflection and an ideal for linguistic expression, 
which they must then try to achieve in the entries they generate for the 
patient’s journal. This is a precise vocabulary, supplemented by numerous 
clinical expressions, slang words and short-hand, but pathology is not, 
however, a powerful logic in practice. Pathology may supply the words, 
but organizational logic and norms determine their use.
This analysis, primarily aimed at understanding the ambiguity of 
pathology in clinical practice, raises a few new questions. It is tempting 
to see the changes in hospital administration and organization in recent 
decades as the cause of some of the difficulties in the case. Change in 
organization may lead to change in decision-making and not necessarily 
to a better result for the individual patient. Further studies with micro-
analysis of practice seen in the context of organizational change could give 
important insight to this field. 
In the introduction, I briefly touched on the rich literature on 
diagnosis in social science. If my impression from that literature is 
correct, social science has left the high status areas of medicine outside the 
scope of research. Thus, the pinnacle of medical knowledge from which 
medicine draws status and standards for practice receives little critical 
reflection from outside medicine. What would a program of social science 
studies into the high status domains of medicine look like and what kind 
of dialogue on diagnosis and diagnostic work could this lead to?
The socialization of medical students and young doctors is intensive, 
both as a process and as a research field developed from the 1960s and 
onwards. However, there are still few studies on how this process happens 
as an integrated part of clinical practice. Perhaps the new questions above 
—how organization manifests in and changes clinical practice— and social 
science studies of high status medicine could together help us understand 
and potentially impact the process of how we make doctors and how they 
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Abstract: Throughout European history, madness has been associated with 
two states: movement and confinement. These apparently contradictory 
states converge in an ob-scene state, in the etymological sense of the 
word: offstage. In this chapter, based on data from ethnographic work 
in the Catalan mental health care network, it is argued that “being ob-
scene” results when madness challenges hegemonic social processes of 
inculcation and persuasion that induce acceptance of behavioural patterns 
considered appropriate and lead patients to identify with the interests 
of therapists. Madness defies not reason, as it is widely supposed, but 
common sense understood as a cultural system. Its refractory nature leads 
to the management of madness by expert systems that seek to subsume 
the experience of affected persons in predictable nosological categories.
Key words: madness, ob-scenity, common sense, ethnography, biopolitics
Fuera de escena: la locura, lo obsceno y el sentido común
Resumen: En la historia de Europa, la locura ha estado asociada con 
dos estados: el movimiento y el confinamiento. Estos estados, aunque 
aparentemente contradictorios, convergen en un estado obs-ceno, en 
su sentido etimológico de fuera de escena. En este capítulo, y tomando 
como base mi trabajo etnográfico en la red de salud mental de Cataluña, 
se argumenta que esta “obs-cenidad” deviene cuando la locura desafía los 
procesos sociales hegemónicos de inculcación y persuasión que inducen 
a la aceptación de los modelos de comportamiento que son considerados 
apropiados y que promueven que los pacientes se identifiquen con 
los intereses de los terapeutas. La locura no desafía la razón, como 
1 This is a translated and slightly shortened version of previous publications in Portuguese 
(Martínez-Hernáez, 2012; 2013a) and Spanish (Martínez-Hernáez, 2013b).
2 Translation: Susan M. DiGiacomo and Mary Savage
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generalmente se indica, sino el sentido común entendido como un sistema 
cultural. Su naturaleza refractaria conduce a una gestión de la vida por los 
sistemas expertos que busca subsumir la experiencia de los afectados en 
categorías nosológicas predecibles.
Palabras clave: locura, obs-cenidad, sentido común, etnografía, biopolítica
In European history madness has always been associated with two social 
practices: movement and confinement. Movement receives one of its finest 
depictions in Don Quixote, in which the witless hero wanders endlessly in 
search of something at once so near and so remote as his own fantasy. 
Among other modalities, confinement includes the insane asylum as a 
means of containing…what, precisely? Unreason, chaos, lack of common 
sense, disorder, fear, difference, dissidence? In any case, confinement has 
persisted for centuries as a form of social control. Although apparently 
contradictory, movement and confinement as related social practices 
define an ob-scene condition in the etymological sense of being “offstage.” 
While movement becomes a departure, either voluntary or forced, from 
the play of social life, confinement annuls the civil rights of those affected 
(Martínez Hernáez, 2000). 
As we might expect, what links movement and confinement is the 
same thing that joins madness to psychiatry, a profession that, in its early 
years, was considered “special” (Campos Marín, 2001; Comelles, 1988). 
Psychiatry is a body of knowledge and practice whose object is alterity, 
although with the passage of time this otherness has come to constitute 
a diffuse and weakly formulated terrain of abnormal states that include 
depression and anxiety; being at risk for mental illness; disconcerting or 
unsettling behaviours associated with aggressivity, gambling, or sexuality; 
discomfiting social interactions; and minor memory loss. Among many 
others, all of the foregoing have been transformed into psychiatrically 
treatable conditions, as historical work (Caponi, 2009, 2012) and the most 
recent versions of DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 
2000) and DSM-V (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) have 
shown. If the biopolitics of psychosis were an exercise in concealment, 
the new biopolitics of neurosis and minor mental disturbances require 
persuasion in order to resolve a supposed anomaly considered to be 
reversible, and put in its place a hyper-normality that links the subject to 
a consumer culture and political economy (Martínez Hernáez, 2013c).
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By contrast, “madness” does not appear to be responsive to persuasion, 
or at least not initially (Goffman, 1988 [1961]; Caudill, 1958; Dunham 
& Winberg, 1960; Foucault, 1999; Rosen, 1974 [1968]). In the 
biomedical tradition, psychosis is not seen as susceptible to understanding 
and still less to dialogue, perhaps because it is considered to be the simple 
expression of disordered judgement and thought, as Kraepelin (1907) 
believed. Instead, what it tends to generate is a monologue in which 
therapists, family members and the supposedly sane find what they were 
looking for: unreason, the inability of the affected person to maintain 
social connection, and diagnostic categories understood as absolute truths 
that generate the idea of the “total patient” in need of “total therapy”3. 
Why the need to locate madness offstage? What is being concealed 
in the very act of hiding it from view, and what is revealed by the 
attempt to render abnormal states invisible? Is it something as simple as 
the Kraepelinian axiom that delusions are the expression of disordered 
judgment, or does it involve other dysfunctions and short-circuits between 
madness and culturally defined forms of power-knowledge? The aim of 
this chapter is to reflect on the social construction of madness as an ob-
scene object that does not deserve a hearing, but should be located off the 
social stage because it disrupts the logic of common sense in the Geertzian 
sense of the word, as the naturalization of cultural convention. 
3 Total nosology takes as its point of departure a definition of the patient self as a 
predetermined entity incompatible with the possibility of a subjective self formed through 
social action, including the professional cultures of mental health care. In this way, the 
damaged self is perceived as a psychopathological island, a stable and naturalized entity that 
responds to therapeutic interventions that are also stable and naturalized: total therapy. This 
model manages distress in terms of a self-referential expert system and its personified world 
of disorders and treatments more than in terms of human needs. Centred more on mental 
illness than on mental health, it is organized through treatment protocols rather than as 
the outcome of a clinical reflexivity that recognizes in affected persons knowledge born of 
experience, and is oriented more toward a politics of life than toward a politics for life. For 
an analysis of the idea of the “total patient”, see Correa-Urquiza (2010). For more on the 
concept of “total therapy,” see Martínez-Hernáez (2009).
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Common sense and ob-scene sense
Over the course of approximately one year, I interviewed Babu two days 
a week with the idea of writing his life history.4 At that time Babu was an 
inpatient in a Barcelona residential treatment centre for chronic psychotics, 
along with some 20 other patients who were also my informants, although 
to a lesser degree. Among the resources available for the treatment of 
mentally ill persons, residential treatment centres, along with supportive 
housing, are understood to be one of the levels closest to reintegration 
into the community, although no one defines what this “community” 
consists of; it often appears to be an idealized entity that has little to do 
with pragmatism based on empirical knowledge of social reality.5 In this 
context, Babu and his companions enjoyed greater freedom of movement 
than would have been possible in other institutional settings. 
Babu divided his time between the residential home where he lived 
and a psychosocial rehabilitation workshop, run by the same foundation 
that managed the residential home, where he spent a few hours each day. 
The workshop’s activities included painting, bookbinding and some small 
assembly jobs; it also had a newsagent and stationer’s shop that was open to 
the general public where Babu was usually in charge of the till. Most of our 
conversations took place in the shop, in a small office adapted for therapy-
related interviews, or during long walks around the neighbourhood.
Babu told me he was from the Konkani people who belonged to 
India’s Catholic minority, and that his family had aristocratic roots. He 
related how his childhood had been marked by the continuous torture 
perpetrated by his alcoholic father. Each night his father would fire an 
unloaded shotgun at the child’s head, and inflict corporal punishments 
on the boy that the next day would be dismissed or ignored by the entire 
4 These interviews were carried out in the context of a broader research project on the 
mental health care service network in Catalonia that included both observation and in-
depth interviews. Fieldwork was mainly carried out between 1990 and 1993 in different 
institutions in the city of Barcelona that included inpatient treatment, outpatient treatment, 
and psychosocial rehabilitation. Since then, I have continued to follow processes of mental 
health care in this network as both a researcher and an expert consultant. For reasons of 
confidentiality pseudonyms have been used, and the names of institutions do not appear in 
this chapter. 
5 See Canals (1994) for a detailed discussion of the concept of community and its use in 
medical contexts. 
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domestic group as though nothing had happened. As in the logic Taussig 
(1995) has explored in his writings on the role of silence and the denial of 
torture in the amplification and management of terror, Babu, his siblings 
and his mother lived with the unpredictability of torture and the torture 
of unpredictability. He said he had been a diligent child at school until he 
became ill with typhus at the age of fifteen, that he found relations with 
women difficult because of his shyness, and that as soon as he was able 
he left to study in London. There he met his wife with whom he came to 
live and work in a city close to Barcelona. He was an executive for a well-
known American multinational.
According to Babu’s account, his problem began unexpectedly in 
Barcelona. He suddenly found it difficult to concentrate at work. This 
difficulty was followed, he explained, by an intense feeling of “depression” 
and a “need to stay at home” away from all social contact, repeatedly 
going over his childhood problems of torture. What happened next is best 
explained in his own words:
I remembered the nights of torture with my father. The time that he whipped 
my brother and the shots to the head, always hoping that he would kill me 
once and for all, and that he would not kill me. I thought that because I had 
suffered so much, I was Jesus Christ. I had sometimes had fantasies when I 
was a child, like being a great footballer or tennis player and being cheered 
by the crowds. Or I was a great scientist and I had made a great discovery, or 
that I was Swedish and I had been adopted by some dirty Indians. Now too I 
thought I was very important. Things were not going well at work. I was very 
anxious and my brain was paralysed, I couldn’t work and I had to stay behind 
longer than everyone else. I knew I would lose my job, but I made myself ill 
with nerves before that and took sick leave.
During my last days at work silly ideas were going through my head, 
like the North American bosses would come to Barcelona and appoint me 
director. My boss would then fall at my feet and beg my forgiveness. Everyone 
was praising me. And the truth is that when I went past the office I thought I 
heard voices saying [cheering] ‘boss, boss’. Then I thought I was the president 
of all the foreign multinationals in Barcelona and they would come to ask 
me for work and favours. When I was walking in the street I thought all 
the women wearing blue and white wanted to be my lovers and all the men 
dressed in those colours, my collaborators. President Bush had stood down to 
give me an opportunity because I was more intelligent. When I saw American 
satellite television I thought they were talking about me because they had put 
an electronic device in my house to protect me against attacks. But by then 
president of the USA wasn’t enough, and I had to be king of the whole world, 
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and as I had suffered so much as a child it was as though I had been crucified 
by my father, because I had never heard another story like mine anywhere 
else. That was terrible, continuous torture. Then I had come back to life to 
help everybody. I had stopped being Babu to be Jesus Christ.
Babu’s experience, although private and personal, had a major impact 
on his relationship with his work colleagues. Anyone who is convinced he 
is president of the United States of America or Jesus Christ will not easily 
go unnoticed in the work environment. Straight away, Babu met first 
with perplexity from his colleagues, and was then completely ostracised 
until his sick leave and the start of psychiatric treatment. So why did this 
exclusion from the social stage happen? Babu’s experience clearly takes 
on forms that are not accepted socially, but what threat does it represent? 
Madness is often regarded as the antithesis of reason or even 
rationality, the first being understood as a quality and the second as the 
systematisation of that quality. The opposite of an idea of “reason”, which 
supposedly allows things to be evaluated in the right way, would be defective 
judgement, confusion of internal and external reality; in sum, madness 
as unreason, and its manifestation in delusions. However, the problem is 
that a therapeutic context can hardly be understood as the embodiment 
of rationality. What is more, analysis of the practices of containment, 
rehabilitation and treatment I observed during my fieldwork shows that, 
rather than this abstract entity called reason, madness seems to be the 
opposite of the more day-to-day level of common sense, understood in the 
terms Clifford Geertz uses in his essay as a “cultural system” (Geertz, 
1983:73-93).
Geertz defines common sense as a cultural system characterised by 
the following attributes or “quasi-qualities:” “naturalness,” “practicalness,” 
“thinness,” “immethodicalness,” and “accessibleness” (Geertz, 1983:85). 
Although it may seem obvious, it is worth emphasising that these qualities 
are not attributes of things, but rather qualities attributed to things by 
common sense. And it is precisely in the interplay of these attributes and 
attributions, and interpretations of their presence or absence, that I believe 
the social construction of madness takes shape. 
Geertz stresses that the most defining quality of common sense is 
naturalness, understood as its meaning of “of-courseness” and a sense of 
“it figures.” As would be expected, this idea of naturalness is not applied to 
the sphere of all things and representations, but rather centres on matters 
that appear self-evidently obvious. Although Geertz does not say so, one 
203
Offstage: madness, the ob-scene, and common sense
does not have to be very perceptive to see that naturalness is essentially an 
attribute of any cultural system because it is what allows the construction 
of what he defines as an aura of factuality (Geertz 1973:91): the condition 
by which representations appear unmistakably real for social actors. One 
way of defining this condition is the cultural principle that things are as 
they are because they correspond to a pre-established “natural” logic that 
legitimises them.
If we analyse Babu’s story, we can observe two distinct registers. In the 
first, events occur following a logic similar to the elementality of common 
sense: if Babu had been tortured by his father, from this perspective it 
stands to reason that he would be affected by it, would have problems 
concentrating, or that he would have childhood fantasies that he was an 
adopted Swedish boy. Ultimately, this type of fantasy that Freud once 
called the “family romance” (Familienroman) of the neurotic (1981:1361) 
—thinking that one is the child of other parents, one has been adopted 
and on that basis, imagining a whole other world of family relationships— 
is probably inherent in everyone’s imaginative and performative capacity. 
But this naturalness in Babu’s story breaks down in a second register that 
begins with “During my last days at work silly ideas were going through 
my head,” leading him to think he is the president of the USA and then 
Jesus Christ. Here, delusion emerges in opposition to the obviousness 
and naturalness of common sense. What alerts the family, friends and 
colleagues of a person like Babu to the fact that he has become disturbed 
is this lack of elementality, or put another way, the break with the aura of 
factuality. In certain circumstances, it is acceptable within the domain of 
common sense (or of alternative common senses) to see the Virgin Mary 
and hear the voice of God, or to imaginatively unmask hegemonic common 
sense and its naturalisation of the world, as some artistic movements do. 
However, if one thing characterises delusion it is a subjective rupture in 
which, paradoxically, the biographical and the outrageous combine to 
reveal the arbitrariness that underlies all naturalisation, to strip bare the 
artifices of a social world of conventions. Expressed in the language of 
structuralism, it is as though event and structure were entirely at odds. 
The specific nature of Babu’s experience also clearly threatens all the 
other attributes of common sense. His fictitious world in which he heads 
all the North American multinationals in Barcelona and later becomes 
president of the United States can hardly be consistent with the principle 
of practicalness (Geertz, 1983). Even less so can Babu’s experience be 
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associated with the special connotations of sagacity and “ability to make 
projects thrive” which, according to Geertz, must be interpreted within 
this attribute (Geertz, 1983:87).
Babu’s fantasising is also key to understanding the absence of other 
attributes of common sense, such as “thinness” (Geertz, 1983:83), in his 
narrative. If, as Geertz says, the common-sense view of the world can 
be summed up by the 18th-century English theologian and philosopher 
Joseph Butler’s affirmation that “every thing is what it is and not another 
thing”, then Babu’s story is premised on the reverse: every thing is not 
what it is but another thing. This is evident in Babu’s subjective world 
and his certainty that he is not who he is (an executive and engineer in 
a multinational corporation), but something else (president of the USA, 
Jesus Christ), but also in his interpretation of social reality because there, 
too, what is (passers-by dressed in blue and white) is obviously something 
else (the women are his lovers and the men, his collaborators).
The next attribute is asystematicity or “immethodicalness” (Geertz, 
1983:90). Although Geertz does not put it quite in these terms, 
immethodicalness refers to the flexibility and elasticity of every assertion 
about the nature of things, to the inconsistency of experience —and this 
does come from Geertz— reflected in the American poet Walt Whitman’s 
“I contradict myself, so I contradict myself. I contain multitudes”: a 
principle that, in the acute phase of his illness, was the opposite of Babu’s 
experience as he did not question his delusion but regarded it as a certainty, 
the only certainty. While this was not the case in his later reflection on 
his own experience once his delusion had abated, his account of that 
experience clearly conveys the absence of malleability, and therefore the 
rigidity, of the system of beliefs and convictions that characterised it.
Geertz’s final quality is “accessibleness,” which tells us that common 
sense is a general property of all social actors, or at least a majority of 
them, since as Geertz tells us “any person with faculties reasonably 
intact can grasp common-sense conclusions” (Geertz, 1983:91). It is no 
coincidence that Geertz himself commonsensically offers us this contrast 
between common sense and madness, although he does so almost in 
passing. Babu’s experience, for example, shows how a largely inaccessible 
idiosyncrasy can contrast with commonly shared judgements.
In sum, in Babu’s experiences we can see a narrative artificiality 
that contrasts with naturalness, a fantasy that counters practicalness, 
a codification that contradicts thinness, a rigidity that is a retort to the 
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flexibility and immethodicalness required to get by on a daily basis, and an 
idiosyncrasy that leans towards the inaccessible. Experiences like Babu’s 
defy common sense, replacing it with a kind of “ob-scene” sense.
Refractions
The modification of this ob-scene sense is a basic, although tacit, objective 
of most care facilities charged with the treatment and rehabilitation of 
people diagnosed with a psychosis. During my fieldwork, and in subsequent 
research, I have observed how these facilities function as schools of common 
sense that set out to reconstruct the aura of factuality of social actions 
and representations in an attempt to turn affected persons into socially 
credible individuals; that is, reproducers of common sense (Martínez-
Hernáez, 2000). These facilities cannot, therefore, avoid a moralising 
function, although paradoxically most therapies consider themselves to be 
unconnected to social and moral spheres, as their understanding of human 
afflictions is based on an individualistic epistemology and methodology. 
For this reason, mental health professionals tend not to seek out strategies 
that would allow affected persons to join their against-the-grain narratives 
to a critical and/or reflexive purpose, to a social function that emerges 
from their particular view of the world. 
In the treatment context in which Babu found himself, affected 
persons were not encouraged to develop their own vision of the world, 
and much less to do so in a critical, creative and reflexive way. Rather, 
they were oriented toward adopting and participating in the most 
stereotypical and normative social conventions without questioning them, 
becoming what we might define as “good patients”. Thus, it was considered 
inappropriate for patients to read books on esotericism, to join minority 
religious groups, or to reflect on abstract problems: resources and 
activities that are usually understood as amplifiers of delusion. In this vein 
I observed a curious discussion between a psychiatrist and her patient, 
who had been diagnosed with schizophrenia a year earlier and had begun 
to study philosophy at the local university. While the patient spoke about 
his interest in philosophical questions about the meaning of existence 
or the nature of things, the psychiatrist pressured him to abandon this 
course of study and switch to one more closely related to practical reality. 
The therapist thus reoriented her patient not to the sphere of rationality, 
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but to the more elemental, practical and supposedly accessible sphere of 
common sense. The conversations generally held in the group therapy 
sessions also show a risk-free preference for topics considered practical 
and elemental, such as public transport, how to find work, or the price 
of goods in the market. These and similar subjects are generally chosen 
because they link in with managing daily life and are therefore considered 
essential to the affected person’s rehabilitation. 
One of the aims of group therapy is to recreate a vision of common 
sense that can be shared by all those taking part in the session. This 
mechanism attempts to retrieve each participant’s individual remnants 
of common sense and use them to build a collective common sense that 
each individual can then adopt. For example, one of the institutions in 
which I did fieldwork ran a session about public transport in which a 
participant, Emilio, said that he refused to travel on double-decker buses 
because they were not safe and were constantly overturning; his rejection 
of this form of transport was even stronger if the bus had an odd number 
because the day, month and year of his birth had even numbers and he 
reasoned that even numbers meant life and odd numbers, death. The 
therapist sought a critical response from the rest of the participants, who 
argued as a group that the bus manufacturers took safety requirements 
into account when designing double-decker buses, and that they had not 
noticed these vehicles overturning any more than others. But when the 
discussion turned to matters such as “fate is written in the numbers” or 
“who can guarantee that these buses will never turn over?”, the therapist 
began to insist they must be practical and accept that if things are as they 
are, that is, if double-decker buses are being driven around cities, then 
there is a reason for it. The therapist thus guided Emilio to an attitude of 
assuming the aura of factuality of cultural representations and artefacts. 
Faced with Emilio’s insistence on imploding cultural conventions, the 
therapist positioned himself as a bastion of common sense, pushing the 
dissenting voices to the margins of the stage.
During my fieldwork, I observed therapists using two mechanisms 
to reconstruct their patients’ common sense. The first was an explicit 
system of negotiation and coercion dependent on a logic of rewards 
and punishments. In the second, the therapist encouraged the patient 
to identify with his or her own judgements. Neither strategy, however, 
met with more than limited success because of the patients’ tendency to 
what has been called derealisation: an involuntary deconstruction of the 
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cultural codes that allow the world to be naturalised. The therapeutic stage 
thus became a scene of continuous struggle between common sense and 
its deconstruction by the patients: a deconstruction that reaffirmed the 
therapists’ commitment to common sense, and a common sense whose 
arbitrariness was exposed by deconstruction. 
In the group sessions the identification strategy entailed motivating 
the patients to respond to and contradict any statements that were not 
considered to be practical or commonsensical, such as the emphatic 
assertion that double-decker buses overturn or, as another informant 
stated, that the State pays for ships where homosexuals and dissidents are 
kept and then abandoned out at sea. A simple glance from the therapist 
to the patients considered to be more “recovered” could be enough to 
prompt them to comment in ways that corresponded to the therapist’s 
expectations. In this way a hierarchy of proximity to the therapist that 
placed a premium on obedience and mimesis was established among 
the group participants. But for this to work, the therapist needed first to 
establish a relationship of transference or idealisation that was absolutely 
necessary for the affected person to identify with his or her interests – or 
perhaps “desires” would be more accurate – since without this connection 
the therapist would not easily be able to use his or her disappointment as a 
strategy when patients responded with bizarre judgements.
In the individual sessions, although the therapists did not have 
recourse to the other patients to act as their mouthpieces, they appealed 
to the patient’s supposed remaining fragments of “common sense”, and to 
their own position as the personification of this common sense. However, 
the trust between the two was easily broken. The therapists would insist 
that patients trust the treatment and let themselves be guided. The patients 
probably thought it highly unlikely that they would be able to trust 
someone who did not trust them. New patients tended to give more explicit 
accounts of their experiences, delusions or hallucinations, but they soon 
realised that this frankness came at a high cost in the form of increased 
medication, the therapist’s distrust, and panic among close friends and 
family. And so the process would continue until the patient decided to 
offer what he or she thought the therapist wanted to hear: an impression of 
common sense performed by a domesticated individual who has purged 
any traces of ob-scene sense from their story and takes a critical view of 
the experience responsible for their being in treatment. This was Babu’s 
strategy as he described it to me. There was no question of trust, only of 
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meeting the therapist’s expectations; telling stories colonised by narrative 
conventions that concealed the outrageous and the unthinkable, and thus 
allowed him to reclaim a small place on the social stage or, at least, a more 
comfortable and tranquil day-to-day existence. 
By way of conclusion
Madness is an offstage voice in both social and therapeutic contexts. 
As a narrative that must be domesticated, delusion is hidden 
psychopharmacologically and psychotherapeutically until it can re-
emerge purified and adjusted to common sense. In many cases, however, 
this task leads to a series of failures, not only because madness is 
resistant to hegemony, inculcation and persuasion, but also because it 
implodes common sense by confronting it with opposing quasi-qualities: 
artificiality, impracticality, codification, rigidity, and inaccessibility. This is 
why managing afflictions of this kind is exhausting for affected persons, 
their families, and mental health professionals alike, who find themselves 
caught in the tension between common sense and idiosyncratically ob-
scene sense. 
Madness is feared because it reveals the contrived nature of common 
sense, including its most basic contrivance: its naturalisation. Madness 
is denied any social use or function; for example, as an instrument 
for rethinking the arbitrariness of our social world. Doing so would 
mean allowing madness onstage as a meaningful social resource. Most 
therapeutic strategies, however, do not seek to engage psychosis in 
dialogue or cede it social space but instead treat it as an anomaly to be 
domesticated, even though this mission seldom meets with success. The 
resulting reproduction of “total therapy” models of treatment reduces 
the possibility of dialogue and social communication, and this in turn 
facilitates an emphasis on management over narrative, nosology over 
experience, bureaucratic pigeonholing over lived identity. And finally, on 
the preeminent rhetoric of evidence, with its ability to objectify human 
affliction through nosologies, categories, diagnostic criteria, reductionistic 
hypotheses and possible treatments, over what, in the last instance, is the 
most evident: suffering. 
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Abstract: This chapter examines the concepts that doctors have used 
to classify their ethnographic and clinical observations regarding their 
patients’ physical signs and symptoms, and their demands for care, in 
diverse cultural contexts. Ever since the Renaissance, when treatises on 
“errors”, “superstitions”, and “commonly presumed truths” began to appear, 
doctors (and anthropologists) developed disease classifications such as 
“ethnic”, “comparative”, and “historical-geographical” pathology, among 
others, before arriving at 20th-century concepts such as ‘ethnic disorders’ 
and “culture-bound syndromes”, a terminology closely connected to the 
concept of folk medicine, which was developed to identify culture areas. 
We analyses the meaning of these concepts, their implications for clinical 
observation, diagnosis and treatment, and their role in the relationships 
between doctors, patients and their social networks, as well as in the 
historical process of medicalization. It concludes with a discussion of 
the emergent concept of “medical concerns”, a product of multiple social 
1 This chapter is based on research funded by two projects: CSO2012-31323 (MEC), Comer 
en tiempos de ‘crisis’: nuevos contextos alimentarios y de salud en España, M. Gracia, PI; and 
HAR2012-3488 De la propaganda sanitaria a la educación para la salud: ideología, discursos 
y saberes en la España de Franco (1939-1975), E. Perdiguero-Gil, PI. Our thanks to Enrique 
Perdiguero-Gil, Sylvie Fainzang, Aida Terrón and Isabella Riccò for their helpful comments 
and suggestions.
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processes including the widespread use of Internet sources of information 
on health and illness. 
Keywords:  medical anthropology, history of anthropology, history of 
medicine, medical nosology, folk medicine
La medicalización del diagnóstico. De las nosologías de base cultural y 
ambiental a las preocupaciones médicas de la población
Resumen: Este capítulo explora los conceptos mediante que los médicos 
han utilizado para clasificar sus observaciones etnográficas y clínicas 
de los síntomas y signos de sus pacientes, así como sus demandas 
de atención en contextos culturales distintos. Desde la aparición, 
desde el Renacimiento de tratados sobre «errores», «supersticiones» o 
«prejuicios», médicos (y antropólogos) desarrollaron clasificaciones como 
patología «étnica», «comparativa» e «histórico-geográfica», entre otras, 
hasta conceptos del siglo xx como «desórdenes étnicos», «síndromes 
delimitados culturalmente» muy vinculados al concepto de folk-medicina, 
desarrollado para identificar áreas culturales. Analizamos el significado de 
tales conceptos, sus implicaciones en la observación clínica, el diagnóstico 
y el tratamiento y su papel en las relaciones entre médicos, pacientes y 
sus respectivas redes sociales, en el marco del proceso de medicalización. 
Concluye con una discusión sobre el concepto de medical concerns 
(preocupaciones médicas), un producto de procesos diversos entre los 
cuales el cada vez más amplio uso de Internet como fuente de información 
en salud y enfermedad.
Palabras clave: antropología médica, historia de la antropología, historia 
de la medicina, nosología médica, folk medicina
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During the 19th century, academic medicine, military and colonial 
doctors, and general practitioners (henceforth, GPs) were faced with 
two related problems: first, how to classify certain illnesses observed in 
overseas colonies and among European peasants, ailments known only 
by local names like “evil eye”, “tarantism” or susto and characterized by 
symptoms that defied easy categorization in Western medical terms; and 
second, how to determine the prevalence of these local diseases. These 
concerns arose out of the demands of local patients for medical treatment, 
and the medical screening of colonial troops, immigrants and colonists. 
The interpretation of such diversity was related to the development of 
anthropology as a field of study. Since the founding of the Société des 
Observateurs de l’Homme (Society of Observers of Man) in Paris in 1799, 
the first professional society of anthropologists (Copans, 1978; Stocking, 
1968), many physicians actively participated in the anthropological and 
ethnological societies created during the 19th century (Bouza Vila, 
2002; Comelles, 1998a; Stocking, 1995) out of professional interest as 
well as intellectual curiosity. In Italy and Spain, they also joined folklore 
societies.2 Given this confluence of interests, Spanish physicians called 
for the teaching of anthropology in medical schools (Calleja, 1892; 
Bouza Vila, 2002), following the example set in France by the physician 
and anthropologist Paul Broca (see Diasio, 1999; Dias, 2004). The close 
involvement of doctors in the founding and development of anthropology 
as a discipline beginning in the late 18th century is fundamental to an 
understanding of the rise of medical anthropology. 
The participation of doctors during this foundational period 
helps to explain why the development of a new scientific nosology 
(Ackerknecht, 1967; Foucault, 1981) in the 19th century required 
the creation of disease categories specific to the disorders observed in 
overseas colonies and among European peasants. In both cases this 
was a consequence of medicalization.3 In the colonies, this process of 
2 For an extended discussion of medical interest in ethnology and folklore, see Comelles 
(1996). See also Comelles (in press), Charuty (1997), Diasio (1999) and Bouza Vila 
(2002). 
3 Here we distinguish between the concept of “medicalization” as defined and used in the 
social sciences beginning in the late 1960s (Busfield, 2017) to mean the redefinition of 
human conditions as objects of medical diagnosis, prevention and treatment, and the 
notion of ‘medicalization’ as a longue durée historical and acculturative process involving the 
gradual expansion of access to and increasing recourse to medical knowledge, services and 
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taxonomic expansion was driven by the need to protect colonists and 
colonial troops from local risks to health. In rural Europe, the increasing 
presence of GPs made these categories necessary instruments in the 
process of acculturation as peasants began to seek medical assistance for 
their problems as an alternative to traditional healers. As a result, new 
terms were coined: in Germany Medicinisch-praktischen Geographie 
(Finke, 1795) and Historisch geographischen Pathologie (geographical and 
historical pathology) (Hirsch 1860; 1883); in France, pathologie ethnique 
(Boudin, 1861) and pathologie comparée (Boudin, 1848), which referred, 
although not exclusively (Heusinger 1847; 1853), to comparative 
human and animal pathology (Anon. 1864); and in Italy medicina 
popolare (Pitrè, 1896), which was a Romance-language adaptation of 
the German concept of Volksmedizin, a German synonym for “domestic 
medicine” (Heidenreich 1826). Although the majority of these terms 
are the product of an “etic” medical gaze, at the same time these same 
doctors developed a terminology that emerged from an “emic” gaze as 
a consequence of their attentiveness, in the course of their clinical work, 
to what we would now call the “explanatory models” of their patients: 
concepts such as “commonly presumed truths”, préjugés, preocupaciones 
and, recently, “medical concerns” (White & Horvitz, 2012).
This chapter, written from the margins of both medicine and 
anthropology, offers a genealogy of these concepts, which later developed 
into others: “comparative psychiatry”, “ethnomedicine”, “ethnopsychiatry”, 
“primitive medicine”, “ethnic disorders” (Devereux, 1973), and “culture-
bound syndromes” (Kiev, 1964; Lebra, 1976; Rubel, 1964; Simons 
& Hughes, 1985) and, finally, “medical concerns”. Each of these has 
a meaning specific to the particular stage in the historical process of 
medicalization in which it emerged, with implications both for clinical 
practice and also for the health education strategies developed since the 
end of the 19th century. All of them are implicated in the construction 
of modern medical anthropology and its influence on clinical practice, 
medical education, health promotion and public health. 
treatment, and the growing hegemony of medical diagnostic categories, which supplanted 
folk diagnoses. The roots of “medicalization” as a historical process in the societies of the 
western Mediterranean can be documented as far back as the Middle Ages (Nutton, 1981), 
although some scholars (Miller, 1985) argue that it is possible to trace its origins to classical 
antiquity. 
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Errors, superstitions and commonly presumed truths
By the 17th century, folk diseases and diagnoses such as the “evil eye” 
had already been incorporated into academic treatises (Ruizes de 
Fontecha, 1606), but most were considered “superstitions”, erreurs 
(errors), and later préjugés (commonly presumed truths).4 Some of the 
first works cataloguing popular medical knowledge from both a clinical 
and an ethnographic point of view were written for non-specialists in 
vernacular languages (Carlino & Jeanneret, 2009; Fissell, 1992). 
These include Andrew Boorde’s The Breuiary of Healthe, for All Maner 
of Sicknesses and Diseases the Which May Be in Man Or Woman ([1547] 
2010) and Laurent Joubert’s Erreurs populaires au fait de la médecine et 
régime de santé (1578, 1586), both of which were seminal references for 
similar subsequent works until the 19th century. Joubert’s six-part book is 
divided into chapters on subjects that include “drinking”, “going to bed”, 
and “on healing”. This is not, then, a nosology properly speaking but a 
large compendium of local knowledge and practice that is the product of a 
double gaze, both clinical and ethnographic, characteristic of the doctors 
of the time. Its aim was to explain “errors”, some of which were the result 
of medical practice, and to offer alternatives, solutions and explanations. 
It should be seen as a pedagogical tool intended to correct wrong practices 
and, because of its wide circulation, included as one more strategy in this 
stage of the process of medicalization5. Table 1 lists some main works in 
this genre until the end of the 19th century. Many of these books were 
written by doctors, or copied from earlier works, and consist of both 
practical manuals and compendiums of curiosities that could be grouped 
together as popularization of medicine (Porter, 1992).
4 “Commonly presumed truths”, a term found in Browne (1658), is a good translation for 
préjugés, the term used in France during the 17th and 18th centuries. For a more detailed 
analysis, see Comelles (in press).
5 A description of the stages of the medicalization process can be found in Egbe, Alegre-
Agis & Comelles, 2017, pp: 241-244.
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Table 1. Examples of books on erreurs, errores and commonly presumed 
truths (1578-1900)
Year Author References
1578 Joubert, L. Erreurs populaires au fait de la médecine et régime de santé corrigés. 
1586 Joubert, L.
Seconde partie des Erreurs populaires, et propos vulgaires, touchant 
la médecine et le régime de santé.
1658 Browne, Th. 
Pseudodoxia Epidemica: Or, Enquiries into Very Many Received 
Tenents, and Commonly Presumed Truths (3rd ed). Translated into 
French (1738), and Spanish (1774).
1726 Lloret y Martí, F.
Apología de la medicina, y sus doctos professores, contra los críticos, 
y defensa de la doctrina de Hypocrates, y Galeno, contra los errores 
vulgares. 
1757 Feijoo, B. J.
Teatro crítico universal, ó discursos varios en todo género de 
materias, para desengaño de errores comunes.
1775
Bienville, J. D. 
T. de.
Traité des erreurs populaires sur la santé. 
1783 Ilharce, J.-L. d’. Erreurs populaires sur la médecine.
1810 Salgues, J. B. Des erreurs et des préjugés: répandus dans la société. 
1812 Richerand, B. A.
Des erreurs populaires relatives à la médécine. Translated into 
Spanish (1826).
1834
Rouveroy, F., et 
Chopin, J.-M.
Le petit libraire forain ou la morale de Jacques le bossu: ouvrage 
dirigé contre les croyances superstitieuses, les préjugés et les erreurs 
populaires. 
1856 Chesnel, M. A. de.
Dictionnaire des superstitions, erreurs, préjugés et traditions 
populaires.
1865 Chatelain, A. Des erreurs et préjugés populaires en médecine. 




Madre é hijo: doctrina científica y errores vulgares en obstetricia y 
pediatría. 
Along with errores vulgares, erreurs populaires (common errors) 
and superstitions, we find the first appearance in 1736 of the concept 
of préjugés (in Spanish, preocupaciones): “received ideas”, a concept very 
close to Browne’s (1658) “commonly presumed truths”. Some examples 
of works based on these categories are included in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Books on préjugés and preocupaciones (1600-1940)
Year Author References
1770
Holbach, P. H. 
Baron d’.
Essai sur les préjugés, ou, De l’influence des opinions sur les 
mœurs et sur le bonheur des hommes: Ouvrage contenant l’apo-
logie de la philosophie.
1801 Laugier, J.-B. Des préjugés en médecine. Premier rabat-joie des vaccinateurs.
1810 Salgues, J. B. Des erreurs et des préjugés répandus dans la société.
1827 Scoutetten, H. Des préjugés sur la médecine.
1831 Voisin, J. C.
De quelques préjugés relatifs à la médecine dans les 
départements de la Bretagne. Chez l’auteur.
1834
Rouveroy, F., & 
Chopin, J.-M.
Le petit libraire forain ou la morale de Jacques le bossu: ouvrage 
dirigé contre les croyances superstitieuses, les préjugés et les 
erreurs populaires.
1856 Chesnel, M. A. de.
Dictionnaire des superstitions, erreurs, préjugés et traditions 
populaires. 
1865 Chatelain, A. Des erreurs et préjugés populaires en médecine. 
1882 Pauc, E. Des erreurs et des préjugés populaires en médecine. 
1895 Rodríguez-López, J. Supersticiones en Galicia y preocupaciones vulgares 
1896 Rodríguez-López, J.
Las preocupaciones en Medicina. Conocimientos útiles a la 
familia. 
1905 Codera y Zaidi, N. F.
Preocupaciones alimenticias. Examen de algunas ideas respecto 
a la alimentación del hombre y de los animales domésticos. 




Ho How to Stop Worrying and Start Living: 
Tim Time Tested Methods for Conquering Worry. New York: 
World’s Work.
1932 Adriano, A.
Carmi, tradizioni, prejudizi nella medicina popolare calabrese. 
Arnaldo Forni editore.
Holbach’s concept of préjugés goes beyond the positivist notion 
of “commonly presumed truths”, representing them as the product of 
ideological influences, mostly from religious discourses. While the 
gaze of the sources listed in Table 1 is predominantly “etic” and based 
on observation from a position of privilege, the notion of “commonly 
presumed truths” corresponds to a different cultural register: that of lay 
opinion, an “emic” register to which medical practitioners had come to 
be attentive.6
6 Today these books should be considered primary ethnographic sources for understanding 
practices related to health, illness and care among the common people from the 16th century 
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European doctors also wrote two types of neo-Hippocratic regional 
and local studies: “medical geographies” and “medical topographies” 
(Jones, 1967:2; Peter, 1967). Medical geographies such as the Historia 
natural del Principado de Asturias by Gaspar Casal (1762) approached 
the regional prevalence of diseases through the Hippocratic concept of 
katastasis (“meteorological constitutions”), which stressed the relation 
between diseases and the environment. Medical topographies, however, 
were local monographs based on naturalist ethnography, and closely 
followed the environmental criteria of classification used by Hippocrates 
in Airs, Waters and Places. In 1795 Leonhard Ludwig Finke drew up 
guidelines7 for medical topographies in his three-volume essay on the 
geographical distribution of diseases and, although no mention was 
made of their source, they served as a reference point for most of the 
subsequent works in this genre. Finke distinguished between “geography” 
and Antropographie (anthropography)8, which consisted of describing 
inhabitants
…according to their nature, color, physique, education, temperament, 
industriousness, diligence, indolence, endurance, hardiness or weakness in 
bearing hardship, and so forth. Their occupations, crafts and trades […]. 
Their foods, beverages and condiments deserve attention, no less than their 
clothing, habitations, games, amusements, and personal habits, such as 
misuse of warm and fiery beverages, or tobacco, hot rooms and the like. […] 
He [the doctor] describes the modes of treatment commonly employed in the 
country, if they are not absurd, as is often de case, because some of them may 
actually be of a nature as to lead an alert physician to think about them, and 
often even to imitate them (L. Finke, cited in Rosen, 1946: 536).
Medical topographies are based on what we refer to as “neo-
Hippocratic ethnography”, which is an ethnographic register based on the 
to the beginning of the 20th century. Many were written by doctors for a readership that 
consisted of both GPs and the general public. Unlike 19th-century treatises on disease, these 
were compendia of practical advice on what to do for someone suffering from, for example, 
a stomach ache or cough. 
7 An English translation of these guidelines is available in Rosen (1946).
8 This is a synonym for the term “ethnography”, and was introduced into German academic 
discourse in the mid-18th century as a result of the work of August Ludwig von Schlözer, a 
cultural historian, on Völkerkunde (ethnology). A detailed history of the term can be found 
in Vermeulen (2008), who makes no reference to Finke’s work. See also Comelles (2000) 
on the significance of ethnography for medical practice.
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authoritative gaze of doctors. Peter (1967), on the basis of his research on 
the late 18th-century medical topographies in the archives of the Société 
Royale de Medecine, believes that for local doctors, ethnographic writing 
was a useful way to make sense of the social chaos that accompanied 
epidemics. Medical topographies served to diagnose local conditions of 
health and disease based on environmental determinism, which then would 
make it possible to develop treatment strategies adapted to local reality. 
At the end of the 18th century, Finke’s (1795) immense compendium of 
geographical and topographical sources (Ueber die verschiedenen Arten 
der Geographien, hauptsächlich aber über medizinische Topographien 
und wie solche abzufassen) on all the European, Asian, American and 
Arctic cultures documented at that time revealed that pathologies have 
enormous local variability. 
From ethnic pathology to ethnic disorders
The term pathologie ethnique (“ethnic pathology”) was formulated by 
Jean-Christian Boudin (1861), a French military physician in Algeria 
(Léonard, 1977) and member of the Société d’Anthropologie. He was 
also the author of one of the first treatises of “comparative pathology” 
(Boudin, 1848), in which he studied “le non-acclimatement, les aptitudes 
et les immunités morbides de diverses races humaines, et la nature de leurs 
maladies” (Périer, 1868: XXXVII), 9 a subject to which he would return 
years later in his Essai de pathologie ethnique: de l’influence de la race sur 
la fréquence, la forme et la gravité des maladies (Boudin, 1861),10 a work 
whose aim was to answer a question of great import at the time: “Les 
diverses races, les diverses nationalités, ont-elles un même degré d’aptitude, 
de prédisposition, pour les maladies, et ces dernières se présentent-elles 
sous des formes et avec des intensités identiques dans toutes les variétés 
humaines?” (Boudin 1861: 6). 11 
9 [Failure to acclimate, propensities and immunity to disease of the various human races, 
and the nature of their maladies].
10 [Essay on Ethnic Pathology: On the Influence of Race on the Frequency, Form and 
Seriousness of Illness].
11 [“Do the various races and nationalities possess the same degree of propensity for or 
predisposition to diseases, and do these present in the same form and with the same intensity 
in all human varieties?”].
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Si la solution du problème est d’un intérêt scientifique incontestable, elle n’est 
pas d’une importance moindre au point de vue économique et social. […] le 
succès d’une expédition de guerre, soit dans les régions polaires, soit dans les 
portions insalubres des contrées tropicales, peut dépendre de la qualité des 
hommes dont on aura fait choix; il en sera de même du choix des travailleurs, 
Coulis, Chinois ou Madériens, que divers gouvernements dirigent 
aujourd’hui sur les colonies, particulièrement depuis la suppression de la 
traite et l’émancipation des noirs. Toutes ces grandes questions économiques 
sont dominées par la notion précise du degré d’aptitude des races aux diverses 
affections, […] par la connaissance de leurs prédispositions morbides et de 
leur résistance respective aux milieux contre lesquels elles sont appelées à 
réagir (Boudin, 1861 :7).12 
The argument he develops is based on a gaze that classifies racial 
difference according to body odor and skin color —“the black appears 
to be highly sensitive to the slightest decrease in temperature” (Boudin, 
1861: 8)— among other considerations based on a broad knowledge 
of contemporary French, German and English ethnographic sources. 
Boudin’s article connects numerous examples of ethnic pathology that 
correspond to classic folk illnesses such as the trance-like state and 
physical and psychic depletion of “second sight” in the Hebrides, as well 
as the influence of climate on propensity to illness, with what he calls “the 
differences, no less curious […] in intellectual faculties” (Boudin 1861: 
12). Boudin supports his argument for “racial” differences in human 
illness with statistical data drawn from veterinary medicine and the 
reporting of illnesses affecting different horse breeds. This use of statistics 
leads him to report that respiratory illnesses were twice as frequent and 
gastrointestinal diseases five times more frequent among British soldiers 
than among Maltese recruits. 
12 [If the solution to this problem is of undeniable scientific interest, it is of no less 
importance from an economic and social point of view. […] the success of a military 
expedition, whether in the polar regions or in the insalubrious areas of tropical countries, 
may depend on the quality of the men chosen to carry them out; the same may be said 
of the choice of workers, Coulis, Chinese or Madeirans, which various governments 
today dispatch to the colonies, particularly after the ending of the slave trade and the 
emancipation of the blacks. All these great economic questions are dominated by the 
notion of the degree to which the races are subject to different diseases, […] by knowledge 
of their predisposition to illness and their resistance to the environments to which they 
are called to respond] (Boudin, 1861: 7). 
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A year before Boudin’s article appeared, August Hirsch (1860) 
published his Handbuch der historisch-geographischen Pathologie,13 which 
defines “pathology” as 
…the expression of a process called forth and sustained, in organisms that 
are capable of life, by the sum of all the influences which act upon them from 
without. The form and fashion of this process, accordingly, are determined by 
the kind of individuality and by the character of the environment. Each of those 
two factors shows many differences in time and in space. As regards the human 
species, the differences are expressed, for the first factor, in the distinctive 
qualities of generations separated by years, and of races and nationalities 
scattered over the globe; for the second factor, they are expressed in peculiarities 
of the climate and the soil, and of the animal and vegetable kingdoms in so far as 
these are brought into direct relation with man, and further, in the vicissitudes 
of politics, of social affairs, of the food-supply, and of mental training. In these 
considerations lie the germs of a science, which, in an ideally complete form, 
would furnish a medical history of mankind, but which, treated more narrowly 
and so as to embrace only the pathological side of human life, will give firstly, 
a picture of the occurrence, the distribution, and the types of the diseases of 
mankind, in distinct epochs of time, and at various points of the earth’s surface; 
and, secondly, will render an account of the relations of those diseases to the 
external conditions surrounding the individual and determining his manner 
of life. And this science I have named, […] the science of geographical and 
historical pathology (Hirsch, 2014, pp. 1–2).
Hirsch refers here to the description of pathology that derives 
from clinical, ethnographic and historical observations, suggesting that 
historical and geographic context has considerable influence on local 
diseases. Hirsch’s ideas should be distinguished from the radical positivism 
of the concepts “comparative pathology” or “ethnic pathology”. These 
labels should be seen in the context of discussions on racial differences and 
adaptability to different environments, the roots of which were present in 
anthropological debates regarding comparative anatomy (Salles, 1849: 
207). Many of Boudin’s observations are grounded in an anthropometric 
gaze, in statistics and in an ill-defined concept of “race” —Jewish, Hindu, 
black— constructed in many cases on the basis of data on military recruits 
13 There is an English translation with a foreword by Hirsch (1883) that includes a review 
of the literature on “historical-geographical pathology” that appeared in print following 
publication of the German edition of his book in 1860. In this chapter, all quotations of 
Hirsch’s work are from the 1883 edition.
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and on morbidity and mortality statistics among the troops. He does not 
mention women. His concept of “ethnic pathology” is based primarily on 
clinical examination and only secondarily on ethnographic knowledge 
because of the position he occupied in the medical service of the French 
army. A few years later, in his Memoria sobre un programa de patología 
general, Johann Ullesperger wrote of a new branch of pathology, “ethnic 
pathology”, which he described as a “comparative analogy between 
etiological notions resulting from objective local differences in a country 
and the subjective individualities of a nation” (Ullesperger, 1866: 15). He 
translated this concept into German as ethnische Pathologie in an article 
on dyspepsia (Ullesperger, 1868), but without reference to the work of 
Hirsch and Finke. While the concept of “ethnic pathology” is connected 
to the Hippocratic notion of “temperament” and to constitutionalist 
approaches (Kretschmer, 1954), as well as to the later development of 
“psychosomatic illness”, in the 19th century it allowed doctors to construct 
a nosography attentive to phenotypic —to their way of thinking, “racial”— 
variability, and to environmental and cultural adaptability. Some examples 
of books in this genre are included in Table 3. 
Table 3. Ethnic, geographic and comparative pathology
1795
Finke L.
(cited in Hirsch 1883)
Versuch einer allgemeinen medizinisch-praktischen Geographie, 
worin der historische Tell der einheimischen Völker- und 
Staaten-Arzeneykunde vorgetragen wird, 3 volumes. 
1813
Schnurrer, F.
(cited in Hirsch 1883)
Geographische Nosologie oder die Lehre von den 
Veränderungen der Krankheiten in den verschiedenen 
Gegenden der Erde, in Verbindung mit physischer 
Geographiebund Natur-Geschichte des Menschen.
1847 Heusinger, C.F. Recherches de pathologie comparée. 
1848 Boudin, J. Études de pathologie comparée. 
1849 Salles, E. F.




(cited in Hirsch, 
1883)
Die geographischen Verhältnisse der Krankheiten 
1860 Hirsch, A.
Handbuch der historisch-geographischen Pathologie. English 
translation: Handbook of Geographical and Historical 
Pathology, 6 volumes (1883).
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1861
Boudin, J. C. M. F. J
(cited in Hirsch 1883)
Essai de pathologie éthnique: de l’influence de la race sur 
la fréquence, la forme et la gravité des maladies. Annales 
d’Hygiène Publique et Medecine Légale, XVI-XVII, 5–50 
64–103. 
1864 Pouchet, G.
De la pluralité des races humaines. Essai anthropologique par 
Georges Pouchet. 
1866 Ullersperger, J. B. Memoria sobre un programa de patología general.
1868 Ullesperger, J. B.
Die Pathologie und Therapie der Dyspepsien. Historisch, 
kritisch, theoretisch und praktisch dargestellt. Zeitschrift Der 
K.k. Gesellschaft Der Aerzte Zu Wien, 21-24, 107–123. 
1877 Lombard, H. C.
Traité de climatologie médicale: comprenant la météorologie 
médicale et l’étude des influences physiologiques, pathologiques, 
prophylactiques et thérapeutiques du climat sur la santé. 
1904 Kraepelin E Vergleischende Pathologie (cited in Bendick 1989)
1925 Kuczynski, M. 
Steppe und Mensch. Kirgisische Reiseeindrücke und 





La Vida en la Amazonía peruana. Obervaciones de un médico.
Table 3 includes two important figures. The first is Emil Kraepelin, 
who proposed a specific taxonomic group for psychiatric folk nosology, 
Vergleichende Pathologie (comparative pathology) (Bendick, 1989; 
Martínez-Hernáez, 2000).14 This taxon did not correspond to particular 
cultural areas, but included a residual category for some disorders, as 
DSM-IV and DSM-V do today. Neither Kraepelin nor the creators of the 
DSM were anthropologists or folklorists; they were clinicians in search of 
a way to include amok, susto and nervios in scientific nosography with the 
aim of simplifying and rationalizing diagnosis, prognosis and therapeutics. 
Many came to accept the universal nature of pathogenesis (Kiev, 1973) 
while resigning themselves to retaining the diversity of patients’ narratives 
about symptoms. What we have here is a clinical problem resolved by 
clinical means, in which the role of anthropology is subsidiary, its purpose 
being to guarantee a certain degree of rigor in the evaluation of signs and 
symptoms and the exploration of their underlying logic. 
14 Kraepelin developed these taxa following his travels in Southeast Asia with his brother, 
a botanist.
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The concept of “ethnic disorder” developed by Georges Devereux 
(1973) in 1956 is an adaptation of the term “ethnic pathology”, substituting 
the more flexible notion of “disorder” for the concept of “pathology”, 
which suggested organic disease. However, elements of the organic 
aspects of “ethnic pathology” remain present in his work. The concept of 
“culture-bound syndromes”, its direct heir, is more relativistic, open and 
inclusive (Simons & Hughes, 1985). Beyond its influence on the design 
of mental health care services, recognition of linguistic diversity as a 
problem to be resolved in clinical communication, and the promotion of 
“cultural competence” for health professionals and institutions, the ethnic 
pathology-ethnic disorder continuum has had little relevance for health 
education, perhaps with the exception of some issues in intercultural 
health. 
The second case is the work of Maxime Kuczynski Godard (1889-
1962) a medical doctor in the best tradition of social medicine. Kuczynski 
worked in Asia prior to World War I, using the concept of ethnische 
Pathologie developed in his manifesto Neue Medizinische Aufgaben 
im neuen Russland (Kuczynski, 1925).15 This should not be confused 
with Boudin’s concept of pathologie ethnique; Kuczynski used ethnische 
Pathologie in the same way as Finke (1795) and Hirsch (1860) used 
“historical-geographical pathology.” 
Because of his training, in the late 1930s while he was exiled in Peru, 
the Peruvian government commissioned him to write a report on health 
in Amazonia, which became the basis for his book La vida en la Amazonia 
Peruana (Kuczynski-Godard, 1944), published in Spanish. We consider 
this to be the first fieldwork-based monograph in modern medical 
anthropology in the tradition of what social medicine was capable of 
when it shifted its interest from the European and American lower classes 
and began to study the effects of capitalism on aboriginal communities. 
Kuczynski did not limit himself to describing the differences in the 
pathologies he observed, but applied to his data —not without a certain 
naiveté because of the novelty of what he was doing— a professional 
ethnographic gaze influenced by American cultural anthropology. He 
developed a sophisticated Marxist interpretation to explain the effects 
of the labor relations imposed by the rubber industry on the indigenous 
15 [New Medical Tasks in the New Russia]. For a detailed discussion of this work, see 
Knipper (2005, 2009). 
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workers they hired, and it is likely that this is the reason why his work was 
not very well received by the new rightist government in Peru. 
Kuczynski’s book, and the work of two anthropologists, the Italian 
Ernesto de Martino (1961) on the Italian mezzogiorno during the 1950s 
and 1960s, and the Argentinian Eduardo Menéndez (1981) in Yucatán 
(Mexico) in the late 1970s, constitute three key sources for the political 
economy approach to processes of health, illness and care, and seminal 
references for a critical medical anthropology. The differences among them 
lie in the fact that Kuczinsky was a classical Marxist while De Martino and 
Menéndez were strongly influenced by Gramsci’s work. 
The concepts of “ethnic”, “geographical”, “comparative” and 
“historical-geographical” pathology are of considerable importance in 
medical taxonomy. Their aim was to classify diseases and symptoms on 
the basis of clinical criteria and describe the local diversity of prevalent 
diseases. The emergence of these concepts is related to the development of 
the second step in the process of medicalization under the hegemony of 
the hygiene-sanitation model and the fight against infectious diseases. In 
the field of social medicine, they had effects on the further development 
of transcultural psychiatry (Kirmayer, 2013) and on some features of 
intercultural health (Aguirre-Beltran, 1947), and eventually on the 
recent formulation of ‘cultural competence’.
The American Medical Association (AMA) is committed to responding 
to the dramatic changes in the nation’s demographics and in health care 
delivery systems in many ways. Recently, for example, the AMA signed 
a Memorandum of Understanding with the Henry J. Kaiser Foundation 
to partner on a nationwide initiative to increase medical professionals’ 
awareness about racial and ethnic disparities in cardiac care. Representative 
of the AMA’s work in this regard is the Cultural Competence Compendium, 
a 460-page resource guide to help physicians and other health professionals 
communicate with patients and provide individualized, respectful, patient-
centered care (AMA, 1999).
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From Volksmedizin to folk medicine
The term Volksmedizin appears for the first time in Die vier Grundpfeiler 
der Volksmedizin, das Blutlassen, Brechen, Abführen und die äusserlichen 
Mittel (Heidenreich, 1826).16 This brief manual, which resembles the 
popular “domestic medicine” books of the time, presents a critique of 
popular healing practices and the behavior of those who prefer home 
remedies to medicine: practices the author considers dangerous. The first 
chapter establishes when the doctor should be called, and the following 
four chapters explain the perils of bleeding, induced vomiting, enemas, 
and the use of homemade salves, ointments and plasters. 
Table 4. Examples of books on domestic medicine and its terminology




Die vier Grundpfeiler der Volksmedizin, 





Modern Domestic Medicine; or, A Popular 
Treatise Illustrating the Character, 
Symptoms, Causes, Distinction, and 
Correct Treatment, of All Diseases Incident 
to the Human Frame; Embracing All the 
Modern Improvements in Medicine, with 









Volksgeneeskunde: nieuwe en eenvoudige 




1824 Colon, P. 





Diccionario de medicina popular III 
en que se descrevem, em linguagem 
accomodada à intelligencia das pessoas 
estranhas á arte de curar
16 [The Four Pillars of Traditional Medicine: Blood-letting, Emetics, Purgatives and External 
Remedies].
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The term Volksgeist, the basis of 19th century folklore studies (see 
Vermeulen, 2008), gave rise to the use of the derivative term Volkmedizin 
in Germany (Flügel, 1863).17 In the United Kingdom, G.W. Black 
adopted it in his book Folk-Medicine: A Chapter in the History of Culture, 
as did Hoffman (1889) in the United States, in Folk-Medicine of the 
Pennsylvania Germans.18 Some examples are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5. The international translations of Volksmedizin
Terminology Year Comelles Title
Volksmedizin (D) 1863 Flügel 
Volksmedizin und Aberglaube im 















Hirte & Leibert 
Några ord om öronsjukdomarna i den 
skånska folkmedicinen
[A few words about childhood diseases 





Overtroiske kurer og folkemedisin i 
Norge/Frosken og padden i nordisk 
folkemedisin
[Superstitious cures and folk medicine 




1891 Cock, A. de Volksgeneeskunde in Vlaanderen





Medicina popular (Spanish translation 
by A. Machado y Alvarez)
17 It was translated into Danish as folkemedicin, into Swedish as folkmedicinen, into 
Norwegian as folkmedicinen, and into Dutch as Volksgeneeskunde, to designate medical 
folklore specifically (see Table 4).
18 See Miller (2008) for a discussion of the introduction of the concept of folk medicine 
into English. 
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Volksmedizin became, in Romance languages, medicina popular 
(Spanish Catalan, and Portuguese), médecine populaire (French), and 
medicina popolare (Italian). By contrast, in folklore studies of health and 
illness the preferred terms were superstitions, supersticiones or préjugés, 
and preocupaciones. 
In his translation of Black’s (1883) book, the Spanish folklorist 
Machado y Álvarez (Black, [1889]1982) used medicina popular. 
Machado probably chose medicina popular because of the advice he sought 
from a physician friend, Federico Rubio y Galí, while translating Black. 
Their correspondence, published as an annex in the Spanish translation 
of Black, is interesting. Rubio y Galí not only rejected the idea that folk 
medicine was a mere curiosity, but stressed its pragmatic value and the 
efficacy of botanical remedies, many of which had been incorporated into 
medical pharmacopeia (Perdiguero-Gil & Ballester Añón, 2003). 
This pragmatism was also observed by an Italian folklorist who was a 
contemporary of Black: 
Do not imagine that empirical remedies are always harmful. This is not always 
so. Most of the time they are based on centuries of experience. What would 
people do living in the country where they rarely see doctors, or call them 
only when the patient is already nearing the end, if they could not resort to 
traditional remedies? (De Nino, 1891: Vol. V). 
De Nino’s position is close to that of some Italian medici condotti 
(rural GPs) of his time. Paolo Mantegazza (1870), Zeno Zanetti (1891) 
and Giuseppe Pitrè (1896) were committed to providing medical care 
to the rural population (Bartoli, 1984, Perdiguero-Gil & Comelles 
2014), but also to learning to understand their own health care practices 
(Bartoli, 1984). They were not interested in “ethnic pathology”, but in a 
much broader way of knowing similar to the early 20th century Austrian 
Kulturkreise19 school, identifying cultural fields or areas relative to health 
and illness through the use of ethnography rather than through the clinical 
gaze (Comelles, Riccò, & Perdiguero-Gil, 2014; Comelles, 1996). 
19 Kulturkreis is the singular form, and Kulturkreise is the plural. This concept was rendered 
in English by the Boasians as ‘culture areas’.
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The ethnographic work of the Italian condotti20 should be viewed 
as the foundational act of medical anthropology, not merely because 
of the data they collected but for their theoretical and methodological 
contribution to the delimitation of this field. Zeno Zanetti (1892) began 
tentatively by identifying the primordial role of women in the production 
and reproduction of knowledge and practice; this was later more fully 
developed and systematized by Pitrè.21 In his book Medicina popolare 
siciliana (Pitrè, 1896) he lays out a research methodology that goes far 
beyond the notion of ethnic pathology when he writes: 
If there is a genre that requires a specialist researcher, it is the field of medicine. 
Working from general knowledge alone it is possible to study mythology, 
dress […] but it would be difficult, in my opinion, to study medical practices 
and beliefs unless one is a doctor. The reason is that in the field of medicine 
it is hard for non-doctors to distinguish what is considered error from what 
is science, the practices of today from those of times past, what was and is 
superstition. This is why there is confusion in the medical texts of non-doctors 
between scientific remedies treated as old wives’ tales and frivolous remedies 
taken for things that have come directly from the scientific laboratory (Pitrè 
1896:VII).
Pitrè did not think in purely clinical terms. He spent three decades 
of his life as a rural GP, during which time he was not only a doctor but 
an ethnographer and one of the most important professional folklorists 
in the Europe of his time. Medicina popolare presents the nosology 
characteristic of late 19th-century Sicily, using academic nosography but 
grounding it in extremely rigorous ethnographic fieldwork. The resulting 
Sicilian Kulturkreis is not simply a miscellaneous folk category like the 
Vergleichende Pathologie promoted by Kraepelin, but a specific cultural 
subcategory based on the notion of culture area found in the work of the 
cultural anthropologists who were his contemporaries: Boas, Rivers, and 
Graebner, among others. 
20 The condotto was the medical officer in rural Italy. The term comes from the Latin 
conductio (hiring), and represents a contractual relationship between a town and a doctor 
(Nutton, 1981). 
21 For more on Pitrè, see Comelles (1996), Charuty (1997) and Diasio (1999). 
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From folk diseases to culture-bound syndromes
Pitrè’s (1896) work is also an exhaustive survey of the folk illnesses he 
observed and systematized. His book follows the structure of a treatise on 
pathology according to location in the body, but his nosography has an 
extraordinarily ethnographic quality, locating the description of the illness 
in specific contexts, using Sicilian terms to demonstrate the rigor of his 
observations. This breaks with the folklorists’ classificatory criteria, as Zeno 
Zanetti (1891) also did. The folklorists neither understood nor used this 
approach in their own work. Table 6 shows the main European sources for 
the classification of folklore on health, illness and treatment before 1939.
Table 6. Medical and health topics 
in the classifications of European folklore
Country Year Author and title Terminology
Portugal 1885
Teófilo Braga 
O povo portugues 
Folk psychology
Superstitions (religion and myth)
Germany 1903
R.F. Kaindl, Die Volkskunde: 
ihre Bedeutung, ihre Ziele 
und ihre Methode mit 
besonderer Berücksichtigung 
ihres Verhältnisses su den 
historischen Wissenschaften
Folk medicine
Catalonia 1912 Cels Gomis
Medicine: superstitious medicine, 




Rossend Serra i Pagès Family life: disease
Catalonia 1929 Rossend Serra i Pagès
Life events: disease, tools related to 










The Museum of Antwerp 
Guide




Charlotte Burne Disease and folk medicine
Sweden 1915 C. W. Von Sydow Diseases and remedies
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Denmark 1917 Dansk Folkemindesamling
Beliefs: body, magic, evil protection, 
pregnancy and delivery
Superstitions: diseases, death, delivery
Norway 1917
Reider Th Cristiansen. 
Nordisk Folkemindesamling





d documents et d’exemples. 




Emile Nourry, [aka Pierre 
Saint Yves]
Popular science, folk medicine
Domestic magic
The cult of saint’s miracles
Social life: sick people. Care. hospitals 
and asylums
France 1933




Arnold Van Gennep Le 
folklore de Flandre et du 
Hainaut
Magic, folk medicine
These classifications reveal the gulf separating the folkloric gaze and its 
taxonomies from the physician-folklorists’ concept of “folk medicine”: the 
term used to identify studies of this type from the end of the 19th century 
until the mid-20th century in southern Europe. Pitrè’s ethnographic work 
and that of the other Italian and Spanish condotti22 should be understood 
as the product of a kind of medicine that required knowledge of the local 
pathologies that led people in remote rural areas to consult doctors when 
they could do so. Although these medical doctors were conscious of their 
acculturating and medicalizing role, as folklorists their concern was to 
preserve local cultural knowledge at risk of disappearing. The shortcomings 
of “medical folklore” lay in its positivism and the interpretive limitations of 
late 19th-century anthropology. It went no further than explaining these 
forms of knowledge and practice as a product of syncretism and interpreted 
them as survivals (Perdiguero & Comelles, 2014). 
22 An institution similar to the condotti existed in Catalonia, where public medical officers 
were called conduits.
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The contributions of Pitrè and Zanetti to folklore theory and medical 
practice did not inspire many followers outside southern European 
medicine (Perdiguero & Comelles, 2014). Their work – like Kuczynski’s 
at a later time —was forgotten, in part because Spanish and Italian were 
languages of marginal importance in scientific medicine (Comelles, 
2002). Even those who based the structure of their own medical folklore 
monographs on Pitrè’s work, such as Victor Lis Quibén (1949) in Spain, 
did not even bother to cite him. Folklore studies would remain anchored 
for decades in the traditional classifications shown in Table 5. Medical 
folklore as such slowly vanished from southern Europe in the mid-20th 
century because of the growing lack of social commitment on the part 
of the southern European GPs (Perdiguero & Comelles, 2014). In the 
English-speaking world, Rivers (2010), a medical doctor and psychiatrist, 
is regarded as the point of departure of medical anthropology on the 
basis of a slender volume, Medicine, Magic and Religion, a collection of 
his lectures on anthropology addressed to a medical audience. Neither he 
nor professional anthropology, of which he was one of the main founders, 
showed any interest in the folklore of the European peasantry. 
A worried world: from “folk medicine” to “medical concerns” 
Earlier genealogies of international medical anthropology stressed 
the dissociation between the hegemonic clinical gaze and a subaltern 
ethnographic gaze in medicine, and between a hegemonic ethnographic 
gaze and a subaltern clinical gaze in medical anthropology. Today, 
ethnically based nosographies maintain their importance but in a different 
way. For some medical specialties such as psychiatry, clinical psychology or 
transcultural psychiatry, they are necessary tools for developing culturally 
specific diagnostic and therapeutic strategies adapted to ethnic and 
cultural diversity. Medical anthropology has made it possible to develop 
more culturally appropriate clinical and therapeutic practices, despite the 
reservations sometimes expressed by academic medical anthropologists, 
who often show little interest in the clinically applied dimension of their 
work, and little understanding of the practical uses to which doctors, 
psychiatrists, psychologists and nurses have put the theoretical approaches 
and analytic concepts the discipline has generated.23 Nevertheless, at the 
23 See Comelles & Martínez-Hernáez, 1993; Martínez-Hernáez & Comelles, 1994; 
Martínez-Hernáez, 2008; and Saillant & Genest, 2007. 
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same time, the incorporation of qualitative research techniques into 
global health is not accompanied by acknowledgment of their origins 
in ethnography, or recognition of the fact that in the 20th century 
ethnography was an important tool of medical knowledge (Comelles, 
1998, 2000).
However, after World War II, the International Union for Health 
Promotion and Education (IUHPE) and three agencies of the United 
Nations – the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) – all advocated a greater role for 
ethnography in the development of diversity-sensitive health promotion 
policies and an emphasis on maintaining health rather than treating 
disease (Comelles et alii, 2014; Terrón, Comelles & Perdiguero-Gil, 
2017). As a consequence, Mexico and other Latin American countries 
developed intercultural health programs (Menéndez, 2016).
This new emphasis on health began to penetrate contemporary folk 
culture beginning in the second half of the 20th century and reveals a shift 
away from the old “disease-sanitation” model and toward a new model 
based on “well-being”. This transition implies changes in the agenda of 
medicalization and also affects the agenda of medical anthropology and of 
modern health promotion and education. 
This shift in emphasis also affects the ways in which anthropologists 
and doctors classify forms of distress. Concepts such as social suffering, 
affliction, and emergent problems that affect wellbeing, such as bullying 
and mobbing, require us to revise some long-held notions. Today the 
rigidity of the ethnic and cultural typologies of earlier times as described 
in this chapter renders them unsuitable in the context of globalization, of 
which medicalization is one dimension. In a globalized world, the notion 
of culture has to be more dynamic and highly diversified. Appadurai 
(1996) characterizes it as an ethnoscape: a fluid, flexible and dynamic space 
in which people make decisions about health, illness and treatment. Its 
main feature is volatility as a result of continuous shifts in meaning, in 
which market processes and social media play a major role. 
One example of this is corporate advertising of functional foods 
(foods designed to enhance health and prevent disease), a process that 
has escaped the control of health professionals and is being driven 
instead by specialists in mass communication (Egbe, Alegre Agis & 
Comelles, 2017). Danacol, for example, a popular low-fat fermented 
236
Josep M. Comelles & Susan M. DiGiacomo
dairy product enriched with plant sterols and advertised as “clinically 
proven” to reduce blood cholesterol levels and thereby reduce the risk 
of a heart attack, is a response to a widespread lay “medical concern” 
constructed through multiple social processes: biomedical research, the 
findings of which are reported in highly summarized, simplified and 
occasionally sensationalized form to the general public through news 
coverage in the print and electronic media; medical advice to individual 
patients concerning reduction of their cholesterol levels through dietary 
changes in order to avoid a heart attack; advertising; Internet sources 
of information and online information-sharing communities; and free-
floating health anxieties in the general population that lead individuals to 
suspect that they may be heart attack candidates and wonder what they 
can do to prevent one.
“Medical concerns”, then, is not an etic category comparable to susto 
or nervios and constructed by anthropologists, but an emic folk category 
that reflects popular demands relative to problems of health and illness 
that take the form of constructions which, like “cholesterol” and “high 
blood pressure”, are built up out of the everyday flow of information 
and opinion. The very nature of contemporary ethnoscapes makes these 
medical concerns and demands fluid and changeable, sometimes with 
great rapidity. This new arena of health and illness takes us far from 
Kleinman’s (1980) three-part model of “popular”, “folk” and “professional” 
sectors of health care, which was bound to an idea of clinical response to 
disease through the classificatory and diagnostic criteria of biomedicine, 
and dependent on the concept of syncretism present in Ackerknecht’s 
(1985) definition of folk medicine, a notion that is no longer applicable. 
Today the face-to-face encounters that took place (historically speaking) 
between health professionals and their patients and served both to 
produce a diagnosis and to construct the diagnostic experience of patients 
and their social networks has now broadened beyond recognition. In 
a “worried and wired” world (Eastin & Guinsler, 2006), laypersons 
increasingly seek medical advice not only from their doctors; using ever 
more powerful search technologies, they have gained access to sources 
of medical information on the Internet, some more reliable than others, 
and their medical concerns are in part driven by exposure to direct 
advertising of new medications and functional foods in both the print 
and electronic media. This worried demand for information materializes 
in online medical search and web browsing behavior organized around 
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“medical concerns” (White & Horvitz, 2009a; 2012) arising from broad 
social conversations about health (see Barsky, 1988) that now take place 
in part through social media. At present, medical diagnosis is no longer 
based exclusively on responding to illness but increasingly on responding 
to these “medical concerns”. In some cases, patients search for additional 
information about an existing diagnosis, often sharing this information 
with their physicians; in others, they consult their physicians seeking 
confirmation of a self-diagnosis based on an interpretation of their 
symptoms through information found on the Web (White & Horvitz, 
2009b). As an emic category, “medical concerns” may prove to be the 
basis of a new folk nosology that should be understood not in terms of 
biomedical disease categories but as a continuous process of construction 
and deconstruction of new threats to health and sometimes to life.
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AFTERWORD
ANTHROPOLOGY AND DIAGNOSIS: 
BIOMEDICAL DISEASES AND THEIR BORDERS
Simon Cohn
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
simon.cohn@lshtm.ac.uk
The contributions in this volume, which follow on from a very successful 
workshop on the subject in June 2016, highlight the diverse ways 
contemporary medical anthropology can productively engage with the 
topic of diagnosis. The chapters have not only covered the practices and 
consequences of diagnosis, but also the broader context that both shapes, 
and is subsequently shaped by, individual encounters with distress and 
suffering. A key theme that can be traced throughout many of them is that 
studying diagnosis entails two inextricably linked perspectives. The first 
entails an extended account of what people do and how they interact with 
each other, both before and after a diagnosis may be reached. This charting 
of all the various actors involved might loosely be termed the “who” of 
diagnosis. The second perspective looks at diagnosis as a fundamental 
individual and social event, that not only names a condition, but often 
determines the hopes, expectations, treatment options and cultural 
meanings associated with the disorder. In other words, this perspective 
collectively addresses the “why” dimension of diagnosis. 
By drawing on both of these, and thinking about them in combination, 
I want to introduce a third focus we might wish to adopt —one that is 
touched on by some of the contributions, but perhaps not explicitly so. 
I want to suggest some of the ways in which diagnostic practices are as 
much about “containing” as they are about “identifying”. By this, I mean 
that the intrinsically social and material processes of diagnosis do not 
simply uncover a pre-existing disease, but make it present through acts 
of discrimination and demarcation. This is not a new point of course, and 
has now become a central argument of more STS-informed research, such 
as that by Mol (see for example, Mol, 1999) and those influenced by her 
work. But here I want to argue it has the potential to stimulate medical 
250
Simon Cohn
anthropology to do much more than highlight the more obvious ways in 
which cultural meanings are ascribed onto a biological reality, to include 
the ways in which forms of ill health are continuously delineated and 
acted upon in order to bring them in to the world as discrete entities. The 
consequence of this is that it can broaden the scope of our ethnographic 
enquiry beyond focussing on “who” and “why”, to also include the “what” 
itself. This, then, is a call to go beyond simply addressing how conditions 
might be socially constructed, which arguably has now become such 
a tired term that it offers little in the way of cultural insight or critique 
(Hacking, 1999), to emphasise how diagnosis is, ultimately, the process 
of “making up” disease. As a result, in addition to the more traditional 
concerns—such as how power and meaning might be articulated through 
diagnostic practices via the body of a patient— precisely how diseases 
emerge as biological entities is itself both a political and ethical matter.
Over the years, many studies have focused on biomedicine’s 
classification of disease - how categories come and go, split or collapse 
into each other —and the different kinds of evidential practices drawn 
on in these processes (see for example, Cambrosio, Keating, Schlich 
et alii, 2006; Timmermans, Bowker & Star, 1998). The point about any 
classification system, in the abstract at least, is that everything should 
fit together; individual entities should be unique and universal, and no 
element should overlap with another (Turnbull, 2000). The overall 
taxonomic system is thereby understood as an exercise in segmenting an 
existing, singular, stable world. So it is not surprising that spatial analogies 
are everywhere in biomedical accounts of disease; the literature is full of 
references to mapping, pathways, routes, entry points, structures, regions, 
zones, even “archipelagos” —all reinforcing the root territorial metaphor 
which not merely helps organise and explain, but actively shapes how 
individual diseases are conceived, and hence what the work of diagnosis 
should be. 
Of course, we are all too familiar with anatomical and pathological 
representations that follow on from a very particular gaze to establish 
where precisely a disease is located; one only has to think about latex 
models that point to The Islets of Langerhans within the pancreas as the 
location of Type I diabetes, or illustrations of cholesterol deposits within 
the major arteries as constituting the location of ischemic heart disease. 
What is key, though, is that it is the stance of the observer that determines 
the position, and nature, of the observed (Cartwright & Crowder, 
2017). In addition to such depictions, the very same diseases are also 
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routinely plotted on to geographical and political maps to represent such 
things as rates of incidence, prevalence or differential distributions that 
betray entrenched social health inequalities (see for example Gatrell, 
Popay & Thomas, 2004). The result is that diagnosing a specific condition 
serves to mark out a terrain not only “in the body” but also beyond it: 
In other words, locating a disease and demarcating its borders not only 
happens in terms of which specific part of a body might be affected, or 
even what whole-body physiological system might be disrupted, but 
also pertaining to what groups of people, what social circumstances, and 
what populations. The biomedical “what”, then, does not solely refer to 
organs and tissues within a body, but also beyond the body, to include its 
distribution and characteristics throughout the environmental plane. As a 
consequence, diagnosis frequently takes place across a very heterogeneous 
terrain, drawing together such things as bodily signs, subjective accounts 
and epidemiological trends, in order to solidify some sense of the disease 
that occupies a unique position in this multifarious space. 
However, there are currently at least two major forces emerging 
within biomedicine that have the potential to unsettle this general sense 
of ordering and the underlying logic of segmentation. In the face of these, 
diagnostic practices are increasingly straining to maintain the idea that 
diseases can and do exist discretely, and that they have their own unique 
aetiology, distinctive pattern of symptoms and differential procedures. 
The result is that some diseases, at least, have already become surprisingly 
fragile objects as they jostle alongside each other in the clinical landscape, 
potentially blurring boundaries in a world that increasingly presents 
itself as complex, fluid and unstable. The first threat to the traditional 
organisation of disease is the direct result of contemporary post-genomic 
research. Proponents argue that these new forms of knowledge, many of 
which are driven by technological advances, will result in greater diagnostic 
precision, more accurate prognosis and new forms of treatment. Take the 
following proclamation:
With the complete sequence of the human genome a reality, and with a 
growing body of transcriptomic, proteomic, and metabolomic datasets in 
health and disease, we are now in a unique position in the history of medicine 
to define human disease precisely, uniquely, and unequivocally, with optimal 
sensitivity and specificity (Loscalzo, Kohane & Barabasi, 2007).
The central argument the authors present is that any gaps or 
uncertainties in the “old system” —especially between consolidating 
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clinical with biological knowledge— will eventually give way to definitive 
evidence from new fields of science, and hence that increased granularity 
will lead to more precision and clarity of the boundaries of individual 
diseases. Now, I do not question the sincerity or enthusiasm expressed in 
such a project. But I do doubt that the quest will be quite so straightforward. 
Indeed, already within both neuropsychiatry and physical medicine, new 
forms of knowledge and evidence are arising that simply do not fit into 
the old systems of classification. For example, attempts to demonstrate the 
underlying pathology of schizophrenia through brain imaging studies are 
not merely suggesting neuroanatomical correlates and specific “abnormal” 
activity patterns of certain regions of the brain, as might be expected, but 
are increasingly suggesting different and more particular ways to conceive 
of the condition, causing some to question the utility and uniqueness of 
the original disease classification itself (Pantelis, Yücel, Wood et alii, 
2005). It is as though the biology, as it is being revealed through these new 
techniques, is emerging somewhat differently to the way the world had 
been understood and organised previously. The rise of new technologies 
and ways to conceive pathology may well introduce greater detail, but with 
that detail comes greater complexity, and in turn, new areas of ambiguity 
and ambivalence are almost inevitable. Although one might assume that 
the straightforward response is to split and subdivide existing categories, 
instead something far more fundamental is happening, whereby the very 
way in which categories are established at all is being questioned. 
The second major force that is being exerted on the current way 
biomedicine conceives diseases, and hence what practices of diagnosis 
must entail, could be said to be happening in the opposite direction across 
the borders of existing disease entities. Rather than trying to understand 
current disease objects in greater and greater detail, a parallel trend 
is demanding a broadening of scope, to understand how they might 
intimately relate to each other. In an era when people are both living 
longer and are suffering from a greater number of non-communicable 
diseases globally, the rising prevalence of what is generally called multi-
morbidity is presenting itself as a growing problem for medical care. 
Although sometimes used interchangeably with the term co-morbidity, 
multi-morbidity simply refers to the increasingly common occurrence of 
people living with more than one condition. This is obviously challenging 
the existing provision of healthcare resources and often requires intricate 
medication regimes. But, in addition, simply keeping individual diseases 
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distinct is becoming harder and harder to do (Mangin & Jamoulle, 
2012). This is not only because they frequently need to be addressed in 
parallel, but because the conditions, therapies, and side effects commonly 
interact with each other. 
In a much-cited paper published over 40 years ago, the clinician 
Feinstein, originator of the disease-illness distinction, already foresaw 
that:
problems of classification of human illness were not particularly important in 
the days when so much epidemiological and clinical science was concerned 
with epidemics of acute infectious disease… But the problems have become 
major barriers to scientific progress in the modern era of chronic diseases, 
which have diverse clinical spectrum and a multiplicity of associated ailments 
(Feinstein, 1970).
The current trend is that new, broader categories are regularly being 
employed to encompass this clustering of conditions that Feinstein alludes 
to. Often these new constellations still make sense to current biomedical 
understanding and the existing classification of conditions. For example, 
following large scale longitudinal studies, the term “cardiovascular disease” 
is ever more used as an overarching category to encompass such things as 
hypertension, angina, atherosclerosis and heart disease (see Kannel & 
Mcgee, 1979). Similarly, obesity, glucose intolerance, high blood lipids 
and elevated blood pressure are now often grouped under a generalised 
“metabolic syndrome” label, not simply because they are frequently 
associated together, but because in combination they raise the risk of 
Type II diabetes and coronary heart disease (Alberti, Zimmet & Shaw, 
2005). This use of broader clinical categories is not without controversy, 
of course, especially given the strategic role the pharmaceutical industry 
often play in these formulations, but the medical community is largely 
agreed that this is an appropriate way of acknowledging the reality of a 
constellation of conditions.
However, some examples of multi-morbidity are more problematic 
for the current biomedical paradigm to make sense of, and are thereby 
much harder to contain within the current understanding of what goes 
where, and how things relate. For example, Type II diabetes is statistically 
associated with clinical depression (Roy & Lloyd, 2012). It is not that one 
can be said to cause the other; large-scale studies have shown that being first 
diagnosed with depression does not increase the likelihood of becoming 
diabetic, and that having diabetes does not then lead to depression. As one 
clinician hesitantly told me, “They seem to go together. But we don’t know 
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why. I mean, they go together, but they shouldn’t…”. The problem is that by 
initially thinking about each disease as a separate entity, occupying its own 
territory, means that when they are regularly seen occurring alongside 
each other demands that they are understood as somehow being causally 
related. It is not surprising that a major line of enquiry has been to discover 
potential interactions between conditions that originally were conceived 
of as distant and unconnected. Lab scientists, clinicians, epidemiologists, 
statisticians, and others are now broadening their gaze and enlisting new 
elements, such as psychosocial variables that might trigger a biochemical 
stress response, or burdens on the immune system might radically alter 
hormonal activity. Despite these attempts, establishing any coherent and 
agreed understanding is failing to establish any definitive causal directions 
behind these increasingly common associations. 
Perhaps as a response, such instances are frequently described as 
“complex”, referring to the fact that they require multiple diagnoses, and 
multiple treatments at the same time. As one doctor told me, “we are 
increasingly having to deal with complex cases… complex patients…..” 
But complexity is not an inherent feature of the world; rather, it is assigned 
by the observer in an the attempt to divide, separate, act and maintain 
a particular version of it. So by describing both cases and patients as 
“complex” can be interpreted as serving a very specific purpose – a 
pragmatic tactic to hold on to the existing biomedical world, and ultimately 
keeping diseases distinct by simply describing them as intertwined. The 
problem is that certain conditions appear to have a relational affinity 
with each other, which may never be able to be reduced to material 
causation, precisely because of their original partitioning. The result is 
that in combination they seem to manifest unique and emergent issues, 
that not only are novel and perhaps unpredictable, but have the potential 
to undermine the distinct nature of diseases from which the notion of 
complexity and multiplicity arises. 
My general point —from both the challenges arising from greater 
details accumulated about specific conditions, and the challenges of trying 
to relate conditions that were once thought of as distinct— is that these 
processes cannot be simply conceived of in terms of lumping and splitting. 
The emerging categories do far more than merely circumscribe existing 
biological understandings of individual diseases; beyond merely a label, 
these new ways of ordering actively determine the nature of biological 
knowledge that is deemed applicable and germane. But I do not want to 
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end this discussion by suggesting that these difficulties of locating and 
discriminating different diseases arise without reference to real-world 
specificities. Rather, the very sense that there is an underlying logic is itself 
always the product of everyday practices, many of which are so routine 
and commonplace that they simply do not get acknowledged. And so it 
is here that anthropology has a particular role to play —to highlight the 
ways in which everyday social life serves to reproduce and reaffirm a sense 
of order. For example, with the continual division and multiplication of 
categories, and in the face of rapidly diminishing healthcare resources, 
one response in the UK has been the controversial strategy not only 
that general practice consultations should not only average 10 mins, but 
a “one appointment, one problem” policy. This was an attempt to stop 
those people who would regularly come with a long list of problems and 
block the system for everyone else – so called “repeaters”. But the act of 
an apparently innocuous poster on the waiting room wall that mandated 
this to patients meant that they too had to be complicit in the process 
of selecting and partitioning prior to their encounter with a doctor. This 
points to the fact that the commitment to discrete diseases not only 
establishes borders and boundaries, but demands ways to navigate, enter 
and pass through entry points and discrete zones.
I implied at the beginning that diagnosis, as it is currently practiced 
within biomedicine, is highly productive —in that the very reality of a 
disease emerges from the interactions of different people, the meanings 
that they assign, and the undoubted materiality of the body. And there 
is no doubt that a focus on diseases as biological things, rendering them 
as fixed, stable and located, has proved very useful. But I want to ask, at 
what costs? And what have been the limitations of this approach? In this 
volume several of the papers are already grappling with these questions, 
not only through a focus on the practices of biomedicine, but also the 
role of patients, their relatives, other health professionals and alternative 
healthcare providers. By exploring the wide range of people that are often 
involved, and their different understandings and representations of ill 
health and particular conditions, the notion that there is a definitive, and 
stable, disease object at the centre is unsettled. Here, I have simply taken 
this line of thinking just a little further, to question the very “reality” of 
discrete disease entities, not in terms of their manifestations in the present 
—which are often all too apparent and fleshy— but in terms of them 
existing as entities independent of those forces which produce them. 
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Looking both in terms of what falls within the territory of a disease, 
and how the boundaries of different territories might be blurring, I have 
proposed that the old logic of segmentation is increasingly under strain. 
Currently, diagnostic practices may well still be trying to circumscribe the 
old boundaries and defend the traditional way of ordering. But as a result, 
there seems to be little opportunity to escape its current constraints, 
and allow for different ways of thinking about ill health that might draw 
on different kinds of evidence, different approaches, and alternative 
ways of thinking about the living, and the failing, body. So perhaps as a 
beginning it falls to us as anthropologists to intervene, and find ways to 
avoid reproducing the spatializing way of thinking about disease entities 
and their boundaries that inevitably reproduce ideas of difference and 
contrast. We must instead listen, and recount, how people articulate their 
own experience and relate to their conditions as intrinsic and legitimate 
aspects of the lives they live.
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on questions of uncertainty and indeterminacy - not merely within 
scientific medical knowledge, but equally in relation to how the body is 
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Diagnostic procedures are emblematic of medical work. Scholars in 
the field of social studies of medicine identify diverse dimensions of 
diagnosis that point to controversies, processual qualities and contested 
evidence. In this anthology, diagnostic fluidity is seen to permeate 
diagnostic work in a wide range of contexts, from medical interactions 
in the clinic, domestic settings and other relations of affective work, 
to organizational structures, and in historical developments. The 
contributors demonstrate, each in their own way, how different 
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